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David Cohen* THE RELATIONSHIP OF CONTRACTUAL 
REMEDIES T O  POLITICAL AND SOCIAL 
STATUS: A PRELIMINARY INQUIRY? 
'And you see', Trollope makes Archdeacon Grantley say, 'land gives so 
much more than rent. It gives position and influence and political power, 
to say nothing about the game." 
What things 'give' is the very heart of the law of property. And what 
agreements 'give' is equally at the heart of the law of contract. No legal 
system could hope to develop at all unless it established rules defining the 
remedies available to enforce agreements or, put another way, insisting 
that one 'gets what one has been promised.' However we choose to define 
the substance of consensual obligations, we must include a reference to 
enforceability.' 
An individual who has had his contractual expectations shattered and 
goes to law in order to obtain compensation or performance premises his 
claim on the destruction of his perceived wealth, represented by his 
personal expectation of profit created at the instant of agreement.3 Both 
parties stand to gain by the exchange through the enjoyment of their 
respective profits which did not exist prior to the bargain. This loss of 
expected profit - which inheres in every exchange,4 but which need not 
necessarily take the form of financial reward - may be protected through a 
variety of legal and non-legal means; the former include the application of 
punitive sanctions, the imposition of a specific legal duty on the promisor 
ordering him to perform, or the imposition of a general legal duty 
mandating a transfer of money damages, in an amount objectively 
assessed by public authority. Traditional contract law has shown a 
well-entrenched predisposition towards the imposition of liability to pay 
damages, reflecting, one suspects, a philosophy of individualism which, 
while it provides the foundation for freedom to contract, at the same time 
nurtures a concomitant freedom to breach.5 
Thus even a preliminary inquiry as to the legal consequences of 
contractual failure reveals that the choices open to an individual to whom 
a consensual obligation is owed, upon discovering that the promised 
performance is not forthcoming, are both limited and well established. 
* Faculty of Law, University of British Columbia 
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He can, in some cases, demand that the promise be performed precisely 
(leaving aside the issue of temporal dislocation) as agreed - the archetyp- 
ical suit for delivery of the subject-matter of a contract of sale and the 
complementary action for the price. More commonly, society may limit 
contractual redress to a claim for monetary compensation for losses 
suffered as a consequence of the failure to p e r f ~ r m . ~  Why, one might ask, 
does society, through the medium of the law, sometimes restrict the 
choice to a substitutionary damage claim and yet in other cases allow, 
indeed in some instances compel, the claimant to insist on performance? 
A number of related theories have been proffered with varying degrees 
of success as possible analytical foundations for the primacy of damages in 
the common law of contract. The arguments have ranged from the 
protection of third-party claims in the case of executory contracts,' 
tautological reliance on the recognition of equitable interests protected by 
equitable remedies,' protection of individual liberty,g administrative 
costs,1° judicial deference," and costs of valuation of market and 
non-market goods1' to the distributive implications of specific perform- 
ance with respect to the relative wealth of the contracting parties.'S 
A recent contribution to this collection of doctrinal and interdiscipli- 
nary theories, or at least a different way of posing the question, has been 
offered by Calabresi and Melamed.14 They suggest that one can identify 
the nature of legal entitlements (or rights) as a consequence of the legal 
rules - including property rules, liability rules, and inalienability rules - 
which have evolved to protect and regulate the creation, use, transfera- 
bility, destruction, and other attributes of entitlements. A right or 
entitlement, let us say the right to privacy, may be said to be protected by a 
property rule if we allow appropriation of it by another only after 
bargaining; the taker must, before he deprives the present possessor of 
the entitlement of it, negotiate a purchase price. Thus when society 
protects a property right, it is not simply granting the owner of the right 
certain privileges with respect to the entitlement; it is actively forcing 
non-owners to refrain from interfering with the enjoyment of the right by 
its owner, unless the owner voluntarily consents to the interference. This 
consent to interference, if it is exacted in return for money, goods, 
services, or any other thing of value, consists of a bargained exchange 
whereby property is distributed and allocated among members of society. 
When we insist on this kind of negotiation we may be said to recognize a 
property right in the object. Other entitlements (or in other instances, the 
same entitlement in a different setting) are protected by liability rules, in 
which case the taker need not negotiate a price but must compensate the 
owner for the harm occasioned by the taking or interference. The classical 
examples given of this kind of entitlement are nuisance and negligence, 
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where, in many instances, because of the numbers of interested parties, 
the unintentional nature of the taking, or the imbalances in negotiation 
brought on by free riders and holdouts,'5 the costs of negotiation are 
prohibitive, foreclosing any realistic attempt at imposing property rules to 
protect entitlements. Finally, some entitlements, such as the right to life 
under most circumstances, are protected further by inalienability rules - 
the owner cannot sell, and the taker cannot lawfully take, with or without 
bargaining or ex post compensation. 
In a recent article, Kronman carried this analysis one step further, 
applying Calabresi and Melamed's thesis to contract entitlements: 
In contract law, a liability rule permits a promisor to breach his promise provided 
he compensates the other party by payment of money damages. The fundamental 
alternative to money damages, in the law of contracts, is specific performance. A 
promise may be said to be specifically enforceable when the law gives its owner, 
the promisee, a right to require the actual (or 'specific') performance of the 
promise. The right to positively enjoin a promise, like the right to negatively 
enjoin a nuisance, may be viewed as an entitlement protected by a property rule. 
In both cases, the owner of the right is in a position to force the would-be taker to 
negotiate a voluntary transfer of the particular entitlement. If the taker acts 
unilaterally (by simply refusing to perform, or by continuing to pollute), he can be 
compelled by an injunctive order to honour the owner's entitlement; and if he 
then refuses to honour the injunction itself, he may be forced to make a payment 
(not necessarily pecuniary) to the state or the promisee greater than that required 
to compensate the promisee for this loss.16 
Bentham long ago made a similar point: 'Property is nothing but the basis 
of expectation: the expectation of deriving certain1 advantages from a 
thing, which we are said to possess, in consequence of the relation in which 
we stand towards it.'' Applying Bentham's thesis to the thing of contract, 
one can quite readily perceive that contractual expectations are accorded 
widely diverse treatment in law. There is no doubt that all contractual 
entitlements are, at least in theory, valuable - the owner can assign the 
entitlement, receiving an immediate return rather than engaging in the 
risk and delay inherent in an executory transaction. He may, if a stranger 
interferes, obtain compensation for inducement of a breach of his con- 
tract which interferes with his expectations coming to fruition. And if his 
promisor fails to perform, he can often recover damages to compensate 
him for his losses. This wealth, however, is not property. It is property 
only if the law offers him the right to its continued existence, rather than 
mere compensation for its loss. As I have noted, however, this is not 
usually the case: 'Expectances are for most purposes not treated as 
property."8 
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Yet Calabresi and Melamed's contentions, with respect to the low cost of 
negotiation operating as an overriding incentive to the recognition of 
property rights (ie, the protection of entitlements by property rules), 
seem particularly apt in the contractual context. As Kronman points out, a 
priori the parties to the contract know one another, and thus one need not 
concern oneself with questions of search and identification,'g and many 
contracts, since they involve only two parties, obviate the difficulties 
caused by holdouts and free riders. For these reasons and others, one 
might have suspected that specific performance would have evolved as 
the preferred remedy in contract law. This has not been so, and it is 
obvious that other forces have been at play in the recognition and 
protection of contractual expectations through liability rules. The only 
species of contract that conforms to Kronman's analysis is the contract for 
the purchase and sale of real property. The most prominent exception to 
liability rules in contract - the specific enforcement of contracts relating to 
land - constitutes perhaps the final vestige of the historical subordination 
of contract to property.'" Contracts relating to land create performatory 
obligations 'as a matter of ~ourse . '~ '  But, of course, land is not 'unique' in 
any sense which would deny absolutely the capability to assess damages. 
Market prices (of a sort) are available to the courts in determining value, 
and notwithstanding ample evidence that the protection of entitlements 
by property rules may be explained by institutional limitations reflected in 
a judicial disinclination to engage in valuation in the absence of a market, 
incongruities in the law suggest that the foundation for the evolution of 
property rules to protect contractual entitlements must be found else- 
where." 
Perhaps specific performance in respect of land - the protection of real 
contractual entitlements by property rules - is not grounded in 'unique- 
ness,' liberty, or the avoidance of valuation errors. When one looks 
beyond the boundaries of specific performance one is immediately struck 
by the variety of relationships ranging from the treatinent of par01 
contracts under the Statute of Frauds's and special rights made available 
to defaulting mortgagors24 to the application of criminal sanctions to 
violations of contractual expectations,'5 which, where they involved the 
transfer of land, were so often imbued with bizarre legal characteristics. 
This diversity of judicial and legislative behaviour suggests that the 
rationale for the creation of property rights in contracts relating to land 
must be found elsewhere than in mere difficulties in assessment of value. 
Too many of us have been naively comfortable with a rule which 
authorizes a court to order specific performance (that is, to recognize 
property rights in contract) whenever it is just, or fair, or equitable, or 
reasonable to do so. Justice, fairness, equity, and reasonableness are, of 
Heinonline - -  32 U. Toronto L.J. 34 1982 
CONTRACTUAL REMEDIES AND POLITICAL AND SOCIAL STATUS 35 
course, values to which the law has aspired and which it will seek to achieve 
for eternity. The obvious difficulty with reliance on what we may call 
justice language is that the meaning of these concepts to one person is 
often precisely the opposite to that attributed to them by another. The 
language ofjustice and fairness is meaningless unless one gives it content. 
The traditional jurisprudence touching on the remedy of specific 
performance does offer some insight as to the underpinnings of justice. 
As I have outlined briefly, the 'uniqueness' of the object of the contract, 
the administrative costs of assessing damages, the risks of over- 
compensation or under-compensation, difficulties of mitigation, and the 
'inadequacy' of damages are the most common judicial rationalizations 
for ordering specific performance. More recently, as I have described, 
followers of economic analysis of law have offered more detailed 
explanations for ordering performance of contractual obligations. I hope 
in this essay to offer a somewhat different perspective on the foundations 
for the creation of property rights in contracts relating to land. No doubt 
the common law and economic explanations (assuming a difference to 
exist) are not entirely without merit. Nonetheless, the ancient and perva- 
sive relationship of land ownership with political identity, legal authority, 
and social status suggests that the rules relating to bargained exchanges of 
land may have some deeper meaning. My assumption, of course, is that 
the law of contract could not have developed in total isolation from the 
political, economic, and social values of the society which gave meaning to 
property. My task, however, is not merely of academic or historical 
relevance. If in fact the law has protected expectations under land 
contracts through specific performance, in implicit recognition of the 
non-economic political and social attributes of such exchanges, then if 
other kinds of contracts are now imbued with political and social 
attributes, we must seriously question whether property rules should be 
extended to reflect this transformation in cultural values. 
This paper has, then, two major themes. In the first part I hope to 
elucidate the relationship of political, legal, and social status associated 
with land ownership to the unique legal remedies - specific performance 
and non-recovery of damages - which society created in respect to ex- 
changes of land (and thus exchanges of status) for money. In the conclu- 
sion I examine the transformation of legal rules applied to agreements in 
which labour is exchanged for money. If, in fact, property rules in con- 
tract evolved in response to the political, legal, and social attributes of land 
ownership, then one may be able to perceive a metamorphosis in the 
nature of labour entitlements as the meaning and place of labour in 
society has evolved. I should point out as well that the purpose of this essay 
is not to deny that land contracts ought no longer to be protected by 
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property rules. It is less ambitious than that. My intent is to point out that 
many of the underlying social and political forces which created the 
traditional boundaries of specific performance are no longer extant. 
Other contracts which have nothing at all to do with real property may 
have replaced, or at least joined, land contracts as the focal point of social 
expectations and obligations. Wealth exists in numerous guises, many of 
which were unknown or even illegal when contract law developed in the 
eighteenth and nineteenth centuries. Private property, be it in tangible 
assets or contracts, is a delicate institution. If the law closes its eyes to social 
change and protects only one form of wealth to the exclusion of all others, 
it exists only to protect those who possess the former. 
Where, then, does one look for guidance in order to uncover the forces 
underlying the evolution of property rules in contract? What is this vast 
difference, this great 'moment' or 'special or fancy value' which justified 
the protection of contractual entitlements through property rules even 
where market value was ascertainable? One must search, it seems, outside 
the sphere of economic expectations - to understand the place of land in 
the constitutional, political, and social institutions of England during the 
formative stages of its legal development - if one is to appreciate fully the 
significance and role of property rules in respect of promissory entitle- 
ments. Maitland, writing in 1908, remarked that England's 'whole consti- 
tutional law seems at times to be but an appendix to the law of real 
property."6 One might equally posit that England's law of real property 
and contract is but a reflection of its constitutional law. This curious 
admixture of property rights, civil status, and political authority born of 
centuries of feudal economy and government remains hidden beneath 
the surface of the law, resulting in an intricate intermingling of private 
and public rights (and law). Only when it is examined closely does one 
grasp the subtle interests and influences which lie beneath apparent 
irrationality and arbitrariness. 
Our starting point in such an inquiry must be to acknowledge at least 
two implicit assumptions under which money damage awards are made. 
First, the protection of promissory entitlements by liability rules may 
presuppose an economic foundation for the contract." Second, it 
presumes the acceptability, in terms of popular cultural and social values, 
of public and collective monetization of the value of the owner's losses. If, 
in fact, we do not find the objective valuation of certain objects acceptable 
in terms of our social and cultural mores, or if the promissory entitlement 
has as its object the transfer of something other than economic wealth, 
then liability rules, involving an award of money damages, may succumb 
to the institution of property. The protection of promissory entitlements 
involving land evolved during the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, 
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indeed had become fixed, as property rules, by the turn of the nineteenth 
century; and if one is to appreciate fully the rationale for this unlikely 
occurrence, one must understand the cultural, social, economic, and 
political values of those times.28 
We begin with the obvious. Few would argue with the proposition that 
land constituted the most important form of economic wealth prior to the 
industrial revolution in England: 'A wealthy man was one who had 
extonsive holdings in land, the landless man was of little acc~unt . "~  The 
prccection of promissory entitlements in respect of land evolved in an age 
where the leading authority on real property could write in terms almost 
incomprehensible to the modern mind: 
In the early ages of Europe, property was chiefly of a substantial and visible, or, 
what lawyers call, a corporeal kind. Trade was little practised, and consequently 
debts were seldom incurred. There were no public funds, and of course no 
funded property. The public wealth consisted principally of land, and the houses and 
buildings erected upon it ,  of the cattle in the fields, and the goods in the houses. Now 
land, which is immovable and indestructable, is evidently a different species of 
property from a cow or a sheep, which may be stolen, killed, eaten; or from a chair 
or a table, which may be broken up or burnt. 
There is now perhaps as much personal property in the country as real; possibly there may 
be more. Real property, however, still retains many of its ancient laws, which invest 
it with an interest and importance to which personal property has no claim.sO 
Protection of entitlements in respect of land evolved in a society whose 
entire economic foundation was 'based and centred on land.'g1 
Of equal or greater importance is that the economic characteristics of 
land as they existed in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries were 
radically different from those which exist today. It has been said, for 
example, that the aggregate value of land in the i 800s 'remained in real 
money terms, about the same as it was in ... 1066,'s' and Dicey, explaining 
the failure of nineteenth-century land reform in England, wrote at the 
end of that century that 'land is not a lucrative investment.'ss Corbin's 
rationale for the emergence of the rule in Bain v Fothergill34 denying 
recognition of a purchaser's expectation interest on breach of a contract 
for the sale of land suggests that land in England was not purchased in the 
hope of a rapid appreciation in price.35 In 1894 Mayne, writing of the time 
at which damages are to be assessed for breach of an executed contract to 
sell land, was unable to find any English authority on the right of the 
purchaser to recover the appreciated value of the land at the time of 
eviction, instead reviewing the considerable American authority on 
point.36 This stability in land prices was openly acknowledged by the 
judiciary. In 1786, the Supreme Court of Connecticut justified its 
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reluctance to adopt an English principle restricting damage remedies in 
respect of land contract in the following terms: 'the diversity ... between 
British practice and ours is undoubtedly founded in the permanent worth 
of their land, as an old country, and the increasing worth of ours as a new 
country.37 
While land may have been in demand during the seventeenth and 
eighteenth c e n t ~ r i e s , ~ ~  the incentives for contracting were apparently not 
pecuniary. 
The seventeenth century merchants who bought land were diverting capital into 
an investment that promised no better than a five percent return. Had they left 
their money in the city, they could have been assured of a ten percent return. 
These individuals were willing to accept a lesser income because they coveted the 
prestige that went with the land. The new men were more interested in behaving 
like landed gentlemen than in earning the kind of profit that would lure a true 
capitalist. The landed gentlemen remained the ideal to which all propertied 
classes aspired.39 
For the most part expected economic returns on capital investment in 
land were generally 'not as high as those to be earned from commerce, 
finance and office-holding.'4" The agricultural purposes to which land 
was put, the practice of granting only leases at will which destroyed any 
incentive in the landlords' tenants to improve their lot, and the doctrine of 
primogeniture which gave the land to the landowner's eldest son only, 
while allocating the capital resources which would allow its improvement 
to the younger children, led Mill to conclude the 'Landed Property in 
England is ... very far from completely fulfilling the conditions which 
render its existence economically justifiable.'4' 
The stability of land prices in England can be contrasted with the 
speculative characteristics of the land economy in North America. In 
America, land was bought and sold in relative freedom, at least in part 
because of its seemingly infinite supply during the post-revolutionary era 
in the United States and, until far more recently, in Canada.4' As early as 
1824, a majority of the New York High Court of Errors noted that 'every 
member of this Court must be well aware how much property is held by 
contract; that purchases are constantly made upon speculation; that the 
value of real estate is fluctuating,'43 and Chancellor Kent spoke of the 
ruinous and oppressive injury which would be incurred by a seller of land 
if he were to be held liable to a purchaser for the rise in value of the land if 
a defect in title were discovered in the future.44 Land in Canada was 
subject to similar appreciations in price brought on by the combined 
forces of urban development and immigration during the nineteenth 
century.45 
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As history all too clearly teaches us, the agrarian economy of pre- 
industrial England, the political and social exploitation of the non-landed 
citizen,@ the stagnation of land, as a matter of both insecurity of 
ownership and retrenchment by the landed aristocracy and gentry,47 and 
the 'burdensome expenses imposed on transactions in land by the 
common law and its lawyers'*8 reflect a political, social and economic 
climate far narrower in focus than today. Lord Jeffrey's 'earth hunger'49 
and Lord Nottingham's reaction to the plight of a mortgagor which 'cried 
aloud for the protection of the Court of Chancery'5O call attention to the 
emotional reactions evoked by land ownership during the formative years 
of contract law. 
This status, which underlies the discontinuity between the legal 
treatment of land contracts and all others, may rest to a large degree on 
the political attributes of land ownership - ownership which, for over four 
centuries, was inextricably entwined with political power and identity. 
The purchase of land was, to put it in its most graphic form, the purchase 
of the right to vote. Lord Mansfield, speaking of the rights of the holder of 
legal title to land in 1752, described '[a] special privilege of the highest 
benefit annexed by the common law to the possession of land ... the right 
of voting for coroners, sheriffs and members of parliament.'s1 Daniel 
Defoe, writing half a century earlier, felt it necessary to withhold political 
rights from mere inhabitants. The right to enact law through representa- 
tion was vested 'upon the Freeholders; the Freeholders are the proper 
Owners of the Country ... the other Inhabitants ... ought to be subject to 
such Laws as the Freeholders impose upon them ... because the Free- 
holders having a Right to the land, the other have no right to live there 
but upon sufferance.'5* 
The identity of the franchise and ownership of land had its source in 
legislation enacted in 1430 which restricted53 the English parliamentary 
franchise in county elections to residents who held title to 'free Land or 
Tenement of the Value of Forty Shillings by the Year.'54 The enactment 
was demonstrably for the purposes of political stabilization, its avowed 
intent being to eliminate the disorder which then accompanied elec- 
tions.55 The express reason for the act was to disenfranchise the 
'outrageous and excessive Number of People ... of small substance and no 
value' who would otherwise have participated in the electoral process.56 
Others have suggested the reactionary mood of the king and Parliament 
and political self-interest on the part of the fifteenth-century parliamen- 
tarians as foundations for the restriction.57 
To ascertain the import in modern terms of a forty-shilling annual 
income from land in the fifteenth century is almost impossible. Not only 
has the meaning and value of money changed, but if one assumes that 
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value is determined by the choices made by individuals in choosing among 
various goods, the transformation of society from a local agrarian 
economy to an international industrial, commercial, and consumer 
economy forecloses meaningful comparisons. Nonetheless, attempts 
have been made. Blackstone calculated that forty shillings in the region of 
Henry VI (1422 - 60) was equivalent to twenty pounds in 1765,58 and in 
1898 the fifteenth-century franchise requirement was estimated at thirty 
to forty p0unds.5~ While there have been a number of similar rough 
estimates, if not outright guesses, at the meaning of a forty-shilling 
freehold in 1 ~ ~ 0 , ~  its true import can best be understood if one considers 
that it is said to have disenfranchised hundreds of thousands of 
leaseholders, copyholders, and freeholders of land with annual rents of 
less than the stated requisite, leaving an electorate of perhaps ten 
thou~and.~ '  Similar legislation today would be nothing less than dictatori- 
a1.6z Although the forty-shilling freehold voting requirement applied 
uniformly in the counties, suffrage in the boroughs, which in time 
returned a far greater percentage of the Commons, was notoriously 
idiosyncratic.63 Franchise qualifications were determined autonomously, 
in some cases extending to members of the borough council, in others to 
all freemen, and in still others to holders of burgage tenements, to 
potwallers, or to those who paid 'scot and lot.'64 In general the franchise 
was restricted, the traditional philosophy being to retain political power in 
the hands of the f e ~ . ~ 5  
An unquestionable consequence of the forty-shilling freehold voting 
requirement was the establishment of a narrow class of enfranchised 
landowners; one historian estimated the average county electorate at only 
4000, returning two members of Parliament in 1 7 6 0 . ~ ~  The aggregate 
county electorate in 1760 is said to have consisted of only 170,000 persons 
and had risen to 188,000 in 183 1 .67 Although increases in population and 
the practice of transferring land to create votes did operate to enlarge the 
electorate to some degree during the seventeenth and eighteenth 
centuries, the consensus seems to be that the numbers enjoying the 
electoral franchise in fact failed to keep up with the expansion of the 
population.68 While the real value of forty shillings per year, measured in 
terms of the goods which it could purchase, may have fallen dramatically 
over the centuries, 'the decline in the number of individuals holding land 
by Freehold, because of the growth of vast landed estates, tended to keep 
the rural electorate comparatively ~ma11.'~9 The picture drawn of the 
borough electorate is no ~re t t ie r .~"  One of the more generous estimates of 
the electorate suggests that 3 or 4 per cent of the population was 
enfranchised prior to 1832,'' while another concludes that only 465,000 
persons of a population of over 24,000,000 were enfranchised in the 
election of 1830.~' 
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The disenfranchisement of all but a narrow political elite was mirrored 
in the nature of land ownership - hardly a startling discovery when, in 
essence, ownership of land constituted, and thus parallelled, ownership 
of the vote. One likely explanation of the limited membership of the 
political and land-owning class is that vast tracts of land were held by 
copyholders, who were not enfranchised until the nineteenth century.73 
Pollock has suggested that in the sixteenth century a third of England was 
copyhold,74 and copyholders, through sheer numbers, constituted an 
important class of the English population.75 While the nature of land 
holdings evolved over the centuries, the purchase of freehold land 
remained the only avenue of entry to the narrow political elite. Even 
during the latter part of the nineteenth century the claim was made that 
'the great English nation is tenant at will to a few thousand landowner~.'7~ 
Bonbright concludes that in 1874 there were only 150,000 citizens who 
owned more than one acre and argues that this accords well with others 
who suggest that the entire population of landowners numbered some 
160,000.77 Whatever the true numbers may have been, there can be no 
doubt that land ownership and the supply of votes were kept to an 
absolute minimum. The result was, as we shall see, precisely what one 
might have expected in the case of any valuable good whose supply is kept 
down by artificial means. 
The limited franchise remained in force, with but one exception during 
the Commonwealth from 1653 until 1660,7' for almost four centuries. In 
1832, the county franchise was substantially extended and some degree of 
uniformity established in the borough franchises, under the Reform Act, 
183279 which, while it left extant the forty-shilling qualification, extended 
the franchise to a wider range of real property interests.'" 
Constitutional law in Canada suffered from the same inegalitarianism. 
The Constitution Act of 179189 was not far removed from its English 
parent - while it did not institute a property qualification for membership 
in the Legislative Council or Assembly, it limited the franchise in counties 
to freeholders of land with a yearly value of forty shillings or its equivalent 
in any tenure.go In non-rural areas, suffrage depended upon ownership 
of a dwelling house and land valued at five pounds, or tenancy at ten 
pounds per year and residency for at least one year.9' Persons disqualified 
under provincial legislation were not entitled to vote for members of the 
Legislative Assembly.g2 No reforms were instituted under the Canada 
Union Act,g3 and in 1849 the earlier acts were consolidated,94 with the 
property franchise and provincial disqualifications continued without 
substantial modification. The franchise was extended in 1853 and 1854 to 
owners, tenants, and occupiers of land with an assessed value of $200 or a 
yearly value of $20 in townships, or with an assessed value of $300 or a 
yearly value of $30 in towns.95 
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At Confederation, these qualifications were in force in Ontario and 
Quebec,@ and similar property qualifications were required of voters in 
Nova Scotia97 and New ~runswick.9~ After Confederation, the federal 
electoral franchise continued to be determined according to provincial 
franchise qualifications, which for decades remained co-extensive with 
ownership of real property.99 Ward has calculated that the electorate in 
the federal parliamentary elections in 1872 approximated only 15 per 
cent of the populations of Ontario, Quebec, Nova Scotia, and New 
Brunswick.lo0 This form of representational democracy based on land 
ownership was hardly ameliorated by minor reforms in electoral laws 
(and, one may presume, by reforms in land ownership), and a decade 
later the parliamentary franchise remained strictly circumscribed, rang- 
ing from 20.2 per cent in Ontario to 11 per cent in British Columbia and 
to 16.6 per cent in Quebec.'"' 
The provincial tendency to abrogate property qualifications and the 
federal government's illiberal views on electoral democracy'"' led to the 
introduction of the first federal Electoral Franchise Act1"3 in 1885, which, 
with minor exceptions in British Columbia and Prince Edward Island,1°4 
instituted a nation-wide property qualification. Under section 2 of the act, 
the franchise was vested in any male who owned real property in his own 
right, or in right of his wife, and who was in actual possession of the land 
or in receipt of the rent and profits from it.lo5 A woman's vote (or rather 
the vote of a woman who may have held land as a beneficiary) was 
exercisable by her husband.lo6 
Constitutional jurisdiction to regulate the allocation of the federal 
parliamentary franchise after 1885 - since the franchise continued to 
depend on ownership of property'"' (traditionally a matter within 
provincial jurisdiction) - raised some debate during the early years of 
Confederation. However, in 1891 the issue was resolved in favour of the 
federal government when the Ontario Divisional Court, Chancery 
Division, affirmed federal legislative authority: 
This legislation does not trench upon 'property and civil rights in the Province' ... 
The subjects of this class of legislation are of a political character, and ... distinct ... 
from matters of civil rights in the Provinces which regard mainly the macm and 
tuurn as between citizens. It is in my view rather confusing to speak of the right of 
voting as comprehended under the 'civil rights' mentioned in sec. 92 sub-s. 13 of 
the B.N.A. Act. This franchise is not an ordinary civil right; it is historically and 
truly a statutory privilege of a political nature, being the chief means whereby the 
people, organized for political purposes, have their share in the functions of 
government. lo* 
Provincial authority to determine the federal parliamentary franchise was 
restored in 18g81°9 and retained until ig17.l'" In 1920 a new federal act 
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was promulgated, and civil personality became the touchstone of political 
identity. " ' 
The political philosophy that land, not civil personality, was represen- 
ted in Parliament is presented most vividly by the political status of women 
who held land. Although there is some dispute as to the absolute right of 
women to exercise the vote in England, a number of commentators take 
the view that, until the nineteenth century, women did 'return ... 
members of parliament,"" and several cases decided during the seven- 
teenth century make this point without reservation.113 Whatever may 
have been the case in England, there is little doubt that women did enjoy 
the franchise in the Canadian provinces during the early years of the 
nineteenth century.114 Those who adopt a more conservative stance admit 
that prior to 1832 a woman could transfer her vote to her husband, a son, 
or another close relative1'5 and that 'a vote in respect of the property"16 
could not be cast away merely on the gender of who might have owned or 
possessed the land at issue. A husband could vote in respect of his wife's 
property unless the land was vested in trustees for her separate welfare, or 
where, after marriage, the property was settled on trustees for her 
separate use. In these cases the male could 'by no means vote in respect 
thereof."17 Legislation enacted to void the creation of votes through the 
vehicle of land transfer was never thought to have extended to the case of 
an estate which descended to 'any number of females, the husband of 
each having a right to vote if his interest amounted to forty shillings a 
year." '* In 1780, after disputes arose as to the exercise of the franchise in 
respect of dower rights, legislation was promulgated which expressly 
enfranchised the husband of a woman who held dower rights at common 
law in respect of her former husband's estates.llg With the reformation of 
the franchise and the transformation of the right to vote from a function 
of land ownership to an attribute of civil status, women were disenfran- 
chised. "" 
The political history of land ownership in England and Canada is 
central to an understanding of the development of contract remedies at 
common law and equity. The promissory entitlement represented by the 
contractual expectations inherent in an agreement to purchase land was 
defined not by the transformation of the purchaser's money into 
economic wealth in another form, and thus compensable in money- 
damages, but rather by the achievement of political identity: '[Mlere 
wealth does not entitle a man to vote unless the wealth is converted into 
occupancy or a tenure of land.'"' The Commons represented not the 
public but rather property in the form of land, and a contract to purchase 
land represented a licence to political representation through property 
ownership. Although we would be wise to heed Holmes' admonition to 
take sceptically the axiom that 'land is capable of having rights,"" the 
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social and political fabric of seventeenth- and eighteenth-century Eng- 
land lends considerable strength to the image that landed property was 
imbued with political rights exercised by the owner of fee, as it were, by 
proxy. As recently as 1885, Anson could write of 'the modern theory, that 
Property as such ... is entitled to representation,'"g and in Anelay v. 
Lewz(i124 Jervis cj said: 'There is a qualification arising out of this piece of 
land.'"5 The concept of the franchise as equivalent to - one might even 
say indistinguishable from - ownership of freehold land has been said to 
be 'typical of the eighteenth century,"26 and one suspects that the 
assimilation of one to the other was such an integral part of political and 
social mores that few would think it necessary to make the point explicitly 
when recognizing political expectations through the enforcement of 
contractual rights in law.127 Nonetheless, legal actions and legislative 
intervention involving the franchise can be found, and it is here that we 
discover an express acknowledgement of the degree to which rights to 
vote, rights in land, and contract law had become inextricably entwined 
with one another. 
Holt cj, in the now famous case of Ashby v considered the 
county freeholder's right to vote by reason of his ownership of land as a 
'real Right, [and] in boroughs ... a real Right annexed to the tenure of 
burgage ... a noble privilege, which entitles the subject to a share in the 
government and legislature.'12g Ashby v White involved a claim for 
damages arising on the malicious refusal of the plaintiff's vote by a 
returning officer in a parliamentary election; Holt cj understood this 
illegal interference with the right to vote as giving rise to a 'cause of action 
on the property of the subject"3" and thus being within the jurisdiction of 
the common law courts notwithstanding that it touched upon parliamen- 
tary matters. The identity of political status and title to land and the real 
nature of both were affirmed by the House of Lords: 
[Tlhere is a great difference between the right of the electors and the right of the 
elected: the one is a temporary right to a place in parliament, pro hac vice; the other 
is a freehold or a franchise. Who has a right to sit in the House of Commons may 
be properly cognisable there; but who has a right to choose is a matter originally 
established, even before there is a parliament. A man has a right to his vote, having 
annexed the right of voting to his freehold, it is of the nature of his freehold, and 
must depend upon it. The same law that gives him his right must defend it for 
him, and any other power that will pretend to take away his right of voting may as 
well pretend to take away the freehold upon which it depends.'3' 
Contractual rights to vote, if seen as rights of freehold or real rights, 
would have been enforceable by specific remedies - the distinguishing 
mark between real and personal rights: '3' 'The Plaintiff has a right to the 
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franchise and therefore the law would give a remedy for breach of that 
right."ss 
A second area where the intersection of contract law and political rights 
is evident is that of mortgages and the enfranchisement of purchasers of 
land prior to completion. From 1430 until close to the end of the 
seventeenth century only holders of legal title to land were entitled to 
exercise the franchise. This prerequisite left two substantial classes of 
persons disenfranchised, notwithstanding that they enjoyed inchoate 
rights in land. Neither purchasers of land whose contractual rights had 
not yet crystalized into full ownership interests nor mortgagors who had 
transferred legal ownership in their land as security for credit with the 
proviso that the conveyance should be void once their debt was paid in full 
could vote under the original franchise legislation. Delays in conveyanc- 
ing were considerable in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, and so 
was the interference with a purchaser's expected exercise of the franchise, 
brought on by the complexities and uncertainties of the law of real 
property; Fry attributes the growth of the doctrine of specific perform- 
ance to the disarray of titles of land: '[Wlhere contract is separated from 
conveyance by all the formalities and delay of an examination into title, 
and the preparation of a formal deed, [specific performance] would be a 
necessity to anything like a civilized system of law."54 
Interference with acquisition of the right to vote was reduced consider- 
ably in 1696. In that year the franchise was extended to prospective 
purchasers in actual physical possession of the land or in receipt of its 
rents and profits pending c ~ m p l e t i o n ' ~ ~  - the purchaser standing in the 
guise of a beneficiary in relation to the vendor as a trustee or quasi- 
trustee.'s6 Thus, after 1696 political rights depended on the terms of the 
contract of purchase and sale, and specifically on the private allocation of 
physical possession or economic return prior to a transfer of legal 
ownership: 'If they belonged to the purchaser under such circumstances 
that he could compel a specific performance, the vendor was a trustee of 
the legal estate for him, he took an equitable freehold and had a right to 
vote."s7 Over time, the recognition of the purchaser's equitable interest in 
the land and, more precisely, his right to specific performance became the 
explicit criterion for the electoral franchise: '[Ilf a person has such an 
equitable title as the Courts will recognize, he is entitled to vote. As where 
there has been an agreement for sale and the vendee has taken possession 
under the agreement, or has become otherwise entitled to a specific 
performance of the c0ntract."3~ 
One might surmise, easily enough, that mortgagors would have been 
similarly dissatisfied with electoral qualifications for different but equally 
persuasive reasons. If a purchaser of land gave a mortgage as security for 
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the price, he did not, through mere acquisition of equitable ownership, 
acquire the vote; and if one already owned land, the mortgage became a 
tool of disenfranchisement if insufficient land was retained to meet the 
forty-shilling annual income qualification.'39 Finally, even if a mortgagor 
retained sufficient land to vote, mortgage transactions resulted in a 
dilution of narrowly circumscribed political authority - where only the 
landowner could vote prior to the mortgage, both he and his creditor 
would be entitled to the franchise once legal ownership was transferred. 
In 1759 Lord Mansfield would openly acknowledge the transfer of the 
franchise as a predominant characteristic of the transfer of legal title by 
way of mortgage prior to i6g6.I4O 
The political implications of what was rapidly evolving into a patently 
commercial transaction were altered in 1696, with the enfranchisement of 
all mortgagors in possession of the land or in receipt of the requisite yearly 
value of forty shillings.'4' Again political identity was dependent upon 
private, contractual allocation of rights to land, and it is not inconceivable 
that the mortgagee's contractual right to dispossess the landowner, as a 
private right of disenfranchisement, was modified by equitable doctrines 
in response to political reality: 'In popular parlance, the possession of the 
land without rack rent or receipt of rent is often made the test of 
ownership. As regards mortgages this is more practical than appears at 
first sight; for the mortgagee rarely takes possession save as a last resort, 
and such possession is therefore usually followed by sale, foreclosure, or 
the acquisition of a squatter's title. Likewise possession confers upon the 
party the parliamentary franchise.'I4' 
The intersection of the law of specific performance and the franchise, 
undisguised in the case of purchases and mortgages of real property, is 
revealed in a third context in the historical treatment in Equity of 
transfers of copyhold land. A contract to sell freehold land, which in truth 
was held only by copyhold, was not capable of specific performance.'43 A 
purchaser would not have copyhold land forced on him even though it 
has been said that the ancient requirement that the lord of the manor 
consent to the transfer had become a mere formality by the end of the 
seventeenth century. It is true, nonetheless, that later contracts in respect 
of copyhold estates were ordered performed.'44 Earlier, however, when 
copyholders were not enfranchised it had been held that an agreement to 
transfer a copyhold estate would not be enforced,'45 and it has been said 
that '[alt one time the Court hesitated to decree specific performance of 
an agreement relating to copyhold lands, in respect of the rights of the 
lord; but about 1680, the distinction was laughed out of c0urt."4~ 
Thus there can be no quarrel with the proposition that the courts, as 
well as the community at large, were cognizant of the interdependence of 
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the franchise and land ownership; and the practice of creating 'occasional 
voters' - voters who acquired ownership of land for the sole purpose of 
voting for a particular candidate - was held an offence at common law 
early in the eighteenth century and possibly earlier.'47 In addition, the 
practice of conveying land 'in order to multiply voices, or to split and 
divide the interest in any houses or lands among several persons, to enable 
them to vote at elections' .was decried in 1696 under section 7 of Lord 
Somer's ~ c t ' 4 ~  and the contract to sell votes deemed 'void and of none 
effect.' This prohibition was later reinforced by the institution of a not 
insubstantial fine in the case of contracts made in 'a fraudulent or collusive 
manner, on purpose to qualify' the recipient to vote.'49 However, these 
statutes, as well as the common law criminal offence, applied only to those 
conveyances which were actually fraudulent,'5" and the practice soon 
arose of splitting estates into numerous smaller units and of granting 
various minor interests in the same land (eg, estates for life, annuities, and 
rent charges), thereby creating a large number of voters whose political 
behaviour could be influenced by the primary landowner. Even before 
the Cromwellian revolution, the freehold franchise had been altered 
drastically; men were voting in counties in respect of annuities, tenancies 
for life, in tail or in fee, and rent charges, as trustees and mortgagees, and 
in respect of the dowers of their wives.'5' 
Thus the mere purchase of a house with five others, all of whom were to 
gain votes, without a collateral contract establishing a candidate for whom 
the votes were to be cast, was not illegal. 15' A classic case is that of Hoyland v 
Bremne~-,'~~ where a large number of properties were purchased by 
members of a political organization from a vendor who knew nothing of 
the purchasers' political intentions. The sales were affirmed without 
question. In Alexander v Newman154 a purchase of property for value by 
thirty-five purchasers from a vendor to whom the land was leased back 
immediately after the sale was challenged under the legislation. The 
vendor and purchasers held the same political views, and the admitted 
and sole purpose of the sale was the transfer of political identity to the 
purchasers. Nonetheless, the conveyances were not voided, the court 
holding that the legislation applied only to those alleged conveyances 
which did not transfer any interest in land at all, and which when made, 
contained stipulations as to how the franchise was to be exercised. The law 
reports are replete with similar cases.155 SO long as the consideration for 
the purchase was paid, and no overt control over the exercise of the 
franchise was retained by the vendor, the sales were not set aside. Where, 
however, the purchases were infected with secret trusts - the conveyances 
merely fictitious - the fraudulent sales were set aside as null 
and void.'5 
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By 1875, Lord Coleridge could say, in a case involving a transfer of land 
to a trustee for the admitted purpose of enfranchising some thirty-four 
beneficiaries: 'It may be that the framers of this deed contemplated a 
fraud upon the election law. It may be that their object was to create votes. 
They had a perfect right to do ~ 0 . ~ 5 ~  And Archibald J, responding to the 
claim that the manifest intention of a transaction was to manufacture 
votes, said that the court would 'not look behind the legal construction of 
the deed."5* SO widespread was the practice that in Etherington v Wilson,'59 
James LJ admitted: 'Of course it is familiar to us all that men constantly 
acquire qualifications for voting in counties. A man buys a 40 s. freehold 
for the sole purpose - the undisguised purpose - of giving himself a vote 
in a county with which he has not and does not mean to have any 
connection whatever.''& The political aspirations and motives of pur- 
chasers of land in boroughs were, it seems, even more unqualified: 'The 
right to vote being attached to the ownership of certain tenements, it was 
simply a matter of buying sufficient properties in a borough to be able to 
control its ele~tion."~' 
The Canadian judiciary took an equally sanguine view of these 
practices, one case holding that under the Canadian constitutional form 
of government, every citizen had the right to purchase such property 'as 
would qualify him to vote in a parliamentary election in whatever district 
he pleases."62 Again, however, the purchase of votes through fraudulent 
sales of real property was di~allowed.'~S 
This entire drama is made all the more meaningful when one realizes 
that land represented not only the right to vote but also, when the 
franchise was extended in the nineteenth century, the power to control 
the exercise of one's tenants' franchise.164 The political influence which 
could be purchased with land could hardly be reflected or assessed in 
money terms: 
[Slome interesting stories were told -of a landlord in mid-Cheshire whose tenants 
supported a candidate during the canvass and then unaccountably voted against 
him; of another whose tenants asked him if they were free to vote as they wished, 
and on his agreeing that they were, they voted against his candidate; and the two 
cases that caused the greatest stir - the case of the Marquis of Lothian and the case 
of the hundred tenants evicted at Cardiganshire (immediately after an election) 
and the fund of f4,ooo collected for them, mainly from the subscriptions of 
fellow tenants ... 
The case of the Marquis of Lothian concerned a substantial tenant who was 
refused a renewal of a nineteen-year lease because he had voted against the 
candidate favoured by the Marquis ... Lothian said there were 'many' reasons why 
he had not renewed the lease, 'but I should consider myself acting unfairly if I did 
not say out at once that among them was the vote he gave at election.'165 
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Even freeholders, supposedly capable of exercising an independent mind 
if they could hold themselves above the pressures of social hierarchy, were 
amenable to economic rewards, and perhaps as tenants on other land 
were subject to inescapable pressure at the hands of their landlords, who 
might threaten them with evicti0n.1~~ 
This exercise of political influence through contract law, incomprehen- 
sible today, was ensured and reinforced through the practice of the open 
ballot, which allowed the purchaser of land to monitor the efficacy of his 
authority and thereby assess the 'return' on his investment. The institu- 
tion of the secret ballot, although advocated for almost a century,'67 did 
not take place until 1872,16' and the exercise of overt political influence 
through widespread bribery at the hands of landowners did not disap- 
pear at least until then. It has been said, however, that one disconcerting 
effect of the secret ballot was to allow voters to take bribes from both 
candidates without fear of d i s c ~ v e r ~ . ' ~ g  
Finally, plural voting - the exercise of the political franchise in as many 
counties as one held land - was notorious.'7" While residence had been a 
franchise requisite for several centuries, by the eighteenth century a man 
could vote in each county in which he had purchased freehold land, and in 
1774 the residency requirement was repealed.'7' Mill wrote, 'A person 
may have a double vote by other means than that of tendering two votes at 
the same hustings; he may have a vote in each of two different 
constituencies: and ... this exceptional privilege at present belongs rather 
to superiority of means than of intelligence."7' The custom of plural 
voting was made possible by the practice of holding the polls open for 
several days, or even weeks,'73 and in Canada, elections in 1867 ran from 7 
August until 2 0  September, and in 1872 from 2 0  July to 1 2  October.'74 
During debates concerning Canadian electoral reform in 1885 some 
members argued that plural voting discriminated against those land 
owners who had bought scattered properties which were too distant to 
allow travel from one constituency to another and worked against the 
interest of other members who were obliged to cover the travelling 
expenses of non-resident voters.'75 Although many abuses of the Cana- 
dian electoral process were eliminated in 1874,176 remnants of this 
distinctly inegalitarian convention lingered until 1920.~77 
The ultimate consequence of the political philosophy that land merited 
representation in Parliament - 'the propertied basis of the franchise'17' - 
was the general acceptance outside the structure of law of the view that the 
vote itself was property, to be bought and sold in the same manner as any 
other valuable posse~sion.'~g Consequently, any person who desired the 
exercise or use of this political property would have to contract for it, 
either in money or through barter.''" Where landed interests were in 
conflict, votes were traded at inflated prices; the only redeeming feature 
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of such contractual freedom in circumstances of laissez-faire political 
competition was that the voter, if his franchise was to be purchased, at 
least had the choice of prospective buyers."' It is not at all inconceivable 
that the price placed on land included this indeterminable, but nonethe- 
less real, premium for the voting privileges expected by a purchaser.'89 In 
the early eighteenth century, in the smaller constituencies, 'voting at 
parliamentary elections was a regular means of li~elihood,"~3 and in view 
of the openness of the practice, it is not at all unlikely that the future 
stream of income from the franchise would constitute a not insubstantial 
factor in the more traditional forms of economic return from land. Votes, 
under this view, were marketable commodities with a fluctuating but 
generally appreciating value, and the only means to acquire this good was 
through the purchase of land.184 Traditional contract theory applied to 
the political relationship of the parliamentarian and his constituents 
reflects this view. Since the vote was a good which could be bought and 
sold as land, the member, if he wanted the good to be used in a certain 
manner, would have to compensate the owner: 'From the point of view of 
the electorate ... the privilege of the franchise was conceived in terms of 
personal advantage in the narrowest sense,'185 and of course those who 
held land which entitled them to vote twice were doubly c~mpensated."~ 
The scheme was self-perpetuating. Those who enjoyed the franchise 
through the purchase of land not only risked the loss of political wealth 
upon the dilution of their voting monopoly, but also would suffer the 
economic loss on the depreciation of the price paid for their votes (which 
presumably would be reflected in a corresponding diminution in the 
capital price of their land). As one commentator has observed somewhat 
cynically, 'the only change effected by the Reform Act was that the price of 
votes fell because the number willing to sell their votes had grown."87 
The purchase and sale of votes, which today are distributed without 
regard to income or wealth, were viewed without embarrassment in 
earlier times. A treatise on election law published in 1880 advised 
solicitors, when assessing the political character of a community, to count 
'men who vote only for a c~nsideration,"~~ stressing that the cost of the 
voter was to be noted as well and warning, 'If your candidate honestly 
resolves not to secure these marketable votes, you must count them as 
against  YOU."^^ The practice was hardly a secret one: the candidates' 
managers were instructed, when canvassing prospective voters, to tabu- 
late those canvassed as: '1. Probable friendly; 2. Probable hostile; 
3. Neutrals; and 4. For sale."gO 
So far I have attempted to demonstrate that in England, as well as in 
Canada, markets and thus contracts in land were in fact private allocative 
devices in which the goods distributed included political identity and, 
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later, political a~thori ty . '~ '  This in itself could explain the quite extraor- 
dinary contractual remedies created by the law to reflect those expecta- 
tions. History demonstrates, however, that markets in land in fact 
represented markets in much more. Not only did one acquire political 
identity and influence on the purchase of land, but contracts for land were 
made with the knowledge that the ultimate right to hold parliamentary 
office was premised on land ownership. From 1 7 1  1 until late in the 
nineteenth century parliamentary representatives from the counties and 
boroughs were qualified only if they possessed land worth at least f 600 
per year and $300 per year respectively.'g2 Thus the franchise and 
political influence were joined by a third political expectation, the 
privilege of sitting in Parliament, and in 1 7 9 4  Clark LJ described 
landowners 'who alone had a right to be represented by Parliament, not 
the rabble who have nothing but personal property."gs It is not, therefore, 
surprising that the legislation enacted in 1 7 1 1  was described in its 
preamble as 'securing the freedom of parliament.'lg4 And of course the 
restriction of political power represented by ownership of land was 
self-perpetuating. It existed, as we have seen, for over four centuries. 
Land in the seventeenth century had become synonymous with freedom 
and liberty, an unformulated assumption upon which a vast part of the 
English law has been built: 'trade, law, and government itself were 
visualized as ministering, in different degrees, to the sanctity of landed 
property.'l95 
Contract was the vehicle which society chose to allocate this political 
good in the same way as it had chosen contract to allocate votes. 
Nonetheless, Cannon notes that the requirement was evaded or 'often 
met by land transfers within families' or with the aid of accommodating 
lawyers or friends.@ It was not uncommon to discover conveyances 
intended to qualify the transferee to sit in Parliament or hold some other 
qualified elected office,lg7 and intra-familial transfers of property, often 
for a nominal consideration, were affirmed by the courts, notwithstand- 
ing that their sole intent was to enfranchise the transferor's son or to 
qualify him to sit in Parliament.'@ Nor were contractual expectations 
limited to parliamentary enfranchisement or qualification, as cases 
respecting transfers of land to circumvent the gaming laws indicate so 
clearly.'99 In Callaghan v Callaghan,'" however, the House of Lords 
dismissed an appeal from a decision of Lord Plunket refusing specific 
performance of an agreement to make a lease intended to qualify the 
transferee for a seat in Parliament, on the ground that there was no 
contractual intention to transfer an interest in land under the contract, 
but only the most obvious intention to qualify the purported lessee.'"' 
Nonetheless, if an interest in land was to be transferred the courts would 
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not hesitate to enforce contracts whose obvious intent was the purchase 
of status and political influence. This private right when exercised openly 
was protected, as one might imagine, by a property rule: an order for 
performance of a contract to establish the plaintiff as a baronet for f 500 
was awarded in the early seventeenth cent~ry, '"~ and Maitland notes that 
'no great absurdity could have resulted from the doctrine that the right to 
a summons [to Parliament] could be conveyed along with the lands.""3 
Once we acknowledge that land rather than the individual was rep- 
resented in Parliament, it becomes entirely clear that an offer of damages 
as compensation for breach of an agreement to transfer land would, 
during the eighteenth century, have been considered entirely dispropor- 
tionate to the injury suffered and also an outright insult to the political 
aspirations of the plaintiff. Although a decision to purchase land most 
likely arose from a variety of motives, it may be said with some degree of 
confidence that monetary profit was not an overriding consideration. To  
the political expectations detailed above (political identity, political 
authority, and parliamentary qualification acquired on the sale), one may 
add legal expectations. Through a bargained exchange of land for money 
the purchaser gained entry to the narrow class of society eligible for jury 
service. Ownership of land was for centuries2"4 a qualification for jury 
service which, while it may or may not at one time have been a desired 
public duty,1°5 resulted in an identity of membership between political 
and legal communities. Men of property, that is land, were allegedly more 
amenable to punishment: '[Tlhe reason why a juryman is to have a 
freehold when he is sworn is that the law intends that he will more take 
care to speak the truth than one who has none; and if he do not say the 
truth he will be punished in attaint and his land wasted."~~ 
The exercise of political and legal authority vested in the English jury 
was a social privilege, like so many other, which formed part of the 
contractual expectations of a purchaser of land. This confluence of legal 
institutions and land ownership was extended in 1732 to justices of the 
peace, who were required to possess land of at least f loo per yearz0' - 'A 
remarkable tribute to the ideal of landed property.'2o8 This legislation 
was, in fact, merely a revision of fifteenth-century legislation which from 
1440 onwards demanded that every justice of the peace derive at least 520 
per year from land.'Og 
Political identity through ownership of land and the franchise - and 
later, political influence exercisable over one's tenants - and parliament- 
ary, jural, and judicial qualifications were, however, only the most 
tangible non-economic promissory expectations motivating the contract 
to purchase land. Of far greater import was the acquisition of social status. 
Wealth acquired through commerce or industry did not make the 
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merchant or factory owner the equal of the landed gentleman - an 
exalted status attainable only through the purchase of an estate - and it is 
almost trite to say that the social status acquired with the acquisition of title 
to land would have defied quantification. Purchases of land were, as we 
have seen, often made in disregard of the financial consequences of the 
investment,'1° and for the law to adjust the rights of the parties through a 
pecuniary award would have been to act in total disregard of the 
purchaser's social as well as his political and legal aspirations."' Owner- 
ship of land was a social privilege - land had not, at the time, entered the 
stream of commerce as an economic commodity. Thus Weber writes that 
'the social prestige of the manorial lords also motivates the nouveawc riches 
to invest their acquired wealth not in a capitalistic venture, but in land, in 
order to rise to the nobility if it be p~ssible.'~" Members of the fledgling 
middle class who had acquired their wealth in commerce, finance, and 
industry bought land to attain social status 'for their children, if not for 
themselves."'3 The price paid for land was not simply the product of the 
economic wealth which it would produce for its new owner but represen- 
ted the value which the purchaser, often new to wealth, would pay for 
entry into the landed class. Objective assessment of this value in the form 
of damages would have been a wholly unthinkable legal response, an 
insult to both parties, and a terribly imprecise and expensive task once 
undertaken. Social expectations and political aspirations in market 
transactions would have resulted in intractable difficulties in assessing the 
value of contractual performance, and one suspects as well that the 
disappointment on contractual failure would not have been compensable 
in money damages. 
The new iniddle class had no shortage of wealth, while the customs and 
social mores of the time insisted upon land ownership as the unique badge 
of social acceptability: 'Traders have no bond of union, no habits of 
intercourse; their wives, if they care for society, want to see not the wives 
of other such men, but 'better people,' as they say - the wives of men 
certainly with land, and, if Heaven help, with titles."'4 The base financial 
success of the new industrialist and merchant were not the measure of 
social worth. If he was to make his mark he would have to 'escape from the 
source of his wealth, to acquire new interest, 'and he was more likely to 
magnify than to belittle the virtues of the life into which he and his wife 
yearned to be admitted, the life of wealth, of power and consideration on 
the land."I5 It would be naive to presume that the licence to such social 
intercourse had a price in money, and one can quite easily appreciate the 
foundations of legal rules which would at once avoid valuation, affirm the 
primacy of land in society, and restrict whatever opportunities might have 
been available to transform land into an economic commodity. 
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The result of all of this, as one modern writer has hypothesized''6 
(unaware, it seems, of his historical accuracy), was the concentration of 
political power in the landed classes. Entry into this exalted class could not 
be obtained without land; members of the new commercial and industrial 
classes sought to become 'squires by p~rchase" '~  and, once established, 
attempted to entrench their status, not only through the perpetuation of 
legal rules which reflected political authority in economic power and 
which, like the doctrine of primogeniture, kept both within narrow 
 onf fines''^ but also, by private arrangements, to ensure that the land 
which constituted a 'unique' entry to social status and political authority 
was retained in perpetuity by the landowner's family."g 
The protection of contractual entitlements by property rules should 
thus be perceived as a reflection of political and social values which for 
centuries had identified the contract for the purchase and sale of land as 
an allocative device in non-economic goods - political identity and 
authority, legal identity, and social status. The special legal status of such 
contracts - enforced by the state in a manner quite unlike exchanges of 
commodities - recognized the non-economic expectations of the contract- 
ing parties. It seems to me, however, that the intersection of property 
rights in contract with political, legal, and social status should be 
considered as a more diffuse phenomenon. That is, the legal protection of 
contractual rights in land by property rules not only served to protect the 
expectations of purchasers; as a more general matter it reaffirmed the 
primacy of land ownership in English society - a primacy undeniable in 
terms of the cultural, political, and social perspectives of the time. The 
moral authority of property (land) was not extended to financial wealth, 
and indeed the law was structured to retain authority in those possessed of 
land, not money. Protection of contractual rights in land through law 
could engender social acceptability and consensus only if the political 
authority and status which the land purchaser sought was respected in 
legal rules defining remedies on breach. Property rules fulfilled these 
intentions; liability rules would only have insulted them. 
There is one further point which must be examined before we turn to 
the analysis of liability rules in contracts for the purchase and sale of land. 
My thesis so far has been that bargained exchanges of real property were 
in reality political, legal, and social acts of extraordinary significance. That 
is, the contractual expectations of purchasers of real property consisted, 
in whole or in part, of political identity, political authority, a number of 
legal privileges, and social status, which may or may not have been trans- 
ferred together with a valuable economic commodity. One may ask, 
therefore, whether an award of damages which would have enabled the 
disappointed purchaser to contract for another piece of land - with 
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roughly similar political, cultural, and social attributes - would have con- 
stituted adequate compensation. To a limited extent that point is well 
taken. There are, however, several reaons for the view that such would 
not have been the case. 
First, while equivalent economic value might have been ascertainable 
at a reasonable investment of legal resources, the assessment of 
equivalent social, political, and cultural value would have raised far more 
complex and unknowable considerations. It is certainly true that a sum of 
money sufficient to permit an alternative purchase might have provided 
the disappointed party with an equivalent piece of real property in 
economic terms. It is not as clear that the alternative real estate would 
have represented an equivalent 'value' in terms of social status, political 
identity, and political authority. A second reason for the failure of the law 
to develop liability rules in contract and thus to insist upon an alternative 
purchase of property was that the market economy had not fully 
enveloped the land distribution system; land was not freely available for 
purchase and sale. The existing distribution of economic, social, and 
political power leads one to conclude that only a very few would consider 
selling their land except if they had no other choice - to do so would, as 
one landowner feared, 'lower the position of my family.'"" The reasons 
why land was not a freely traded commodity were the amount of settled 
land, the moral costs of selling political authority and power, and the 
uncertainties surrounding the existence of the seller's right to sell.'" The 
disappointed purchaser's substitute contract would most likely have been 
shadowed by the vagaries of third-party claims to the land, and, as we shall 
see, the risk of loss due to a defective title was allocated by the law to the 
purchaser. Third, the introduction of a damage rule representing the 
purchaser's expectation interest would have meant that the state would be 
called upon to state publicly the 'worth' of political rights and social status 
associated with land ownership, and, as we shall see, if it is not altogether 
unlikely that legal rules were developed so as to avoid valuation."* 
Fourth, denial of expectation damages and the prohibition, through an 
order for specific performance, of the right to breach contracts may have 
reflected an intuitive understanding on the part of the judiciary that 
allowing a contracting party to breach his contract and pay damages 
might have encouraged trade in land. The distribution of land and 
political power could hardly be described as equitable, and it may be that 
the perpetuation of this inequality was furthered by legal structures pro- 
tecting contractual entitlements through property r~les.~'8 Finally, one 
must note that, at least from 1696, a breach of a contract to sell land in 
law disenfranchised the purchaser."4 The contractual entitlement to 
vote, which had been transformed in 1696 from inchoate to actual, was 
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liable to be destroyed in contractual breach. It takes little imagination to 
consider what the social response to an attempted disenfranchisement 
prior to completion would have been. 
Thus the relationship of legal contract remedies to political and social 
commodities consists of two interdependent concepts. The first, which I 
have described in some detail, recognizes the protection of contractual 
expectations of political, legal, and social status by property rules. The 
second facet of the symbiotic relationship between culture and law was the 
legal decision not to protect these same non-economic expectations by 
liability rules. The duality of the thesis recognizes that contractual 
remedies generally afford individuals the freedom to choose which of 
damages or specific performance better maximizes their individual 
satisfaction. In the case of exchanges of political, legal, and social status, 
however, the state insisted that contractual expectations, if they were to be 
recognized at all, were to be protected only by a property rule. It is 
impossible to say with any degree of certainty why liability rules (damage 
awards) did not develop to any substantial degree in respect of contracts 
to sell land. Yet the matter deserves investigation. A decision to protect 
contractual entitlements by property rules does not necessarily deny the 
existence of liability rules under some circumstances for a breach of an 
agreement to exchange political, legal, and social status for money; and 
theories of individuality and wealth maximization would suggest that 
both kinds of entitlement would have been recognized in law. The 
evolution of the law in this context to deny damages reveals attitudes 
which reinforce the view that political, social, and legal contractual 
expectations provided the foundation for the development of property in 
contract. 
The legal rules denying recovery of damages in respect of contracts for 
the purchase and sale of land are well known. Courts exercising equitable 
jurisdiction to order performance of contractual obligations were not 
granted express authority to award damages until 1858,''~ and since 
disappointed purchasers would generally have sought equitable relief - 
their primary interest being land rather than economic wealth in the guise 
of money damages to which they may or may not have been entitled - 
principles of damage remedies in respect of land contracts remained in 
the most attenuated forms until the latter part of the nineteenth 
~entury ."~  Of course a court could, in awarding specific performance of a 
contract, concurrently order that the price be modified in an amount 
equal to the reduced value of the property transferred,"' this compensa- 
tion (even though it involved valuation of that part of the contract left 
unperformed) being 'very different' from damages.228 It is only fair to say 
that money awards had been ordered, albeit infrequently, in Equity,''g 
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but this was without statutory authority and notwithstanding Lord 
Eldon's admonition that he was 'not ... aware that this Court would give 
relief in the shape of  damage^."^" Nonetheless, it has been argued that 
where the failing was one of tenure, the vendor would not likely obtain 
specific performance together with compensation. 'Differences of tenure 
do not in general admit of ~aluation,"~' and because tenure was the 
criterion upon which the franchise was founded, monetization of political 
rights and social status in Equity would not generally have been the 
practice. 
The disinclination of Equity to assess the value of contractual expecta- 
tions to land was adopted, as well, in the common law courts, which would 
not, in the usual case, award damages (contrasted with an order for the 
return of the purchaser's deposit and incidental expenses) on a basis 
which would oblige the courts to embark on the treacherous task of 
assessing the value of real estate. The leading case of the eighteenth 
century, Flureau v Thornhill,'3' denied recovery for the loss of the 'fancied 
goodness' of the purchaser's bargain, a limitation which was affirmed with 
unwavering consistency throughout the nineteenth ~entury.~33 Earlier 
cases, which are hardly well known, reveal very little of the forces 
operating on the law at the time.'s4 Gray v Br~icoe,~35 decided in 1604, 
involved an executed contract and a conveyance of land by the defendant 
of which he said he was seized in fee simple. In fact, he held only by 
copyhold. The somewhat cryptic report states that 'the jury shall give 
damages, in their consciences, according to that rate, that the country 
values fee-simple land, more than copyhold land.'@ 
The best-known example of the comon law rule forbidding recovery of 
lost profits, fii-st enunciated in 1775 in Flureau v Thornhill,'37 is the decision 
of the House of Lords in Bainv ~othergill'3~ to restrict contractual recovery 
in land contracts which failed because of a defect in title to return of the 
purchaser's deposit with interest and incidental expenses.'39 Lost profits - 
the value of the purchaser's bargain - were not recoverable. Traditional 
explanations for the rule range from an implied contractual term denying 
recovery of the purchaser's expectation interest in the light of the widely 
known inaccuracies of the land registration system in force in England in 
the eighteenth and nineteenth centurie~;'4~ judicial legislation designed 
to increase the liquidity of realty;'4' and contractual liability premised on 
fault rather than strict liability.'4' In addition, it has been argued - indeed 
the point was made in Bain v Fothergill itself - that the expense and time 
concomitant to assessment of real estate values justified a decision which 
rendered the calculation of damages certain.'43 Related to this theory is 
another which explains the rule in Bain v Fothergill as a judicial device 
designed to limit the disconcerting practice ofjuries of awarding arbitrary 
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and sometimes outrageous damage awards, exacerbated by the absence of 
objective evidence of value.'44 Mayne offers a more enlightened view, 
suggesting that the rule forbidding recovery of the appreciated value of 
the land in the case of executed contracts ' is clearly the equitable rule, 
where the improvements arise from causes of an entirely collateral 
nature, such as the growth of a town, the formation of a railway, or the 
like. The occupier has had all the benefits of this increased value, so long 
as it lasted, without paying anything like it.'*45 
It is true that doctrinal purity and administrative convenience must be 
recognized as having played a role in the evolution of laws which denied 
protection of contractual entitlements by liability rules. My point, 
however, is that the societal decision to deny the right to recover damages 
was based upon considerations identical to those which provided the 
foundation for the recognition of property rights in contract. It may be 
argued that motives very different from those expressed in the cases lay 
behind the common law doctrine denying recovery of damages for breach 
of contract to sell land. The combined forces of the rules mandating 
performance of land contracts almost without exception and complemen- 
tary rules denying compensation in damages defined land, and contracts 
respecting land, very differently from other kinds of property and 
contracts. 
Specific performance as a means of withdrawing land from commerce, 
or, in any event, of erecting barriers to its entry, may be perceived more 
accurately as a component in a broader political constitution which 
included a common law rule denying recovery of lost profits on breach of 
a contract to buy land. Fuller and Perdue have detailed the significance of 
recovery for lost opportunities, or, to put it differently, of recovery of an 
individual's expectation interest, as an incentive to the development of 
market exchange transactions in western economies: 
In seekingjustification for the rule granting the value of the expectancy there is no 
need, however, to restrict ourselves by the assumption, hitherto made, that the 
rule can only be intended to cure or prevent the losses caused by reliance ... It may 
be said that there is not only a policy in favor of preventing and undoing the harms 
resulting from reliance, but also a policy in favor of promoting and facilitating 
reliance on business agreements. Agreements can accomplish little, either for 
their makers or for society, unless they are made the basis for action. When 
business agreements are not only made but are also acted on, the division of labor 
is facilitated, goods find their way to the places where they are most needed, and 
economic activity is generally stimulated. These advantages would be threatened 
by any rule which limited legal protection to the reliance interest. Such a rule 
would in practice tend to discourage reliance. The difficulties in proving reliance 
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and subjecting it to pecuniary measurement are such that the business man 
knowing, or sensing, that these obstacles stood in the way ofjudicial relief would 
hesitate to rely on a promise in any case where the legal sanction was of 
significance to him. To encourage reliance we must therefore dispense with its 
proof. For this reason it has been found wise to make recovery on a promise 
independent of reliance, both in the sense that in some cases the promise is 
enforced though not relied on (as in the bilateral business agreement) and in the 
sense that recovery is not limited to the detriment incurred in reliance.@ 
Generally, we have chosen to encourage commerce through legal 
recognition of the purchaser's expected return on his investment - a legal 
rule complemented as it must be (in terms of economic efficiency) by a 
general rule denying specific performance. The operation of the two 
rules allows a promisor to break his contract whenever it is advantageous 
for him to do so while at the same time leaving the promisee no worse off, 
in monetary terms, than he was prior to the breach. 
Land, however, was not accorded such a liberal ideology. Specific 
performance tied the hands of sellers of land who might otherwise have 
breached their contracts if offered a higher price by one to whom the land 
was more valuable.'47 In addition, the most potent form of incentive to 
contract - legal protection of the contractor's expected economic profit - 
was, in a very great number of cases, denied outright. The most obvious 
and substantial risk in the market-place in land (ie, the risk of non- 
performance due to a defect of title) was allocated by the state to the 
purchaser. He might, of course, negotiate for a reallocation of that risk to 
the seller, but the transfer would not come cheaply, and negotiations are 
never costiess. Finally, the risk was absolute. Not only was the loss 
non-compensable in damages, specific performance would not generally 
be ordered if the seller did not have full ownership of the land.@ Without 
this encouragement, markets in land in the hope of attaining financial 
profit may not have developed as rapidly as they otherwise might have. 
One cannot but question the foundation of contract when, for some two 
hundred years during which specific performance was granted almost 
without hesitation, one can uncover perhaps three or four cases in which 
damages for breach were sought,'49 compared with dozens of reported 
cases in contracts involving goods.'5" Perhaps a modern perspective 
allows a more sensitive appreciation of the subtle impact of denying 
recovery for lost profits: '[Rleal property is the only character of property 
absolutely essential to human existence, and ... it is the policy of the law ... 
not to encourage speculative or chance bargaining in it, but to adjust the 
rights of the parties concerning its transfer, by placing them in the status 
quo.'15' The status quo is precisely what contract and exchange relation- 
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ships are not about, and in societies in which land was not so intensely 
endowed with political and social personality, calls for the abolition of the 
rule and for legal recognition of the expectation interest in contract came 
q~ickly.'~' 
It is a truism to say that the power to alienate is a central element in the 
bundle of rights which constitute 'ownership' in land, and while society 
acknowledged the right to transfer land through private bargains, bar- 
riers were erected through which contractual exchange could take place 
only with substantial interference. It has been said, for example, that the 
medieval distinction between real and personal property amounted 
'roughly to this, that over the first, one had much less power of disposition 
than over the second."53 Primogeniture,'5* the perpetuation of feudal 
tenures until 1660,'~5 and the pervasive resistance to land reform which 
would have increased security of titles and eliminated the worst part of the 
consumptive costs on land transfer's6 are only the most obvious devices 
which limited economic intercourse in land. To these can be added 
specific performance. Unlike the law applicable to all other contracts, 
which simply meant that a party who intended to breach would have to 
assess his prospective profits on breach against the damages payable to his 
first contractor, the law of specific performance, through the creation of a 
property right in the purchaser, forbad the sale of land at a better price to 
an alternative purchaser who valued the property more highly, unless the 
first purchaser were willing to sell his opportunity to engage in political 
life and society. In addition, the purchaser of land could not generally 
recover his expectation interest or profit on breach, and in an era when 
ownership of land was notoriously obscure and inconclusive the risk of 
non-compensable forgone opportunities arising on contractual failure 
operated as a potent disincentive to contractual exchange. Finally, the 
costs of professional assistance, registration fees, transaction taxes, 
expenses of searching and confirming title, and the substantial delays 
characteristic of land transfer in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries 
combined to create imposing obstacles to efficient market exchange. The 
existence of these 'costs of sale,' added to the cost of the land itself, would 
certainly have reduced the incidence of exchange transactions. As 
transaction costs are added to the 'true market value' of the land, the 
number of willing buyers diminishes, and the most probable transactions 
(between buyers and sellers of land whose numbers are, by definition, 
highest at the market price) are excluded.'57 
The point here is quite simple. The rule denying compensation in 
damages for a breach of contract to transfer land, if in reality a contract to 
transfer political, legal, and social status, may have operated as a barrier to 
the creation of markets in land - and may thus have protected and 
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reinforced the existing distribution of those commodities. In addition, 
rules denying compensation may have had a more subtle, but equally 
significant, impact on the manner in which society and the law defined 
land and thus exchanges of land. 
I remarked earlier, too summarily perhaps, that liability rules in 
contract presuppose that society is willing to engage in the public valua- 
tion of the object of private exchange relationships. When we enforce 
contracts to transfer grain, or automobiles, or corporate shares, we do 
not find it disturbing (if in fact the issue enters our conscious minds at all) 
that a public, government agency (ie, a court, and in particular a judge 
whose orders are enforced through executive action) will tell us what 
these commodities are 'worth' in dollars and cents. This dispassionate 
attitude to public valuation is not always so easily come by. Were ajudge to 
enforce a contract to sell a kidney, or an arm, or a leg, some of us, at least, 
would react with horror. While markets in many goods have been 
permitted in western societies, markets in human body parts have not 
gained considerable social acceptance. Although some might actually 
insist that everything has a price,'58 and while economic analysis of 
contract remedies has implicitly assumed monetization of all 10sses,~59 that 
assertion, even if true, does not necessarily mean that the state should 
announce that fact, and indeed it does not deny that some want to believe 
that certain things are (or perhaps ought to be) literally priceless. The 
point is that the pricingof certain 'ethical phenomena"6"carries the risk of 
degradation if in fact such monetization is possible at all, and at its most 
simplistic level the costs of this monetization may be so great as to justify 
the adoption of distribution and allocative mechanisms other than the 
market. As we have seen, land transfer was a political and cultural 
ceremony of some significance, and while society may have allowed 
market exchanges in land to take place, the bargaining was not always an 
amoral event. 'Is it going too far to suggest that while estates in land were 
focused with a vital personal affinity between lord and vassal, to speak of a 
land market [was] profane?''61 
Thus we have seen that while contracts for the sale of land, which as a 
matter of course carried the franchise and political authority, were 
specifically enforced, the law denied legal recognition of contracts which 
were openly bargains to distribute votes or to confer a knighthood. The 
point here is that the law may have been unwilling to admit that social 
goods were being traded like all other commodities. We put prices on 
things we don't want to price, but we don't like doing it, admitting that we 
do it, or especially having it called to our attention. We enforce contracts 
knowing the buyer is buying the right to sit in Parliament, but if he says he 
is doing that we call him 'venal' or 'mer~enar~."~ '  This would be even 
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more so if we as a society were asked to state publicly the worth of that 
right. Essentially the same attitudes were revealed by one commentator 
who wrote, at the turn of the century: 'There was a time, and that not 
many years since, when a proposal to a landowner to discuss the merits of 
what is called "Free Trade in Land" would have been regarded by him in 
much the same light as a suggestion that he should put a price on his 
personal raiment."63 
The political and social goods associated with land ownership may have 
evoked powerful moral notions as to the appropriate role of the state in 
recognizing market transactions. At the same time, this almost religious 
sanctity may have been raised as justification for the decidedly skewed 
distribution of land in society. The inequalities of distribution were, as 
Mill put it, justified by imbuing land with honorific qualities: 'Landed 
property is felt even by those most tendacious of its rights, to be a very 
different thing from other property; and where the bulk of the com- 
munity have been disinherited of their share of it, and it has become the 
exclusive attribute of a small minority, men have generally tried to 
reconcile it, at least in theory, to their sense ofjustice, by endeavouring to 
attach duties to it, and erecting it into a sort of magistry, either moral or 
legal."64 
Calabresi and Bobbit have denominated this market trait as the 'cost of 
costing': '[M]oralisms and the affront to values ... of market determina- 
tions that say or imply that the value of life or some precious activity 
integral to life is reducible to a money fig~re."~5 The 'right' to land created 
through the adoption of property rules during the seventeenth and 
eighteenth centuries emphasized the pricelessness of land through obvi- 
ation of the odious task of public assessment of the value of so majestic 
a good. Political authority, the right to vote, and social status (all 
represented by promissory entitlements to land) were protected, to a very 
large degree, by a property rule and not by a liability rule.'66 Not only did 
society through specific performance acknowledge the primacy of land; 
at the same time it retreated from calls to engage in the pricing or 
monetization of social class or political power. 
The conclusion one must draw after assessing the development of 
property rules and liability rules in contracts for the transfer of land is that 
the law not surprisingly reflected the very powerful political and social 
mores of the times. The limitations on freedom to contract created and 
preserved through the technical complexities of the land law were 
complemented both by the denial of the freedom to breach through the 
doctrine of specific performance and by the denial of compensation if 
breach did occur. Land was not destined to become a commodity trading 
freely at prices determined by multitudes of individual bargains. Rather, 
as a proxy for political authority, it would be kept within narrow bounds, 
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perpetuating a social hierarchy where 'the freeholder on the land, and the 
freeman in the town were, each in his sphere, the accredited elements in 
society, in comparison with which other men appeared, not as rival 
classes, but as adjuncts, or excrescences, or even social dangers.'167 
Economic individualism and the metamorphosis of the legal and 
economic foundations of English society from status to contractz6* were 
not to alter the status of landlord. Pollock, in his notes to Maine's treatise, 
says '[Wlhat we call [a man's] status is his position as a lawful man, a voter, 
and so f0rth,"~9 implicitly acknowledging that the transfer of freehold 
land would have consisted of an exchange of money for political status. 
And the metamorphosis of land from a symbol of political and social 
status to an economic commodity would have meant the devolution of 
political authority to all of those who could pay for it. The sale of land, if 
assimilated to the sale of personality, would have become a commercial 
event involving the exchange of wealth in money for wealth in land - 
which would have meant the death of the sale and contract as a political 
and social event. Specific performance and non-recovery of damages 
were simply doctrinal manifestations of values which had evolved in a 
society which first created a right to participate in government, then 
defined it in terms of the ownership and possession of a real object in the 
hands of a relatively narrow structure of society, and finally established 
and preserved legal rules which at once proclaimed the ideal of repre- 
sentative democracy and the inviolability of pr~perty. '~" Land, during the 
early history of England, does not easily fit within the paradigm of con- 
tract as linked to the ethics of free enterprise, small individualistic 
entrepreneurs, and ~api ta l ism.~~'  To the extent that free enterprise 
capitalism existed at all, it did not apply to the ownership of rights enjoyed 
by a narrow political Clite. The state had a direct and abiding interest in 
the distribution of this political wealth among the populace, and if 
freedom of contract would entail a reallocation of political authority, those 
who controlled the machinery of government, including judicial govern- 
ment, would not be likely to encourage it.'7' 
The absence, or at least the sublimation, of pecuniary motivations in 
transactions which assumed the guise of contract but in substance were 
consumated with radically different objectives nurtured the advancement 
of non-pecuniary remedies. Personal expectations of political identity or 
societal objectives respecting the allocation and transfer of land would 
hardly have been well served had legal institutions limited redress to 
money compensation. The observation that 'the factors that have made 
compulsion of promisors attractive in a planned economy are plainly 
absent in a free enterprise economy''73 takes on a special meaning in the 
light of the role of land before the industrial revolution. Land had not yet 
been incorporated into the market-place, and the 'privileged freeholder' 
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who clung to his vote with extraordinary tenacity, secluding it from 
copyholders and leaseholders, did so by keeping his freehold out of the 
market. In the end, this tactic could not have met with success, and indeed 
landowners were mortgaging and selling off their land throughout the 
seventeenth and eighteenth centuries in order to raise capital. But they 
did so only because they were left no alternative, and they did it with a full 
knowledge that society would thereby be admitted to the franchise.'74 
The status of land and, for our purposes, the status of contracts to 
transfer land that is reflected in the evolution of property rules and the 
complementary modification of liability rules denying recovery of expec- 
tation interests has surfaced in at least one jurisdiction, in the application 
of criminal sanctions to interference with promissory entitlements. This 
extension of protection beyond liability and property rules reflects a 
philosophy of state compulsion not frequently found in the common law 
of ~ontract.'7~ The introduction of penal sanctions to enforce contracts or 
to deter purposeful contractual breach is most obvious in the context of 
imprisonment for contempt, exercisable against a promisor whose 
voluntary private obligation has been transmuted into law through the 
issuance of an order for specific performance. His incentive to perform, 
perhaps consisting of the fear of social reprobation, the loss of commer- 
cial reputation, or an order to pay damages, is joined by the prospect of 
incarceration for contempt. Less common is the application of direct 
criminal liability for breach of contract such as existed in respect of land 
contracts even in ~ a n a d a . ' ~ ~  
Generally, the law has not coerced men to keep their promises, except 
in so far as recovery for lost profits is perceived as a penalty designed to 
encourage reliance on contract.*77 It is just possible that the direct 
imposition of criminal sanctions for breach of consensual 0bli~ations~7~ to 
transfer land and the more common indirect invocation of penal 
sanctions through the threat of contempt in the case of an order of specific 
performance evince a sensitivity not only to the expectations of purchas- 
ers of land apart from their purely financial motives but also to the social 
philosophy that land was not an economic commodity liable to be debased 
by market bargaining and distributed according to taste among the 
common populace. Rather, as we have seen, land was retained as a symbol 
of social class - its ownership a measure of political authority - and thus its 
distribution among the citizenry was to be closely monitored.'79 
In view of the overt political and social nature of land ownership, it is not 
at all surprising that the contracts to exchange land dramatized the 
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creation of property rules to protect contractual entitlements. Enfran- 
chisement on the acquisition of title could be made the object of a 
compensatory damage award only in a most superficial manner, with 
substantial risks of error, and only after a significant expenditure of 
judicial resources. The 'fancied goodness' of one's bargain on the 
purchase of real estate not only consisted of the obvious economic worth 
of the land (even if one could assess and account for the present value of 
future electoral payments) but included as well the enormous political 
power represented by the vote itself - in some cases the licence to sit in 
Parliament - and the incalculable value of political authority which the 
landowner could exercise over his tenants. At a time when the common 
law was moving towards objective valuation of compensation in cases of 
contract damages,280 the inescapable subjectivity and affront to social 
values represented by an attempt to value political rights and social 
privilege inevitably foreclosed the application of liability rules to contract 
entitlements in respect of land. While there is little doubt that other 
attributes of such contracts distinguished them from exchange transac- 
tions to which liability rules were traditionally applied,28' the social status 
and the value of political authority which surrounded the acquisition of 
land in England before the nineteenth century certainly played a role in 
the creation of law. 
But all of this is history. Ownership of land no longer constitutes a legal 
prerequisite to vote, to sit in Parliament, or to act as a juror.28a 
Landowners no longer control the exercise of their tenants' franchise, nor 
do tenants charge for their support. Egalitarianism, at least in the context 
of electoral democracy, is relatively well established in our political 
culture. And while class still pervades social intercourse, land ownership is 
hardly a unique badge of social acceptability. 
Where, one might ask, do we go from here? If, in reality, political, legal, 
and social status are more evenly shared in Canada than was the case in 
England during the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries (or perhaps 
ought to be more evenly shared), what can one say about the law? The 
answer has two parts. The first is that the legal rules relating to contracts 
for the transfer of land may not be as absolute as once believed. Property 
rules may be applied in a discretionary manner, and liability rules may be 
recognized without fear of encouraging commerce or of degrading 
political and social class. The second part of the answer is that the legal 
rules defining rather different contracts which may now be associated 
with political and social identity may be evolving in a manner which 
reflects that underlying cultural reality. 1 have described the weakening of 
the traditional property rules protecting contractual entitlements to 
land2'3 and the complementary modification of the liability rules which 
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historically denied protection to those contractual entitlements. What I 
would like to do now is to explore the implications of this thesis in respect 
of contracts involving the exchange of labour for money. 
It may be argued that the evolution of political, social, and cultural 
mores that has provided the foundation for the tentative, though dilatory, 
metamorphosis of contractual entitlements in respect of land may at the 
same time provide some insight into the legal definition of labour 
entitlements. Legal principles respecting promissory entitlements under 
individual and collective contracts of employment over the past century 
have reflected a persistent progression from liability rules to property 
rules, and courts no longer order the specific performance of contracts 
respecting land in every ~ a s e . ~ ~ 4  This redefinition of the nature of 
contractual entitlements to which the law applies property rules is hardly 
startling, and the institution of labour which most often surfaces when 
contract expectations are specificially enforced in a modern context has, 
to a large extent, joined land as a source of political and social authority. 
The boundaries of political and social power are now exceedingly diffuse. 
The distribution of political and social power is no longer as narrow as it 
once was, and the boundaries of property rules in contract cannot but 
reflect that dis~i~ation.'~5 
Historically, contracts of employment were not afforded the status of 
property, the common law rule stating emphatically that 'if a contract is 
terminated there are ordinarily no questions affecting status or involving 
property rights.'lS6 The ostensible foundations for the rule - a supposed 
fear of coerced employment and an understandable reluctance to oblige 
individuals to work in a close personal relationship with one another - are 
well One cannot, however, ignore the reality of protecting 
employment contracts by liability rules. As soon as society allows an 
individual to interfere with another's contract entitlements and simply 
obligates the contract-breacher to pay damages to compensate the other 
for his economic loss,'88 we sanction industrial decisions of the employer 
made solely in his interest. That is, where we decide not to protect a 
contractual entitlement to employment by a property rule, all the gains 
generated by the employer's breach are retained by the employer. At the 
same time we ignore the non-economic attributes of the contract of 
employment which, depending on one's philosophy, are non-compensa- 
ble in money damages, ought not to be compensable in damages, or are 
compensable only after extensive judicial assessment of intangible loss 
and the concomitant risk of over-compensation or under-compensation. 
It is not at all surprising that liability rules in the case of contracts of 
employment have undergone substantial modification in response to the 
transformation in the nature of the employment relationship and in the 
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expectations and attitudes of members of society towards employment. A 
person's job is no longer simply a means of acquiring short-term financial 
gain. It often represents security in the form of pension and seniority 
rights, status in the form of community respect and recognition, a sense of 
camaraderie with one's fellow employees, political influence through 
union membership, a foundation for marital and familial stability, 
security in an increasingly transient work force, a position of authority in a 
union hierarchy, and much more. What we have seen in response to these 
non-economic attributes of contracts is a judicial acceptance of the 
philosophy that losses suffered on breach of an individual contract of 
employment are of more than a narrow financial import to an employee. 
The resulting modification of the rules defining labour entitlements has 
had two branches. The first has been the recognition of subjective, 
non-economic expectations in the application of liability rules. The 
second has been the protection of labour entitlements by property rules. 
The older cases almost unanimously rejected claims for non-economic 
loss on breach of contracts of employment,'89 and those which did 
acknowledge this facet of contract allowed recovery for other than lost 
wages only in cases of theatrical or journalistic endeavours,'gO on the 
theory that a term of the contract of employment, express or implied, 
was the opportunity of enhancing the employee's reputation.'gl The 
intransigent attitudes expressed at the turn of the twentieth century in 
Addk v Gramophone Company Ltd.,'g2 which it has been said by one judge 
'can work inj~stice,'~93 have in recent times been adopted with reluctance. 
In Cox v Philips Industries Ltd.*94 Lawson, J awarded 2500 to the plaintiff, 
representing the 'vexation, distress and general disappointment and 
f r~s t ra t ion ' '~~  consequent upon the loss of employment. In another case, 
the 'loss of social prestige' incurred by union members who had been 
wrongfully expelled from their union was held compensable in contract, 
notwithstanding the absence of any demonstrable pecuniary ~ o s s . ' ~ ~  
Moreover, the extension of the interests protected by liability rules in 
the case of contracts of employment has been complemented by modifi- 
cations of the principles of specific performance. While it is too early to say 
whether or not an individual can be considered to enjoy the 'ownership of 
his job,' an increasingly sensitive judiciary and legislature are responding 
to the realities of social and economic life in the twentieth century. No 
longer can we accept the absolute authority of the law of master and 
servant reflected in judicial attitudes of the nineteenth century: 'A servant 
is a person subject to the command of his master as to the manner in which 
he shall do his work."g7 Although there may still be legitimate fears of 
economic duress in cases of employers seeking to enforce labour 
contracts,'g8 rules prohibiting the specific enforcements of labour con- 
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tracts are no longer absolute. The personal element of contract and the 
archaic status relationship of master-servant have in a very great number 
of cases become a fiction. In addition, the creation of the limited 
corporation and the reallocation of bargaining power through the 
legitimation of collective labour action suggest that historic fears of 
villeinage are no longer incontrovertible, if in fact such fears ever existed. 
Traditional contract theory has justified the application of liability rules 
to labour entitlements on the theory that the establishment of property 
rules - that is, specific performance of labour contracts - would have 
transformed agreements to serve into private enslavement at the behest 
of the employer. Thus the employer's entitlement could not be protected 
by a property rule, and theories of mutuality299 were invoked tojustify the 
converse - neither could the employee's entitlement be protected by a 
property rule. The thesis which I have developed in relation to land - that 
property rules were designed as a constraint on market exchanges and as 
a societal response to non-economic attributes of certain exchange 
relationships - suggests that rather different motives may explain the 
creation of labour entitlements which at the hands of the employee were 
protected only by a liability rule, while at the hands of the employer they 
were protected not by a private property rule (specific performance) but 
rather by a public property rule - the criminal law. 
As we have been told so often, employees as well as employers were free 
to break their promises subject only to liability in damages. If the 
employee was offered better wages, or if the employer could take 
advantage of less expensive labour, each was free to act as he wanted. 
This liberal ideology was, however, more apparent than real. Evidence 
suggests that, in reality, employers could very often 'specifically enforce' 
contracts of employment under the criminal law, while employees did not 
enjoy a complementary property right. Legal coercion can operate either 
through the vehicle of specific performance or, more directly, through 
the application of criminal sanctions for breach of contractual obligations. 
While specific performance was denied on the grounds that the law would 
not compel personal servitude, the criminal law for centuries described a 
breach of a contract of employment as a crime. 
From 1663 onwards, justices of the peace were granted jurisdiction to 
resolve employment disputes (to use a modern phrase) in certain cases, 
mostly involving payment of wages.3"" Any person trained in any of a wide 
variety of specific crafts was compellable to work in that craft except if the 
person was possessed of hnds, tenements, or for a term of any lfe or lives of 
clear yearly value of forty shillings (thus exempting land owners from the 
application of the statute!), and servants who departed from their 
master's service ('who promise or covenant to serve and do not serve 
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according to the tenor of the same')sol were subject to be committed 'to 
ward, there to remain without bail or mainprise' until they would agree to 
return and serve their master according to law.so2 In addition, servants 
who left the jurisdiction where they were employed were subject to 
recapture and imprisonment until they found another 'well and honestly 
to serve their masters ... according to the order of the law.'sOs Dissatisfac- 
tion with the act led to its replacement in 1747 by more extensive 
regulatory legislati0n.9~4 Any employee within statutorily prescribed 
classes who was found guilty of any misdemeanour, miscarriage, or ill be- 
haviour in his or her service or employment was subject 'to commitment 
to the house of correction, to remain and be corrected [whipped]so5 and 
held to hard labour for a reasonable time, not exceeding one calendar 
month.'so6 In 1766, further legislation was enacted in response to the 
disturbing practice of apprentices who, after considerable training at 
substantial cost to their masters, left for better wages.s07 After 1766 such 
behaviour in breach of contract was punishable by up to three months' 
imprisonment.so8 In addition, section 4 of the act applied to servants and 
employees 'who contract with persons for certain terms, [and] leave their 
respective services before the terms of their contracts are fulfilled, to the 
great disappointment and loss of the persons with whom they so contract.' 
The remedy for breach of contract under that section was imprisonment 
for up to three months and not less than one month.s09 There can be no 
doubt that this legislative framework, which remained in force for the 
greater part of the nineteenth century,s1° imposed criminal liability for 
breach of an employment contract by an employee. Mens rea was a 
necessary ingredient of the offence,sl' and, as we have seen, the penalties 
for breach of contract were severe. 
Thus we can see that employers did not need to seek the assistance of 
the state in the guise of enforcing entitlements by property rules. Far 
more expeditious and effective redress was available through the coercive 
medium of the criminal law. The liberal rhetoric of the Equity judges was, 
it seems, a facade, a distortion of real societal values which compelled the 
performance of personal service contracts through corporal punishment 
and incarceration. The remote possibility of imprisonment for contempt 
of court in the case of a refusal to obey an order for specific performance 
would evoke little fear in a servant liable, in summary proceedings, to 
imprisonment or physical brutality. 
In any event, labour relations have now moved to a point very distant 
from the quasi-servitude characteristic of the eighteenth- and 
nineteenth-century employment relationship. The modern example of 
contractual breach in the sphere of employment relations consists of an 
arbitrary dismissal of an employee contrary to the terms of a collective 
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agreement prohibiting discharge except for 'just cause.' When an 
employee is discharged in violation of the terms of a collective agreement, 
his only 'right' to continued employment is a contractual right either 
under an individual contract of employment or, more commonly, 
through the medium of a collective agreement of which the individual 
employee is a beneficiary. Traditional contract theory tells us that the 
employee's entitlement under his contract consists only of a right in 
damages. Modern labour policy is another matter entirely. A breach by an 
employer where the collective agreement prohibits discharge except for 
just cause is remedied in arbitration proceedings not simply by an order 
for payment of money damages but in addition through a mandatory 
order that the employee be rehired: 'Although an order of reinstatement 
and the substitution of a lesser penalty generally involve a form of 
mandatory order that was not recognized at common law, the authority of 
an arbitrator to reinstate an employee who was unjustly discharged has 
never been questi0ned.'3'~ 
The same philosophy has been reflected in court decisions through 
relaxation of the principles which historically denied the rights of 
employees to the specific enforcement of individual contracts of employ- 
ment. Individual contract entitlements have been protected by property 
rules when the terms of a collective agreement provide expressly for 
continuation of the employment relationship, and injunctive relief 
restraining an employee from engaging in his occupation has been 
ordered by the court, at least for a temporary period.3'3 As long ago as 
1944, the province of Saskatchewan enacted The Trade Union Act,S14 
which authorized an administrative tribunal, inter alia, to order an 
employer to reinstate an employee discharged in violation of the 
provisions of the act. The contrast between this view of labour contracts 
and traditional judicial conservatism was explained by the Judicial 
Committee of the Privy Council in Labour Relatim Board (Saskatchan) v 
John East Iron Works: 
The jurisdiction of the Board under s.g(e) is not invoked by the employee for the 
enforcement of his contractual rights: those, whatever they may be, he can assert 
elsewhere. But his reinstatement, which the terms of his contract of employment 
might not by themselvesjustify, is the means by which labour practices regarded as 
unfair are frustrated and the policy of collective bargaining as a road to industrial 
peace is secured. It is in the light of this new conception of industrial relations that 
the question to be determined by the Board must be viewed, and, even if the issue 
so raised can be regarded as a justifiable one, it finds no analogy in those issues 
which were familiar to the Courts of 1867.3'5 
In more recent times, the Canada Labour code316 has established a right, 
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albeit in limited circumstances, to reinstatement of employment when an 
employee has been unjustly dismissed. 
Collective rights enjoyed by the trade union and individual employees 
and the complementary contractual right of the employer to collective 
labour, established under collective agreements, are also protected by 
property rules. A lockout occurring while a collective agreement is extant 
is remedied not by damages but rather by injunctive relief.3'7 Similarly, an 
illegal strike will be enjoined, a distinction being drawn between the 
institution of forced labour and the enforcement of modern collective 
agreements.S1B The reasons for the transformation of the contractual 
entitlement are obvious. Obedience to the provisions of the collective 
agreement is often crucial to economic stability, the collective employ- 
ment relationship involving thousands of employees in industries inter- 
ference with whose operations would inevitably cripple vast sectors of a 
sensitively balanced and interdependent economy. Industrial peace, not 
industrial strife compensated by damage payments, has become the 
judicial and legislative goal. Expectations under collective labour con- 
tracts, from the perspective of both the employee and the employer, have 
replaced entitlements created by the seventeenth-century contract for the 
sale of land as deserving of protection by property rules. The collective 
agreement, however, has an economic impact which reinforces the social 
and political influence which it now reflects. In fact, the economic 
consequences of a major industrial dispute may be so terribly devastating 
to individual employees and employers, as well as to the economy of the 
nation, that the time-honoured but abstruse phrase that 'damages are an 
inadequate remedy' once again becomes meaningful. 
The concept of 'ownership of jobs,' which simply reflects the enforce- 
ment of promissory entitlements through property rules, is now a 
common social expectation: 
With respect to the protection of the employee's interest in his job, we are dealing 
with an inference from facts rather than with ajudicially named property interest. 
The legal recognition of collective bargaining as a 'right' with workers maintaining 
their employee status during strikes or other labor disputes, and with enforceable 
claims on employment if illegally discharged, with back pay for the period of 
illegal withholding of employment - all this amounts to property, however 
unwilling the courts may be to offend traditional sentiment by use of the term.3'9 
Perhaps the form of property in employment which readers will 
recognize most immediately is that defined by membership rights granted 
by self-governing professional licensing institutions. Membership in the 
medical, legal, and academic professions, or indeed in any other private 
organization which exercises a monopoly or near-monopoly over a 
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unique and essential service and which restricts entry through any of a 
variety of standards, is an 'immensely valuable right,'sZ0 representing a 
legal licence to perform certain activities which others are excluded from 
performing.g2' The 'right' to join a profession or to continue one's 
membership if one has fulfilled the professional req~irements3'~ and has 
not breached the rules established by the guild is protected by a property 
rule. Thurman Arnold once described himself as owning only 'rank and 
privilege in an organizational hierarchy,'s23 and many of us today could 
say little more than that. Charles Reich echoed these sentiments three 
decades later, when he spoke of wealth deriving from professional or 
occupational employment.3'4 Reich called attention to the failure of 
society to afford substantive and procedural protection to these new 
forms of property, a failure remedied today in some jurisdictions by 
judicial creativity, legislative initiatives, and executive programs.3'5 The 
most dramatic example of this metamorphosis in contract entitlements in 
respect of labour contracts is the institutionalization of specific perform- 
ance of employment contracts in England. There, legislation has empha- 
sized reinstatement and re-engagement of employees, which became 
primary remedies in cases of individual loss of employment under the 
Employment Protection Act, 1975326 and have been continued in more 
recent times under the Employment Protection (Consolidation) Act, 
1978.3'~ Yet the legislation, which in a euphemistic trick has avoided using 
the term 'specific performance' to describe its remedial process, does not 
sanction disobedience through the invocation ofjudicial or administrative 
contempt. Instead it authorizes economic sancti0ns3'~ - the assessment of 
substantial sums above the amount considered appropriate according to 
compensatory standards.3'9 
This tentative advance in the law, in respect of both individual and 
collective contract entitlements, merely reflects another stage in a long 
history of social innovation designed to promote the creation and 
redistribution of property and, with it, the transfer of social and political 
power. Legislation which first relaxed and then erased franchise qualifi- 
cations premised on land ownership was interwoven with and dependent 
upon the introduction of reform legislation designed to simplify the 
archaic, irrational, and wholly dysfunctional land law, which, in govern- 
ing the ownership and sale of land, had effectively precluded access to it. 
Simplification of substantive real property law3s0 and the introduction of 
legislation which insisted upon public registration to protect property 
rights33' intended to reduce the fetters on land as a factor in commerce 
were but an adjunct of political reform. The revolution in democratic 
politics and land ownership went hand in hand, and efforts to subvert 
reform were directed at both. Dicey, reflecting on the conflict in 
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philosophies of democratic socialism and radicalism in the nineteenth 
century in their efforts to 'make land easily saleable'33' when confronted 
both by the political conservatism of the landowners and by the land laws 
which had withdrawn land from the mainstream of commerce,333 argued 
that the latter merely reinforced the former, representing the ideas and 
meeting the desires of the landed classes.334 
The weakenings of the rigid, historical limitations on property rules 
cannot be denied. Land no longer represents the most powerful or the 
sole form of wealth; nor does it now stand as a symbol of absolute political 
power or otherwise unattainable social privilege. The creation and 
redistribution of new and traditional forms of wealth have dramatically 
altered the assumptions upon which property rules were first developed 
to protect only a narrowly defined class of contract entitlements. The 
application of property rules to promissory entitlements is not a static 
construct but, like contract law itself, reflects and shapes social and 
cultural norms. Contract does not, whether or not we are comfortable 
with its dynamic nature, exhibit well-settled principles335 but rather 
involves an ongoing interaction with other social institutions, responding 
to change which may have been born outside the legal system but which, at 
the same time, has been sculpted by the law.3s6 The evolving economic, 
political, social, and cultural attributes of land and labour and the 
corresponding modifications of the rules protecting contractual entitle- 
ments are indeed reform movements. 
The progression of society from status to contract reflects a restructur- 
ing of individual relationships away from immutable, hierarchical alloca- 
tions of authority, grounded not only in family but more directly in the 
'tenurial relation of man to man,' in 'estates and tenure of land.'337 Social 
relationships today are not static, involving as they do an ongoing struggle 
to achieve some semblance of balance between institutions, as well as 
individuals, insisting on respect for divergent or antipodal interests. To 
the extent that society allows the creation and definition of relationships 
through private expressions of free will either by individuals acting alone 
or by collective institutions of labour, capital, and consumer interests, 
contract cannot remain burdened under eighteenth-century ideals of 
status in land. Our conception of property over the centuries has ex- 
hibited only one constant, and that constant is that the meaning of 
property will always change. There is nothing either in history or in 
reason to support a thesis which would exempt property rights in contract 
from this evolutionary process, and it thus becomes imperative that the 
law, if it is founded in social consensus, must respond to the values and 
forces which have shaped contractual expectations and private obliga- 
tions in our society. 
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contractual right of pre-emption as an interest in land (as a subspecies of option) on the 
'underlying theory ... that the option to purchase land does create an equitable interest 
because it is specifically enforceable.' Ibid, at 277. See also Frobicher Ltd. v Canudian 
Pipelines Ltd. et al. (1958) 2 1 D.L.R. (2d) 449 (s.c.c.). Morris and Leach The RuLAgaimt 
Perpetuities (2nd ed 1962) 219, 220. Jackson Principles of Prqpetty Law (1967) 301,302, 
399. Precisely the opposite result obtains in Australia, where a right of pre-emption has 
been held to constitute a mere contractual interest. MuRoy v WiLton (1947) 47 S.R. 
(N.s.w.) 3 15,325. Harpum, Rights of pre-emption: Ugly ducklings into swans (1978) 37 
Camb. LJ.  2 13; Scott, Options of purchase (1918) 38 Can. Law Tims  242. One discovers 
on reading the cases that the issue as to whether an option creates an interest in land is 
apt to be determined according to its consequences. If the outcome is the invalidation 
of the option-holder's rights (for example, under the rule against perpetuities), one is 
Likely to find decisions describing the right as purely contractual - thus not constituting 
an interest in land. Where, however, an interest in land is a pre-requisite to certain 
rights (eg, where the land has been sold to a third party, and the validity of the holder's 
registration is challenged) a proprietary interest will miraculously appear. La Forest 
has made the point that protecting property rights effects fungibiity, but concludes 
that the interest of the optionee, if recognized as a property interest, will bring the 
registration acts into play, leading to a dearer determination of priorities. He thus 
overlooks the point that priority conflicts might be avoided entirely simply by defining 
the optionee's interest as a claim in damages. La Forest, Real property - options - 
rights of pre-emption - equitable interest in land - personal contractual obligation - 
rule against perpetuities (1960) 38 Can. Bar Rev. 595. Similarly, in Warnington v M i l k  
rig751 2 W.L.R. 654, where the English Court of Appeal refused specific performance 
of an agreement for a sublease, Stamp LJ noted that the 'equitable interests which the 
intended lessee has under an agreement for a lease do not exist in v m ,  but arise 
because the intended lessee has an equitable right to specific performance.' Ibid, at 
661. Megarry J has adopted the same restricted analysis, suggesting that 'the existence 
of an equitable interest in the purchaser as soon as the contract is signed depends'upon 
the contract being specifically enforceable.' Megany, Note (1960) 76 Law (2. Rev. zoo, 
202; Mapp, Torrens' elusive title (1978) I A h .  L.R. (Book Series) 162. 
Yet others have argued precisely the converse - that specific performance is available 
because the daimant has acquired an equitable interest in the property. Heathcote v The 
North StaffmdchireRailway Company (1 850) 2 M. & G. I lo, I 12. The courts consistently fail 
to explore beyond that point, justifying the creation of property rights in contract on 
the availability of specific performance, and the availability of specific performance on 
the existence of property rights, leaving the law no wiser than it was before. Brandeis J,  
in Zn&nutimul News Seruices v Associated Press (1918) 248 U.S. 2 15, admitted the obvious 
in recognizing the shallowness of the traditional view for what it is. If we are to 
understand why property rules are only sometimes applied to protect contractual 
entitlements, we must, at the outset, jettison the tautological reliance on the right to 
specific performance as the prerequisite to the creation of property rights and the 
existence of property rights as a pre-condition to an order of performance of a 
promissory obligation: 'The doctrines relating to specific performance do not, I think, 
afford a test or measure of the rights created. There are cases where the rights of the 
parties may be worked out by specific performance though no specific lien is created. 
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More frequently, a specific lien is created though no case of specific performance is 
contemplated.' Tailby v Official Receiver (1888) 13 App.Cas. 523, 548. 
g The classic argument put forward for limiting curial jurisdiction to order specific 
performance is 'respect for individual freedom,' the right to freedom of contract 
reflected in the concomitant freedom to breach. Keeton and Sheridan, Equity (2nd ed 
1976) 360. O'Neill, Specific performance of a contract for purchase and sale of land 
(147%) 2 1  Chitty's L.I. 104. The view that specific performance constitutes a direct 
- 
infringement df pefsonar liberty is reflected in derisions establishing the power to 
order ~erformance of contractual oblieations in the iudiciarv rather than in adminis- 
-2 a 
trative agencies in some circumstances. See Reference re Constitutional Questions Act 
(Alberta) (1978) 7 R.P.R. 104. 
The  time-honoured phrase 'The law of England will not permit any man to enslave 
himself by contract' (Somersett's case, 2 0  St. Tr. 1; Stocker v Brockkbank (1851) 42 E.R. 
257) and the historical and somewhat archaic doctrine forbidding the ordering of 
performance of contracts of personal service need no elaboration here. See Marsh, 
Specific performance of contracts for continuous personal relations (1 894) 14 Can. Law 
Times 1; Emerald Resources Ltd. v Sterling Oil Properties Management Ltd. (1969) 3 D.L.R. 
(3d) 630,647, affirmed 15 D.L.R. (3d) 256n; Garnett v Amtrong(lg78) 83 D.L.R. (3d) 7 17 
(N.B.s.c.A.D.); Rushton v McPherson [1939] 4 D.L.R. 78111, 14 M.P.R. 235; McWhirter v 
Governors of the University of Alberta (1978) 80 D.L.R. ( ~ d )  609. 
There can be little doubt that the protection of a contractual obligation by a property 
rule impacts more intrusively on the liberty of one who interferes with it than does 
protection by a liability rule. Where the value of the promised performance is, to the 
plaintiff, identical to the value of the damage award, the only consequence of an order 
for specific performance will be to deprive the defendant of a choice between 
alternative courses of behaviour. If ordered to perform, he can comply, ignore the 
judicial direction and thus risk incarceration, or bargain with the claimant under the 
handicap of a judicial order in the other's favour. Where a contract entitlement is 
protected only be a liability rule, the defendant can choose to perform, either by 
locating a new contractor or  by performing himself; he may renegotiate the contract, 
or, as is more common, he can compensate the plaintiff through a transfer of money 
raised in a manner which generates the least cost to him. Simpson A Histoty ofthe Com- 
mon Law of Contract (1975) 597. In Bromage v Genning (1616) I Rolle 368 an action had 
been commenced to compel the defendant to execute a lease. A prohibition against the 
action was sought, and Lord Coke said that 'this would subvert the intention of the 
covenantor when he intends it to be at his election either to lose the damages or to make 
the lease, and they wish to compel him to make the lease against his will; and so it is if a 
man binds himself in an obligation to enfeoff another, he cannot be compelled to make 
the feoffment.' 
l o  An order for performance of even a simple contract of sale may catalyse substantial, 
time-consuming, and intractable disputes involving the manner and time of delivery, 
the quality of the property transferred, claims of third parties, misunderstandings as to 
allocation of responsibility for obligations which continue after delivery, and the like. 
In the regular course of events, these expected nonconformities with contractually 
assumed obligations are often resolved informally through private negotiation - by 
promises to cure, modification and renegotiation of future sale contracts, or  price 
adjustments. An order for performance, unlike a damage award, which in terms is as 
simple an obligation as one might conceive, obliges the court to take upon itself the 
myriad risks attendant upon contract. If the plaintiff is, or  ought to be, indifferent as to 
a compensatory or performatory award, the choice is obvious. 
Difficulties of supervision with respect to the exactitude of the ordered performance, 
administrative costs imposed by a judicial supervisory role, and the lack of expertise in 
the judiciary have been proffered, over time, as explanations for refusals to order 
performance. See generally Dominion Coal Co. Ltd. v Dominion Iron &f Steel Co. Lld. [ igog] 
A.C. 893; PowellDUffvyn Steam Coal Co. v Taff Vale Railway (1894) LR g Ch. App. 331; 
Ryan v Mutual Tontine Ltd. [~gog]  A.C. 293; Powell Duffryn Steam Coal Co. v Westminster 
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Chambers Association [18g3] 1 Ch. 116 (c.A.) (promise to provide a porter held not spe- 
cifically enforceable). A common example of the attitude of the courts towards 
specific performance is presented by the case of construction contracts - which are not 
generally specifically enforced on the ground that the judicial branch of government 
has neither the resources nor the expertise to engage in extended and exacting 
supervision of private obligations. Yet again the rule is not absolute. Tanenbaum v W.J. 
Bell Papm Co. [1g56] O.R. 278; Gross v Wright [1923] S.C.R. 2 14,2 19. Williston suggests 
that traditional judicial conservatism is due to 'the difficulty of enforcing a decree 
without an expenditure of effort disproportionate to the value of the result.' 5 Willuton 
on Contracts (1937) 3976-7. 
It is clear that the mere presence of uncertainty or ambiguity in the order or the 
requirement of judicial supervision will not be dispositive. Thus a vendor has been 
ordered to make an application to a land planning authority for a subdivision approval 
in Dynamic TransportLtd, v O.K. DetailingLtd. (1978) 85 D.L.R. (3d) 19; Hoggv Wilkaetal. 
(1974) 51 D.L.R. (3d) 51 1; Sleiner et al. v E.H.D. Investments Ltd. (1977) 78 D.L.R. (3d) 
499 leave to appeal to the Supreme Court of Canada refused 14 December 1977). A 
contrary view was expressed in E.J.H. Holdings Ltd. v Bougieet m. (1977) 3 Alta. L.R. 244. 
Similarly a company has been ordered to apply for permission to deal on the London 
Stock Exchange. Nmlhtrn Counties Securities Ltd. v Jackson &? Steep& Ltd. [I  9741 2 All E.R. 
625. 
1 I It is easy enough to see that the social obligation arising on contract has been defined in 
a manner which limits the intrusive nature of the judicial role. While we might have 
chosen to establish a legal obligation to perform a specific task, we have created a more 
generalized obligation to transfer wealth in the form of money, allowing each 
individual to retain the freedom to act as he wants, subject only to this economic 
restraint. The similarity between this perception of individual contract obligation 
fulfilled through a transfer of money and a more generalized social obligation again 
met through a transfer of money rather than services or performance is remarkable: 
'One reason why taxation seems generally thought to be a more acceptable form of 
required contribution than, say, a system of required tasks or a requirement of 
payments in kind is that it leaves citizens with greater latitude in declding how to 
arrange their lives while still meeting their social obligations.' Scanlon, Liberty, contract 
and contribution, supra note 7. Nozick, however, has denied the distinction: 'Taxation 
of earnings from labor is on par with forced labor.' Nozick Anarchy, State and Utopia 
(1974) 169. See generally Cooley A Treatise on the Law of T a M t i a  (2nd ed 1886) 13-15, 
McCulloch describes 'labour taxes, or contributions of personal services for the 
execution of public works,' as 'among the very worst species of taxes.' McCulloch A 
Treatise on the Princi'p&s and Practical Iquence of Tawtion and the Funding System (3rd ed 
1863) 44-50 in Scottish Economics Classics Ed (O'Brien, ed, 1975). 
12 Some writen who have thought about why we enforce some promises through specific 
performance and leave others to damage awards have analysed decisions as to the 
grant or denial of specific enforcement in terms of the dangers inherent in assessing 
value in the absence of objective, accessible market price information. Kronman, 
Specific performance (1978) 45 U .  Chi. L.R. 351,352,353. Trietal, Specific perform- 
ance in the sale of goods,' [1g66] J. of Bus. Law 2 I 1, 2 16. 
Property rules have been chosen as the preferred mode of protecting certain classes 
of contractual entitlements, not on the basis of any intrinsic quality or value of the 
performance, but on the notorious risks of over-compensation or under-compensation 
attendant upon subjective assessment of value. As long ago as 1824 specific perform- 
ance of a contract for the sale of a debt upon which dividends were to be paid was 
ordered on the ground that damages could not 'accurately represent the value of the 
future dividends; and to compel this purchaser to take such damages would be to 
compel him to sell those dividends at a conjectural price.' Adderley v Diron (1824) 1 Sim 
& St. 607, 612; 57 E.R. 239. In essence, we recognize that to limit the protection of a 
promissory entitlement to liability rules is to force its 'sale' at an objectively and 
collectively determined price. If the price to be charged cannot be determined with any 
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degree of precision or without a substantial expenditure of judicial resources, we are 
apt to protect the entitlement by a property rule. For example, in Tanenbaum v W.J. Bell 
PapmCo. Ltd., supra note lo, at 3 0 9 ~ 3  10, the assessment of the present value of the cost 
of road-repair over ten years was said to be 'quite impossible to do with any degree of 
accuracy' in the light of the uncertainty as to the frequency and kind of use and the cost 
of money in the future. Accordingly, the contract for the construction of the road was 
ordered performed. 
Similar difficulties of assessment have generated corresponding judicial responses 
in a range of substantive areas of law. The well-known practice of enjoining an 
infringement of trade mark rights has been defended on the ground that 'the common 
law remedy in such situations, involving guesses as to loss of profits, is hopelessly 
inadequate.' Robinette, Protection of property interests in equity (1932) lo Can. Bar 
Rev. 172,177. 
Stoliar has argued. on the same lines. that the right of a ~urchaser who is offered a 
., " ,  " 
late delivery to reject the goods for breach of condition in the absence of proof of loss 
is a response to uncertainties in damage assessment. Delay, of itself, may not result in a 
directly calculable economic loss, and, even where it does, its assessment raises 
intractable problems. The response - allowing the buyer to repudiate even in the 
absence of demonstrable loss - is simply a means of allocating the risk of uncertainty in 
damage assessment to the party in breach. See Thomas Borihwick (Ghgow), Ltd. v Bunge 
E3 Co., Ltd. [1969] U. R. 17,28; Bowes v Shand(1877), 2 App. Cas. 455; Atiyah Thesaleof 
Goods (4th ed 1974) 60; AVO" W Co. v Comptoir Wegimont [1g21] 3 K.B. 435. Stoljar, 
Untimely performance in the law of contract (1955) 71 Law Q. Rev. 527,528. The result 
is to place the entire risk of market fluctuation on the seller if he breaches his delivery 
obligation by even a day. Bowes v Shand, ibid, per Mellish LJ at I 16; Reuterv Sah (1879) 4 
C.B.D. 239, 257. 
The same complexities inherent in demonstrating value in the absence of market 
price information and the dangers of over-compensation or under-compensation 
often underlie the recognition of liquidated damages clauses in building and 
construction contracts. Such provisions are especially important in the case of 
unprovable anticipated losses, where the adoption of stipulated compensation allows 
the parties to 'insure' their losses by agreeing on a set price for the entitlement, and to 
reduce the process costs incurred in determining the value of the expected perform- 
ance. Stoljar, ibid, at 528; Goetz and Scott, Liquidated damages, penalties and thejust 
compensation principle: Some notes on an enforcement model and a theory of efficient 
breach (1977) 77 Col. L.R. 554. Section 2-718(1) of the Uniform Commercial Code 
acknowledges that the reasonableness of a liquidated damages clause stands to be 
determined, in part, on the 'difficulties of proof of loss.' 
The archtypical case of non-market valuation is presented by land, which, because 
each parcel of realty is 'unique,' cannot, in theory, have a true market value. It may, of 
course, be virtually indistinguishable from neighbouring lands, and the sale of similar, 
albeit non-identical, lands may provide information as to the value of the promised 
performance; but again the costs and uncertainty of assessment are notorious. Hoggv 
Wilkin (1975) 51 D.L.R. (3d) 41 I (noting speculative nature of damage award and risks of 
over-compensation o r  under-compensation in cases of contracts for the sale of land). A 
typical case is Harris et a1.v Darh'ngta Properties Ltd. (1978) 6 B.C.L.R. 88, where evidence 
led by the plaintiff established the value of the land at $5 I ,450, expert evidence led by 
the defendant established the value at $8o,ooo, and the defendant himself testified that 
the land was worth $61,500. The  decision - placing a value of $65,000 on the land - 
was an uneasy compromise. 
In Hechter and Reymaft v Thurston [ig78] I W.W.R. 695 Nitikman J considered the 
evidence of a qualified appraiser as to the value of real property, the absence of sales of 
comparable property, deficiencies in accessability, and the irrelevance of sales of 
property of different areas and characteristics and admitted that the evidence of value 
in assessing damages for breach of contract was 'not very dependable.' See also E.J.H. 
Hokfings Ltd. v Bovgie et al. (1977) 3 Alta. L.R. (2d) 244. 
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The absence of a market in land is arguably of far less significance today than in the 
eighteenth century, when the rules protecting promissory entitlements were devel- 
oped. See Reiter and Sharpe, Wroth v Tyler: Must equity remedy contract damages? (1979) 
3 Can. Bw. L.J. 146, 151. As one text puts it, 'How much sense the "uniqueness of 
Blackacre" idea ever made is questionable. It makes no sense at all when translated into 
the brave, new world of Levittown in which land seems to have become fungible as 
wheat or  corn or oil.' Kessler and Gilmore Contracts, Cares and Materialr.(nnd ed 1974) 
994. 
13 Several writers have suggested that specific performance ought to be the preferred 
remedy in contract law - or at the very least should be granted more readily than it is 
today. They argue, quite persuasively, that the judicial order (or, more precisely, the 
perceived likelihood of the order) creates an environment in which the party who 
chooses to break his contractual obligation must transfer some, not all, of the wealth 
generated by the breach to his contracting partner. He will not transfer all of his 
new-found wealth, since he would be left in no better a position than he would have 
been in had he not decided to breach. Rather, he will transfer some of this benefit to the 
plaintiff, thus leaving himself better off than if he had fulfilled his contract, and leaving 
the innocent plaintiff with a portion of the wealth as well. One difficulty with this thesis 
is the probability of negotiation taking place. While the perceived likelihood of an 
order for performance will provide the potential defendant with an incentive to 
negotiate which would not exist if damages were to be awarded on breach, there is no 
obvious corresponding incentive to negotiate from the point of view of the innocent 
party. He will, if he so desires, enjoy the entire benefit of the original contract, and may 
enjoy the increased wealth now enjoyed by the contract breaker, without having to 
transfer any portion of the latter wealth. 
It is true, nonetheless, that the non-breaching party may be willing to negotiate an 
exchange of his property (ie, his potential right of specific performance) in return for 
money, thus establishing in monetary terms the subjective value of the contract to him. 
The negotiation may come about in view of the ever-present uncertainty flowing from 
evidentiary requirements, potential appeals, the exercise ofjudicial discretion, and the 
risk of intervening legislation or administrative regulation affecting the transaction. 
Moreover, the delay inherent in ajudicially ordered transfer of property may provide a 
powerful incentive to negotiate an exchange of the right to specific performance in 
return for an immediate transfer of wealth. This is not, of course, to ignore the 
non-compensable legal litigation costs and the similarly non-compensable personal 
litigation costs including stress, foregone opportunities, fear of retribution, and the 
like, which may also lead to negotiation. 
The distributive consequences of property rules have been the subject of judicial 
comment which emphasizes the process of contractual renegotiation between two 
parties where one, but not the other, is subject to a judicial order to perform the 
contract - a law, so to speak, 'passed' with only the defendant in mind. Advocates of 
specific performance have denied the coerciveness of this enforcement mechanism, 
arguing that it simply obliges the parties to negotiate a price for the right to breach - a 
thesis which may or may not be supported by the common experience that the issuance 
of an injunction or an order of specific performance typically settles the issues in 
dispute. Lord Denning has suggested that settlement is reached in gg cases out of loo 
where preliminary injunctions are issued. Fellowes v Fisher [1975] 2 All E.R 829,836. See 
Prescott, Note (1975) 91 Law 4. Rev. 168. The opportunity to renegotiate assumes, 
however, that a fair bargaining process will exist, and as long ago as 1863 in Isenbwg v 
E a t  India Howe Estate Co. (1863) 3 De G.J. a s. 263 Lord Westbury pointed out the 
dangers inherent in an order for specific performance, fearing that the defendants 
would 'be made subject to any extortionate demand' (ibid) which the plaintiff might 
impose. More recently, Graham J insisted that if an injunction were to be employed in 
order to compel a market exchange, the claimants 'must not be treated as if they were in 
the extremely powerful bargaining position which an interlocutory injunction would 
have given them.' Bracewell v Appleby [ig75] 1 Ch. 408,419. The individual nature of 
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the mandatory judicial order may have a compelling psychological impact which is 
absent in the vague, generalized notion of legal duty which most often reinforces 
contractual performance. As Chayes notes, an injunction may constitute a far more 
severe restraint on behaviour than the risk of future liability in money damages. 
Chayes, The role of the judge in public law litigation (1976) 89 Ham. L.R. 1281. One 
purpose of liability rules, and the consequent objective assessment of damages, may be 
to ensure that the price paid by the defendant is not distorted by the shadow of a 
judicially imposed duty to perform on pain of imprisonment for contempt. 
On balance, while it may be valid to argue for a distributive element in an order for 
specific performance, experience suggests that performatory obligations 'may prevent 
a negotiated solution rather than bringing it about.' Pearce The Valuation of Social Cost 
(1978) 13; Posner Economic Analysis of Law (2nd ed 1977) 97. 
14 Calabresi and Melamed, Property rules, liability rules and inalienability: One view of 
the cathedral (1072) 86 Ham. L.R. 1080. See also Hale. Coercion and distribution in a 
. ., , " d 
supposedly non-coercive state (1923) 38 PoLSc. Q. 470. 
15 Calabresi and Melamed, supra note 14, at 1106, 1107 
16 Kronman, supra note 12  
- 
17 Bentham Thory of Legislation, Principles of the Civil Code 137 (Hildreth, ed, 1840) i 37 
18 Philbrick, Changing conceptions of property in law (1938) 86 U. Pa. L.R. 691,694 
19 Kronman, supra note 12, at 353 
20 Horwitz has described the antiquated and generally disparaged theory that contracts 
were, in essence, transfers of title. Honviu, The historical foundations of modern 
contract law (1974) 87 Ham. L.R. g17,gro-3. 
21 Maitland insists that '[oln the whole ... specific performance applies to agreements for 
the sale or the lease of lands as a matter of course.' Maitland Equity (1910) 240. In 
Kloepfer Wholesah Hardware and Automotive Company Ltd. v Roy [1g52] 2 S.C.R. 465.472 
the Supreme Court of Canada said that 'generally speaking, specific performance 
applies to agreements for the sale of land as a matter of course.' In recent years we have 
witnessed a departure from the strictness of the rule, especially where the motives for 
the purchase of land are speculative. Chalh v Fairuiew Construction Ltd.(1978) 33 A.P.R. 
13; [1g77] 3 R.P.R. 117. One commentator over a half-century ago proposed that sales 
of land not be specifically enforced when the contract is of a speculative nature. Heap, 
A draft of a proposed code on the subject of the sale of lands (1922) 42 Can. Law T i w  
257. In Prittie v Laughton (1902) 1 0 . w . ~  185 specific performance of a land contract was 
refused on the grounds of the purchaser's speculative intentions. American courts 
have for a number of years been willing to assess the motives of the purchaser in 
determining whether specific performance of a contract to sell land should be enforced. 
Where the motives are speculative, damages will be the likely remedy. See Bird and 
Fanning, Specific performance of contracts to convey real estate (1935) 23 Ky. LJ.  380. 
See Watkins v Paul 95 Idaho 499.51 1 P. 2d 781 (1973); Suchan v Rutherford go Idaho 
288,295,296; 410 P. 2d 434,443 (1966); Paddock v Davenport 108 N.C. 710; 12  S.E. 464 
(1890). Recent decisions in Canada contain references to a similar philosophy. See 
306793 Ontario Ltd. in T w t  v Rims (1979) 25 O.R. (zd) 79 per MacKinnon A.C.J.O. at 81; 
Heron Bay Investmats Ltd. v Peel Elder Developmmtr Ltd. (1976) 2 C.P.C. 338, 339. See 
generally Brenner, Specific performance of contracts for the sale of land purchased for 
resale or investment (1978) 24 McCiU LJ. 513. 
22 The first suspicion that the development of property rules to protect promissory 
entitlements does not rest entirely on the intricacies and risks inherent in assessing 
damages is the well-established, indeed ancient, practice of awarding 'compensation' 
when specific performance is ordered, and where the transferor cannot convey all that 
he promised. See Wood v Gn;ffith (1 8 18) I Swan. 43; 36 E.R. 29 1 (purchaser successful in 
compelling vendor to convey limited interest, with compensation adjusted in accord- 
ance with the diminution in the value of the interest transferred); Mortlock v B u l k  
(1804) l o  Ves. 292; 32 E.R. 857 (purchaser granted specific performance with abate- 
ment of purchase price); Bowes v V a u  (1918), 43 O.L.R. 521 (area of land smaller than 
that contracted for, specific performance with compensation ordered); Mason v 
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Freeman [ig58] S.C.R. 483 (refusal to bar dower by vendor's wife, specific performance 
with compensation respecting the diminished value of the land ordered). See Harpum, 
Specific performance with compensation as a purchaser's remedy - A study in con- 
tract and equity [ig81] Camb. LJ. 47. 
The risks of error resulting in over-compensation or under-compensation, and the 
intricacies of assessment in cases of partial contractual performance are as prevalent as 
in the case of valuing the entire property, but this, as Fry notes, has not interfered with 
the development of liability rules to augment property rules; the law did not hesitate to 
value land where performance was demanded: 'Where the difference in value of the 
interest contracted for and the interest that can actually be conveyed is incapable of 
computation, the Court will not enforce specific performance. But having regard to 
some of the decided cases already referred to, it is conceived that the Court will seldom 
now consider a difficulty of this kind insuperable ... The objection that the compensation is 
unarcertuinable it, as h been already in substance obserued, one which the Court is unwilling to 
entertain' (emphasis added). Fry Specific Performance (2nd ed 1881) 539,540. 
Although one might concede that the complexities and likelihood of error in 
ascertaining the value of land in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries (when no 
market existed in which the prices of land bought and sold might have served as an 
accurate proxy for value) may have provided a powerful incentive for a remedial tool 
which would avoid the costs generated by non-market valuation, it would seem that 
other forces were at play in shaping and colouring the evolution of the law. As Maitland 
put it, 'even if land can be said to have a market value, still a man may well have 
consented to pay more ... to him the land may have a fancy value.' Maitland Equity (2nd 
ed 1936) 238. This attitude was typical of judicial discourse of the eighteenth and 
nineteenth centuries. In Adder* v Dkon (1824) 1 Sim. & St. 607, Sir John Leach vc 
commented that 'damages at law ... may not be a complete remedy to the purchaser, to 
whom the land may have a peculiar and special value' (ibid, at 610); and in 1746 Lord 
Chancellor Hardwicke observed that specific performance of land contracts would be 
decreed as a matter of course, a purchaser agreeing to buy 'on a particular liking to the 
land.' Buton v Litter and Cooper (1746). 3 Atk. 383,384. Even earlier, in 1719, land was 
pictured as a 'matter of moment and use,' Cud v Rutter (1719) P. Wms. 570; 24 E.R. 52 1. 
Remarks by councel at 571; being 'more commodious, pleasant or  convenient than 
another parcel of land' (ibid). Fry, while admitting the difficulties inherent in assessing 
value in the absence of market information, argued that 'one landed estate, though of 
precisely t h e  same market value as another, may be vastly different in every 
circumstance that makes it an object of desire.' Fry Spenfic Pnformance (2nd ed 1881) 
Para 43. 
23 The centrality of land contracts to English law and legal institutions is most evident in 
the direct disobedience of the Court of Equity in enforcing parol contracts in the face of 
legislation enacted in 1677 imposing formalities on the legal recognition (in any form) 
of promissory entitlements in respect of land. The Statute of Frauds (1677) 29 Car. 2, s. 
4 required that every 'Contract o r  Sale of Land, Tenements or  Hereditaments, or  any 
Interest in o r  concerning them' must be evidenced in writing. Holdsworth has 
exhaustively detailed the history of the statute. Holdsworth, 6 History of English Law 
(1924) 379-97. The courts devised means to avoid the statute within seven years of its 
enactment. Bzltcher v Stapelq, (1685) 1 Vern. 363. See Law Reform Commission of 
British Columbia Report on the Statute of Fraudc (L.R.c. 33, 1977); Spry Equitable Remedies 
(1971) 233; Pollock, Princi'pb of C a t r c t r  521 (13th ed., 1950). 
24 Judicial attitudes in the case of credit transactions in which the debtor's land was 
pledged as collateral stood in stark contrast to the rigour of enforcement, at common 
law, of more common contractual obligations. The intrusion of equitable doctrines to 
allow the landowner further time to meet his debt obligation so as not to forfeit his land 
has beenjustified by onejudge in almost religious terms - a product of 'the piety or  love 
of fees of those who administer equity.' Salt v Marquess of Northampton [ i  8921 A.C. 1, ig. 
Although security agreements in which personal property was impressed with debt 
obligations have, in some cases, been assimilated to the position of mortgages of realty, 
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Maitland could still say, as recently as 1910, that 'mortgages of such things ... have 
nothing to do with the doctrines of equity,' Maitland, supra note 22, at 193, 194. 
Ashburner makes the same point. Ashburner Pnncipb ofEquity (1902) 257,261. Rules 
protecting entitlements in the case of mortgages have little in common with the 
property rules applied to protect promissory entitlements in the case of purchases. In 
contracts of purchase, the law specifically compels a transfer of land, protecting the 
purchaser's entitlement through the invocation of a property rule. In the case of a 
contract to transfer land on default of a debt obligation, however, the entitlement of the 
'purchaser' (ie, the prospective transferee-mortgagee) is protected merely by a liability 
rule. In most cases, the law modifies his consensual rights, giving the debtor further 
time to pay. At best, he receives only his damages - the law insisting that the land be 
sold, with the surplus generated by the sale to be returned to the owner. Thus the 
contractual entitlement of the mortgagee can be destroyed by the mortgagor on 
payment of compensation for the mortgagee's losses. 
25 Infra, at notes 300-1 1 
26 Maitland Constitutional Histoy (1908) 538. Watkins writes that 'from [the feudal] system 
are derived our laws relative to property.' Watkins The Law of Tenures (1824) xxv, xxvi. 
Mcllwain, in The Growth of Political Thought in the West (1932) 177, 182, 355, details a 
similar confusion of public and private authority. 
27 What I mean by 'economic foundation' is simply that the individuals who are involved 
in the exchange process must perceive, or be prepared to perceive, the commodities 
that are being traded as being reducible to monetary equivalents. The wheat, or 
machinery, or shares represent a certain sum of money which has only temporarily 
assumed the guise of a tangible object. The 'economic foundation' of the contract 
reflects the financial motivations and expectations of the parties engaged in the trade. 
28 'Social needs are the essential life that give vitality to all legal institutes.' Philbrick, supra 
note 18, at 694. See also Reich, The new property (1964) 73 Yak LJ. 733. Watkins, 
writing of the feudal system observed that 'to it must we have recourse, in order to 
account for the origin and utility of many [laws] which might otherwise appear useless 
or unjust; and to it must we continually recur, to explain and illustrate what might 
otherwise seem dictated only by caprice.' Watkins, supra note 26, at xxvi. 
29 Adams Garrow's Law of Real Property (5th ed 1961) 2. Cheshire writes that 'land 
constituted the sole form of wealth.' Cheshire on M o h  Real Property (1925) 4. Topham 
comments that 'land was by far the most important form of wealth.' Topham's Real 
Property (5th ed 1961) 2. 
30 Williams The Law of Real Property (1845) 1.5 (emphasis added). See also, Pollock The 
Land Laws (1883) 53. In 1836 the value of fixed property in England was calculated to 
be f 3,327 million, out of an aggregate national capital of f4,305.5 million. Manufactur- 
ing and commercial capital, exclusive of ships, was said to represent only 5 per cent of 
the English national wealth. List The National System of Political Economy (1909) 192, 193. 
Brodrick has described the appreciation in land values during the nineteenth century. 
Brodrick English Land and English Lnndlurdc ( I  88 I) 84-8. 
31 Cheshire, supra note 29, at 6 
32 Stamp The Land ofBritain (1946) 241 
33 Dicey, The paradox of the land law (1905) Law Q. Rev. 22 I ,  226 
34 (1874) L.R. 7 H.L. 158 
35 5 Curbin on Contractr (1964) 53 1 
36 Mayne Treatise on Damages (5th ed 1894) 2 12-14 
37 Hmfurd v Waight 1 Kirby 3 (Conn. 1786) 
38 See Stone The Causes of the English Revolution 1529-1642 (1972) 73,77. 
39 Haskins, Extending the grasp of the dead hand: Reflections on the origin of the rule 
against perpetuities (1978) 126 U. Pa. L.R. 1g,24. Of course land did have value as a 
source of economic wealth through agriculture, urbanization, and pressures of 
population, and many have detailed the increased profitableness and resulting 
demand for land in the late sixteenth and early seventeenth centuries. As Tawney 
wrote: 'During the decade between 1540 and 1550 there was a furor of land 
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speculation. To the Abbey lands, which came into the market after 1536, were added 
those of the guilds and chantries in 1547. It is quite clear that some of the grantees of 
estates did not acquire them with the intention of retaining them, but simply "bought 
for the rise."' Tawney The Agrarinn P r o b h  in the Sirteenth Century (1912) 35,381. 2 
Cunningham The Growth of English Industry and Commerce (6th ed 1925) 105. 
40 Dickinson Liberty and Property. Political Ideology in Eighteenth Century Britain (1977) 51 
4 i i Mill Principles of Political Economy (5th London ed 1893) 294. Guttsman concludes that 
the landed estate considered as a financial investment was, even through the 
nineteenth century, inferior to industrial or commercial property. Guttsman, supra 
note 1, at 127. 
42 The Australian experience was similar - land quickly became a marketable commodity, 
and land ownership was far more diverse than in England. Whalen, Immediate success 
of registration of title to land in Australia and early failures in England (1967) 2 
N.Z.U.L.R. 416, 423-24. Morden reveals a decidedly realistic attitude to the dramatic 
differences between England in the eighteenth century and Canada at the turn of the 
twentieth, suggesting that 'the obvious fact that land was plentiful' in Canada explains 
the departure in philosophy of Canadian expropriation legislation from its English 
predecessors. Morden, The new expropriation legislation: Powers and procedures in 
The Law Society of Upper Canada, Special Lectures, Recent Devehpientr in Real Estate 
Law (1975) 225, 238-41. Land in England no longer exhibits the price stability it once 
did. Drewett, Land values and the suburban land market in 2 Hall (ed) The Confainmat 
of Urban Land (1973) 220-2. The Law Commission in England reacted to rapid 
increases in land values by proposing substantive reforms in the law of contract to 
protect the interests of prospective purchasers of land. See Law Commission Transfer of 
Land 'Subject to Contract' Agreements 1-3 (Working Paper No. 5 1,1973)- The commission 
retreated from its proposals in its report on the same topic. Law Commission TraNfmof 
Land. Report on ' S e e c t  to Contract' Agreements (Law Comm. No. 65,1975). See generally 
Hall (ed) Land Values (1965). 
43 Sqmrourv Delancy (1824) 3 Conv. 445, reversing (1822) 6 Johns Ch. 222. See also Gates, 
The homestead law in an incongruous land system (1936) 41 Am. Hist. Rev. 655. 
Hibbard has described rampant land speculation in America as characteristic of the 
colonial and confederation periods. Hibbard A History of the Public LandPolicies (1924) 
ch 12. 
44 Pilcher v Livingston 4 Johnson's Rep. 1 
45 M c K i n m  v Burrows (1834) 3 Q.B. (o.s.) 590; Kilborn v Workman (1862) g Ch 255. See 
Risk, The last golden age: Property and the allocation of losses in Ontario in the 
nineteenth century (1977) 27 U.T.L.J. 199, 210. 
46 Moore Social Origins of Dictatorship andDemocracy (1966) 8-13,25-g; Gash Politics in the 
Age ofpeel (1953) 177-181; Hobsbaum Zndushy and Empire 97 (1968). 
47 See McCloskey, The enclosure of open fields: Preface to a study of its impact on the 
efficiency of English agriculture in the eighteenth century (1 g72), 32 J .  ofEcon. Hist. 15. 
48 Ibid, at 23. See also Davies, The small landowner 1780-1832, in the light of the land tax 
assessments (1927-8) 1 Econ. Hist. Rev. 87; Habakkuk, English land ownership, 
1680-1740 (1939-40) 10 E c m  Hut  Rev. 1; Beckett, English land ownership in the later 
seventeenth and eighteenth centuries: The debate and the problems (1977) 30 Econ. 
Hist. Rev. (2d series) 567,570. 
49 Cockburn Lqe ofLurd Jejfrey (1857) 185 
50 See Hanbury Essays in Equity (1933) 39 
51 Burgess v Whe& (1759) i Eden. 177, 225; 28 E.R. 652. The connection of land 
ownership and the right to vote is not, of course, the entire answer. For example it may 
not explain awards of specific performance (or rather the legal ancestors of specific 
performance) prior to 1430. See Fry, supra note 22, at para 19; 1 Spence Equitable 
Juricpdence (1846) 644,645; Newland A treatise on Contracts (1 808) 88,89. Simpson has 
collected a number of cases of specific performance of contracts to convey land in the 
mid-fifteenth century. Simpson, supra note g, at 595. 
Nor can the vote explain the specific enforcement of contracts for the sale of personal 
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property o r  of land situated outside of England. See Fry, supra note 22, at paras 14,23; 
Davis v Park (1860) L.R. 8 Ch 862; T o l k  v Cartmet (1705) 2 Vern. 494; Penn v Lord 
Baltimore (1750) i Ves. Sen. 444. In addition, contracts relating to interests in land 
which did not carry the vote were specifically enforced. Hinton v Hinton (1855) 2 Ves. 
Sen. 631,638 (contract to convey copyhold enforced). 
A partial explanation for the discontinuity between the class of contracts for which 
specific performance would lie and the narrower class which would involve a transfer 
of the franchise may be found in the judicial response to the Statute of Frauds (29 Car. 
11, c. 3) in 1677 which proscribed the enforcement of parol contracts for the sale of land, 
including in the definition of land much more than freehold. Scriven Copyhold (2nd ed 
1823) 262. The doctrine of part performance quickly arose as an equitable device 
which enabled Chancery to order the specific enforcement of parol contracts 
notwithstanding their unenforceability of law. The doctrine was applied, however, 
only to those contracts for which a Court of Equity would entertain or, in the view of 
some, grant a suit for specific performance. McManus v Cook (1887) 35 Ch. D. 68 1,697 
(doctrine of part performance applies to contracts in respect of which a court would 
entertain a suit for specific performance) Rink v March [igzi] 1 W.W.R. gig (part 
performance applies to contracts of which specific performance would be ordered ). See 
also Sarbit v Hanson and Booth Fisheries Can. Co. [ig50] 4 D.L.R. 34, reversed on other 
grounds, [ig52] 2 D.L.R. 108; L a u q  v Purse11 (1888) 39 Ch. D. 508,518. 
This doctrine created a powerful incentive to expand the equitable jurisdiction to 
award specific performance of a broad range of contracts notwithstanding that political 
rights were not necessarily at issue. Some authorities take a narrower position - that the 
doctrine of part performance applies only to contracts 'concerning land' or 'relating to 
land,'but this view has been widely criticized. Britain v Rossiter(i87g) 1 1 Q.B.C. i 23, 129, 
13 1, criticized in Williams The Stat& of Frauds (1932) 239; Maddison v Alderson (1887) 1 
Mac. & G. 572; 41 E.R. 1387; Fry states that the doctrine applies to 'all cases in which a 
Court of Equity would entertain a suit if the alleged contract had been in writing.' Fry 
Spec@ Petformance (6th ed 192 1) 283. Spry concurs in this opinion, citing numerous 
Australian authorities to that effect. Spry, supra note 23, at 237, 238. 
52 Defoe The Original Power of the Collective Body of the People of England, Examined and 
Assert~d (1702) 18 
53 There is some debate as to whether the pre-1430 franchise extended to freemen or to 
freeholders. See Hodgins The Canoda Franchise Act (1886) 14. Chalmers and Asquith, as 
well as Medley, argue that only freeholders elected members of Parliament prior to 
1430. Chalmers and Asquith Outlines of Constitutional Law (3rd ed 1925) 334. Medley 
English Constitutional Histoy (4th ed 1907) 195, 196. Professor Hearn discusses the 
possibility that only tenants in chief of the Crown voted prior to 1430. Hearn The 
Government of England (1886) 534-7. In 1405 by 7 Henry IV, c 15 the franchise was 
expressly vested in all freeholders. 
54 8 Henry VI, c 7. The residency qualification was made explicit in 1432 by lo Henry VI, c 
7. Little attention was paid to the latter statute, and it was formally repealed by 14 Geo. 
111, c 68. 
55 Prior to 1430, parliamentary elections had been subject to serious disruption by the 
local populace. Love11 English CorrttitutMnal and Legal Histoy (1962) 199,200. Reiss The 
Histoy of the English Electoral Law in the Middle Ages trans1 K.L. Wood-Legh (1 973) 57-9 
56 8 Henry VI, c 7 
57 Plucknett TasweU-Lungmead's CunstitutioMl Histoy (loth ed 1946) 225; Wilkinson 
Constitutional Hisloty of England in the Ffteenth Century (1963) 289 
58 1 Blackstone Commentaties on theLaws ofEngland (18th ed 1829) i 73. Bishop Fleetwood 
in 'Chronicon Pretiosum' argued that the franchise requirement was equivalent to 
twelve pounds in the reign of Queen Anne. Cited in Leader The Franchise, A Manual of 
Registration and Election Law and Practice (1879) 54, and in Blackstone, ibid, at 173. 
59 Medley, supra note 53, at 196 
60 In 1886 Hearn estimated the qualification as an eighteen-pound freehold. Hearn, 
supra note 53, at 538,539. 'The qualification thus prescribed was at the time (1430) a 
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high limit.' Courtney The Wwking Constitution of the United Kingdom (1901) 59. Bailey 
estimates that a 40-shilling freehold would be worth several hundred dollars in the 
middleof the twentieth century. Bailey BritishParliamentary Democracy (1958) 61 at note 
4. Gneist in 1889 suggested that the qualification would have to be raised to loo to 800 
shillings to take account of the change in the value of money. Gneist A Histo7 ofthe 
English Parliament (3rd ed I 889) 39 1. 
61 See Bishop Fleetwood Chronicon Pretiosum 174, cited in Blackstone, supra note 58, at 
173. Wilkinson estimated that the electorate represented in the Commons numbered 
some 10,000. Wilkinson, supra note 57, at 292. 
62 The overt political ramifications of this legislation cannot be denied. The feudal service 
obligations of tenure holders to their landlords which, on the surface, had gradually 
disappeared during the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, had, in truth, been 
transformed into political servitudes - the exercise of political authority by the 
landowners over their tenants. 
The major forms of feudal tenure were military tenure or  knightservice, providing 
the landowner with a standing army, either directly or  through scutage payments; 
socage tenure, providing agriculturai production; frankalmoign tenure, ensuring 
religious salvation; and serjeanty tenure, providing personal servants for the landown- 
er. See Powell Real Property (1977) 41-70; Pollock, supra note 30; Holdsworth An 
HistwiEalZntroduction to theLandLaw (1927) 2 1-9; Baker An Introduction to English Legal 
History (2nd ed 1979) 193-201. Tenurial holding of land was abolished gradually 
during the middle ages. The most important legislation affecting the institution of 
feudal tenure was the statute Quia Emptwes 18 Edw. I ,  c 1) in 1290; and an 'Act taking 
away the Court of Wards and Liveries and Tenures in Capite and by Knight Service 
and Purveyance and for settling a Revenue upon his Majesty in lieu thereof (1 2 Car. 11, 
c 24) in 1660 transformed knightservice and socage tenure into free and common 
socage. See 1 Washburn The American Law of Real Property (1860) 29-54; Williams, 
supra note 30, at 86-91. 
De Tocqueville's laudatory praise of English democracy - that feudalism did not 
result in the establishment of a caste system in England - is accurate only in the most 
narrow of perspectives. The obligation of service owed to the lord of the manor was 
replaced by the more insidious obligation of political fielty. The military authority of 
the feudal lord had evolved into political influence exercised through the ownership of 
property, and, until the nineteenth century, property meant land. De Tocqueville 
L'Ancien Regime (1856) 178. Robertson Ekctwal Justice (1931) 18, 20; Cannon 
Parliamentary Reform 1640-1832 (1973) 1-5. 
63 Gwyer Anson's Law and Custom ofthe Constituth (5th ed I 92 2) I 1 1 - 15; Medley, supra 
note 53, at 201, 205; Cannon, supra note 62 
64 Pollard The Evolutwn of Parliament (1926) 156; Maitland The Constitutiml History of 
Enghnd (1913) 3569 357 
65 The result of periodic House of Commons decisions on disputed elections in the 
boroughs 'over the years was substantially to reduce the size of the borough electorate.' 
Cannon, supra note 62, at 34; Keir The Constitutional History ofModrm Britain Since 1485 
(8th ed 1966) 46. 
66 Lovell English Constitutional and Legal History (1962) 199,250. The debate as to the size 
of the electorate is hardly satisfying. Dalrymple states that the electorate in some 
particular counties numbered at least 30,000. Dalrymple An Essay Towards a General 
Histoly of Feudal Property in Great Britain (4th ed 1759) 274. Polland estimates that 3000 
voters were present at the county election in Norfolk in 1586. Pollard, supra note 64, at 
163. 
67 Lovell, ibid. Marriot estimates the electorate at 160,000. 1 Marriot The Mechanism of the 
M o h  State (1927) 477. Cannon, supra note 62, at 290-2. 
68 Cannon, supra note 62, at 41,42, states: 
'In 17 15 the total population of England and Wales was some 54 million: by 1 ?go it 
had risen to 84 million, and by 1831 it stood at nearly 14 million.- that is, it had 
increased by 155%. Plumb's estimate of the English electorate at the end of Anne's 
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reign was approximately 250,000. The House of Commons, 1715-54 suggests a slightly 
higher figure of 261,000, of whom 160,000 were county voters. The subsequent 
volume of The House of Commons puts the county vote in 1754 at about 177,000, with 
105,000 in the boroughs, making a grand total of some 282,000. Although percentages 
may suggest a false precision, the electorate seems to have increased in that period by 
some 8% against a population increase of some 18%. 
'To assess the electorate in the years immediately preceding 1832 is far from easy, 
since there were several counties where there were no contests or only token ones, and 
the evidence for many boroughs is similarly fragmentary. There seems little doubt 
however that the increase in the county electorate was modest ... 
'From the figures I have compiled, I would put the increase in the county electorate 
between 1754 and 1831 at not much higher than 6%. During the same period, the 
English borough electorate seems to have increased by some 50%. My estimate for the 
total English electorate in the years immediately before 1832 is some 344,000, 
representing an overall increase on 1754 of something like 20%. Since during the same 
period the total population more than doubled; we may say with reasonable confidence 
that there was a sharp decline in the proportion of people who had even a formal share 
in the political life of the nation.' 
69 Stout British Government (1953) 202 
70 Lovell estimates an electorate, in 1760, of some 85,000 in the boroughs, of which some 
15,000 elected over half the borough members. Lovell, supra note 66, at 429. 
Robertson writes that by the mid-Georgian era, the boroughs 'had generally become 
the mere vestiges of villages ... mere private possessions, politically speaking, of rich 
landowners.' Robertson, supra note 62, at 25. 'Only the merest fraction' of the 
population possessed the vote. Pollard, supra note 20, at 338. It has been calculated 
elsewhere that at the end of the eighteenth century, 1 1,075 voters elected 257 members 
of Parliament, and that this narrow electorate was itself controlled by less than zoo 
more influential landowners. Dickinson, supra note 40, at 238. Even where the 
borough franchise appeared generous, it was often in reality strictly circumscribed; 
Gatton, which enfranchised all freeholders and 'scot the lot' inhabitants, consisted of an 
electorate of seven; Tavistock only ten. Marriot, supra note 67, at 476. Walcott has 
estimated that in 1701 over 40 per cent of the boroughs consisted of electorates of less 
than loo voters, another 25 per cent had less than 500, and only 1 2  per cent had more 
than 1000. Walcott English Politics in the Early Eighteenth Century (1956) 23. An admittedly 
idiosyncratic sample of various boroughs during the eighteenth century reveals an 
electorate of loo in Tregony in 1696; 250 in Abingdon in 1699 and again in 1796; over 
iooo in Colchester in 17 i 1; 450 in Carlisle in 17 12; 37 in Bury St Edmonds in 171 8-24; 
and loo or fewer in several boroughs, including Appleby and Great Bedwyn. 
Nottingham's electorate in 1753 was over 2000. Williams The Eighteenth Century 
Constitution 1688-1815 (1960) 152-70. 
71 Phillips and Jackson Constitutional and Administrative Law (6th ed 1978) 187 
72 McKenzie British Political Parties (2nd ed 1963) 2,4 
73 Wright The Law Relating to Laded Estates (1897) 135, 136 
74 Pollack, supra note 30, at 49 
75 Powell, supra note 62 at 60. Coke wrote in 1584 that the '[glreat part of the land within 
the realm is in grant by copy.' Heydun's Case (1584) 3 Co. Rep., at note 86. 
76 1 Rogers Histg,  of Agriculture and P k e s  in England (1866) 693. See Sir Colin Thornton 
Kenisley, Tradition and change in property ownership, in Denman (ed) Contemporary 
Problems of Land Ow~enhip  (1962). Tuberville argues that no more than 7000 persons 
owned 80 per cent of the land in England as late as 1876. Tuberville The House of Lo& 
in the Age of R 4 m  1784-1837 (1958) 407-10. See also Scmtton Land in Fetters (1886) 
144-5: 
77 Brodnck, supra note 30, at 166. Brickdale, writing in 1914, could say that 'the soil of 
our country ... will remain for ever what it is at present - chiefly an exclusive luxury of 
the very rich, and seldom, if ever, enjoyed by any beyond the limited circle of the 
comparatively well-to-do.' Brickdale Methods of Land Transfer (1914) 207. 
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The influence exercised by those who held the political franchise was exacerbated by 
the archaic distribution of parliamentary seats prior to the nineteenth century. For 
example, London, with an immense population numbering in the hundreds of 
thousands, returned four members to the House of Commons in 1801, while 2 1  
Cornish boroughs, each with a population of under zoo, returned 42 members. 
Lovell, supra note 66, at 427. Other boroughs, such as Gratton, returned two members 
out of an electorate of six. Ibid, at 419. TWO boroughs, Old Sarum and Dunwich, no 
longer existed, the former being deserted and the latter having fallen into the sea. Yet 
both returned members to Parliament, chosen by owners of the land where the 
boroughs formerly existed as thriving communities. Stout, supra note 69, at 203. The 
burgage boroughs, in which the franchise was allocated to the owners of specific pieces 
of property, were often 'pocket boroughs,' literally in the pocket of a family or patron 
who controlled all or nearly all of the enfranchised property. Lovell, supra 66, at 428, 
429. Cannon, supra note 62. 
The result of four centuries of propertied voting rights was a form of representa- 
tional democracy which vested absolute political control in a narrow oligarchy of 
landowners. One historian has detailed the history of political democracy in the late 
eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries in graphic terms, describing the House of 
Commons of over 500 parliamentarians of whom 326 were returned by 182 
individuals. Robertson, supra note 62, at 34-8. Although mathematical accuracy is an 
unattainable object, similar figures are given by others. See 2 Gneist The Histmy of the 
English Constitution (2nd ed 1889) 447. 
In 1816, Oldfield calculated that 87 peers controlled the return of 218 English 
parliamentarians and that 57 peers were responsible for the return of 82 Scottish and 
Irish members. 6 Oldfield The Representative Histoty of Great Britain and Ireland (1816) 
295-9. The influence of commoners was equally pervasive. In 1780,6000 men were 
said to have returned a clear majority of the members of Parliament. Marriot, supra 
note 67, at 477. Todd cites evidence prepared in 1865 which compared voting rights 
based on population (4 votes to the upper class, 32 to the middle, and 64 to the working 
classes) to the allocation of voting rights based on land ownership (83 to the upper 
classes, 13 to the middle, and 4 to the working classes). 1 Todd Parliamentaty Government 
in England (1887) 26. 
78 Under article 18 of the Instrument of Government, The Government of the Commonwealth of 
England, Scotland and Ireland, and t& Dominions k e u d o  belonging, 16 December 1653, 
the qualification for the county franchise was extended to those who possessed or 
owned real or personal property of a value o f f  roo. The borough franchise was left to 
custom. See Gardner, Constitutional documents of the puritan Revolution, in Medley, 
supra note 53, at 31 1. Gough has described the conflict between the radical and 
conservative factions of the Levellers. The latter regarded 'the safeguarding of 
property as one of the primary objects of government, and ... insisted on the historic 
principle that the franchise should be extended to property owners.' Gough Fundamen- 
tal LOW in English Constitutional Histmy (1 96 I )  1 I 3, I 14. MacPherson has described the 
numerous franchise proposals considered by participants in the seventeenth-century 
revolutionary movements. MacPherson The Political Theory of Possm've Individualism 
(1962) 107-59. See also Cannon, supra note 62, at 1-23. 
Reform of the franchise was abandoned upon the restoration of the monarchy in 
1660. Keir, supra note 65, at 231. 
79 2 W i  IV, c 45 
80 For example, the franchise was extended to non-occupying freeholders of an annual 
value of ten pounds; to holders of land by copyhold or any other tenure for life or lives, 
or any longer estate, of the same annual value; to leaseholders for any term originally of 
greater than sixty years with an annual value of ten pounds, or of a term of twenty years 
with an annual value of fifty pounds; and to persons occupying as tenants-at-will who 
were liable for rent of at least fifty pounds. Ibid, ss 18-20. 
8 1 Keir, supra note 65, at 40 I 
82 Butt The Power of Parliament ( I  968) 59. Lovell, supra note 66, at 47 1. Turberville relates 
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that some Members of Parliament objected to the enfranchisement of fifty-pound 
tenants-at-will because it would favour the landlords. Turberville, supra note 76, at 
268,407. 
83 See I May The Constitutional Histoly of England (191 1) 302-8. In the appendix to Cox 
and Grady Registration and Elections, Parliamentary and Municipal (1880), twenty-four 
statutes ranging from the House Occupiers' Disqualification Removal Act, 4 I Vict., c 3, 
to the Property Qualification Abolition Act, 21 & 2 2  Vict., c 26, are set out in full. The 
Representation of the People Act, 1gi8,7 & 8 Geo. v, c 65, repealed over one hundred 
earlier statutes. 
84 30 & 3 I Vict., c 1 0 2  
8; 48 & i9 Vict., c 3 
86 See Laski, The personnel of the English cabinet 1801-1924 (1928) 22 Am. Pol. Sci. Rev. 
18, ig. Lovell, supra note 66, at 472-7. Jennings The British Constitution (1942) 5. Even 
Bagehot, who favoured restricting the electorate, complained in 1888 '[tlhat Parlia- 
ment leans too much to the opinions of the landed interest.' Bagehot The English 
Constitution (5th ed 1888) 163. Turberville, supra note 76, at 407. Butt, supra note 82, at 
40. Marriot, supra note 67, at 482,483. Guttsman has collected detailed statistical data 
describing the continued influence of the landed interests during the nineteenth and 
twentieth centuries. Guttsman, supra note 1, at 75-108. One should note, however, 
that such influence was not limited to land owners; it extended as well, to the church. 
See Somenille and Ross Irish Memoirs (1925) 28. 
87 Todd, supra note 77, at 12-26; Turberville, supra note 76, at 407; 2 Taylor The Origin 
and Growth of the English Constitution (1904) 530; Gneist, supra note 77, at 455-75 
88 Representation of the People Act, 1918, 7 & 8 Geo. v, c 64; Representation of the 
People Act, 1928, 18 & 19 Geo. v, c i z  
89 31 Geo. III,  c 3 1. By contrast, land as a political commodity, withdrawn from the regular 
channels of commerce, did not prevail in the American colonies. Although the United 
States began with the same traditions, democratic ideals combined with an abundance 
of land quickly produced reform. See Konig, Community, custom and the common 
law: Social change and the development of land law in seventeenth-century Massachu- 
setts (1974) 18 Am. J. Legal Hut 137. De Tocqueville, Democracy in America (Mayer and 
Lerner eds, 1966) 696. The original colonies began with English electoral traditions, 
but possibly by the end of the eighteenth century, and certainly by the middle of the 
nineteenth, property qualifications were abandoned in most states. Dieu In Defence of 
Property (1963) 146,147. Nonetheless, even in America, vast tracts of land were held by 
the very wealthy, and it has been argued that in 1787 'property qualifications left 
perhaps ... a third of the white, male population disenfranchised.' Parenti Democracy 
for the Few (1977) 50-1. Taft has suggested that of a population of 4,000,000 in 
the 13 colonies, only 150,ooo were qualified to vote. Taft Popular Governmat (1913) 
'3. 
No explicit constitutional protection of a universal right of suffrage exists in the 
United States, and the courts have consistently refused to invoke the constitutional 
guarantee of a republican form of government as the foundation of a constitutional 
protection of the right to vote. Pope v Williams 193 U.S. 62 1 (1904); Luther v B w h  48 
U.S. (7 How.) I (1849); Baker v Cam 369 U.S. 186 (1962). Voting rights have been 
protected under the equal protection clause of the Fourteenth Amendment (see Harper 
v Virginia Board of Elections 383 U.S. 663 (1966); Kramer v Union FreeSchoolDistrict No. 15 
395 U.S. 621 (1969)), and the First Amendment 'political expression' doctrine has also 
been referred to in support of the franchise. Kusper v Pontikes 414 U.S. 51 (1973). 
Nonetheless, vivid examples of property qualifications, indeed of land ownership, as 
a prerequisite to the franchise in elections for certain limited purposes have recently 
been sustained by the Supreme Court. See Salyer Land Co. v Tulare Lake Basin Water 
Stmage Co. 410 u.S. 719 (1973). Compare Hill v Stone 95 S.Ct. 1637 (1975) (p~operty 
qualification held invalid in the case of a general obligation bond election). 
go 31 Geo 11, c 31, ss 20,24 
91 Ibid 
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92 In Upper Canada persons who had sworn allegiance to a foreign state, whose deeds had 
not been registered within three months of an election, or who had not been in 
possession of land or in receipt of its income for twelve months prior to an election were 
disqualified. 40 Geo. 111, c 3; 4 Geo. c 3. A university franchise was established in 1820 by 
60 Geo. 111, c 2, s 4; I Geo. IV, c 2. 
In Lower Canada, persons who were not in receipt of income from land for six 
months prior to the election, fraudulent grantees, and persons guilty of perjury were 
disenfranchised. 2 Geo. IV, c 4; 5 Geo. IV, c 33. 
93 3 & 4 Vict., c 35, s 27 
94 I 2 Vict., c 1 2 
95 16 Vict., c 153; 18 Vict., c 7; 18 Vict., c 87 
96 C.S .C .  22 Vict., c 6, s 4 
97 See Beck The Government of Nova Scotia (1957) 257, 258. 
98 S.N.B. 18 Vict., c 37 
gg Section 41 of the British North America Act, 1867,30 & 31 Vict., c 3, provided for the 
continuation of provincial franchise qualifications until federal legislation was enacted. 
The provincial franchise prerequisites were hardly enlightened. See Kennedy The 
Constitution of C a d  (1922) 391; Beck, supra note 97; Schindeler, Responsible 
Government in Onturio (1969) 93,94; Donnelly The Govament  of Manitoba (1963) 72.73; 
I Keith, Responsible Government in the Dominions (2nd ed 1927) 392-5. 
loo Ward The Canudian House of Commons, Representation (1950) 2 12 ;  Brady Democrq in the 
Dominions (1958) 68 
101 Ward, ibid, at 2 13 
102 Dawson The Government of C a d  (5th ed 1970) 321; Kennedy The Constitution of 
Canada 1534-1937 (2nd ed 1938) 387; Keith, supra note 99, at 393 
103 48 & 49 Via., c 40; see Mallory The Structure of Canadian Government ( I  97 I) I 8 I .  Prior to 
1885 the federal parliament had enacted a number of temporary election acts, all of 
which had retained the provincial franchise: 34 Vict., c 20; 35 Vict., c 13; 36 Vict., c 27; 
37 Vict., c g. The Electoral Franchise Act of 1885 repealed the previous acts and, with 
the exceptions of British Columbia and Prince Edward Island, instituted uniform 
property qualifications throughout the country. 
104 In these provinces, more liberal vested rights of franchise existing as of 20 July 1885 
were retained. 
105 See Electoral Franchise Act, 48 & 49 Vict., c 40, s 2. 
106 Ermatinger CaMdian Franchise and Election Laws (1886) 6-9. Other significant 
franchise qualifications of an extremely complicated system of electoral prerequisites 
included: attainment of the age of majority; British citizenship; and either ownership 
of real property worth $200 in any town or $300 in a city or tenancy rights at a monthly 
rental of at least f 2, a quarterly rental of at least $6, a half-yearly rental of at least $12, 
or an annual rental of at least $20. Other franchise qualifications included occupancy of 
real property; residence and income from trade, office, calling, or profession; and 
family relationship. Similar franchise requirements were imposed in the counties. 
Electoral Franchise Act, 48 & 49 Vict., c 40, ss 3,4. 
107 Legislative authority over 'Property and Civil Rights in the Provinces' is vested in the 
provincial governments under s 92 (13) of the British North America Act, 1867,3o & 
31 Vict., c 3. 
108 Re North Perth Hessin v Lloyd (1891) 2 I O.R. 538,541,542. But see Re Simmons and Dalton 
(1886) 12 O.R. 505,517 (suggesting that the right to vote was a mere civil right within 
provincial jurisdiction and beyond federal legislative competence). 
log 61 Vict., c 14 
110 7 & 8 G e 0 . v , c 3 4 ; 7 & 8 G e 0 . v , c 3 9 .  
I I 1 Dominion Elections Act l o  & I I Geo. c46, s 29. The right tovote is now dependent upon 
citizenship. Canada Elections Act s.c. 1970, c 14 (1st Supp.); as amended by S.C. 
1973-4, c 51; 1974-5-6, c 66; S.C.  1977-8, c 3. Vestiges of the property qualification 
remained until 1948 in respect of the disenfranchisement of residents of charitable 
institutions in New Brunswick, Ontario, and Nova Scotia. See Ward, supra note 100, at 
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233-7. Mill had argued, decades earlier, for the disenfranchisement of those'in receipt 
of parish relief.' Mill Considmations on Representative Govmment (McCallum, ed, 1946) 
213-15. 
Property qualifications for membership in the House of Commons, originally 
entrusted to the provinces, had been abolished in 1874 by 37 Vict., c g, s 20. 
I i 2 Pollard, supra note 64, at 156. McKinley The Suffsage Franchise in the Thirteen English 
Colonies in America (1905) 8,g. But see 4 Co. Inst. at 4,5; Nairn v St. And~ews University 
[igog] A.C. 147 (women disentitled to vote at common law). 12 Halsbury Encyclopedia of 
the Laws of England (1910) 140; Brown v Ingram 7 Sess. Ca. (3rd Ser.) 281 (Scotland). 
One advocate of reform suggested in 1797 that 'it has never been in the 
contemplation of the most absurd theorists to extend the elective Franchise to the other 
sex.' 33 FOX Parliamentaly Histoty cols 726, 727, cited in Bailey, supra note 60, at 66. 
i 13 Cathannev Susvq, cited in Olivev Zngram(i73g) 7 Mod. 263,264; Coatesv Lisle 14 Jac. 1, 
cited in Olive v Ingram; Holt v Lyle (1606). 4 Jac. 1, cited in Olive v Ingram, at 267,271 
114 Cleverdon The Woman Suffsge Movement in Canada (2nd ed 1974) 214,215 
1 15 Phiiips and Jackson Constitutiunul and Administrative Law (6th ed 1978) 187 
116 Anclay v Lewis (1855) 17 C.B. 316,328 
i 17 Elliot A Practical Treatice on the Qualifications and Registration of Parliamentuv Electors 
(1839) 14 
1 18 1 Blackstone Commentaries on the Laws of England (1 8th ed 1829) 173, at note 62 
i i g  20 Geo. 111, c 17, s 12 
120 See Chorlton v Lings (1868) L.R. 4 C.P. 374; i H. & C. (women not entitled to vote in 
boroughs); Churlton v Kessler (1868) L.R. 4 C.P. 397; 1 H. & C. 42 (women not entitled to 
vote in counties); Rogers Elections, Registration and Election Agency (13th ed 1880) 180. 
The Reform Act, 1 8 3 2 , ~  Wm. c 45 referred to 'male persons,' and the Representation 
of the People Act, 1867,30 & 31 Vict., c 102, used the word 'man.' It should be noted, 
however, that women did not, merely through ownership of land, acquire the privilege 
of sitting in Parliament. Maitland, supra note 64, at 364. 
121 Pollard, supra note 64, at 165 
122 Holmes, supra note 5, at 384. Cf Lovell, supra note 66, at 426. Austin has said that land 
'is erected into a legal or fictitious person' Austin Jurirpndence (3rd ed 1872) 847. 
123 Anson, The franchise bid (1885) 1 Law Rev. 25,27 
124 (1855) 17 C.B. 316 
125 Ibid, at 325 
126 Cough, supra note 78, at 178. Gough in another context refers to the Statutes of Uses 
(153 6), De Donis Conditiunulibus and Quia Emptores as striking 'close to the heart of what 
... one might have thought would have been inviolable - the individual's rights of 
property, and even that most "real" of all kinds of property, property in land.' Ibid, at 
25. 
127 'It is the beliefs which are so much a matter of course that they are rather tacitly 
presupposed than formally expressed and argued for, the ways of thinking which seem 
so natural and inevitable that they are not scrutinized with the eye of logical 
self-consciousness, that often are most decisive of the character of a philosopher's 
doctrine, and still oftener of the dominant intellectual tendencies of an age.' Lovejoy 
The Great Chain of Being: A Study of the Histny of an Idea (2nd ed 1964) 
128 (1704) 1 Sak. ig; 1 E.R. 41 7. Holt CJ dissented in the case, the majority holding that the 
common law judges had no authority where matters of Parliament were at issue. See 
Sugden The Law of Property as Administered by the House of Lords (1840) 18 
129 Ashby v White, ibid, at 20 
130 Ibid. S.A. de Smith describes the right to vote as 'in the nature of a proprietary right.' 
De Smith Constitutional and Administrative Law (3rd ed 1977) 238 
131 14 St. Trials 695,792 
132 Mayne, supra note 36, at 1, 2; Williams Principles of the Law of Real Property (14th ed 
1882) 7; Kersley G o h e ' s  Modem Law of PmmlProperty  (9th ed 1949) 2. 'In early law, 
property was deemed "real" if the courts would restore to a dispossessed owner the 
thing itself, the "res," and not merely give compensation for the loss.' Megarry and 
Wade The Law of Real Property (4th ed 1975) lo. 
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133 Heuston Essays in Constitutional Law (1 96 I )  8 1 
134 Fry, supra note 51, at 16. 'The proof of title often takes a considerable time.' Wright, 
supra note 73, at 2. 
135 7 & 8 Will. 111, c 25, s 7; 2 & 3 Will. IV, c 45, s 23. Underhill Thelaw ofMortgages (6th ed 
1910) 451, 451. See Wallis v Birh (1870) 5 L.R.C.P. 222 (curate of parish as holder of 
equitable interest in freehold of church entitled to vote). Bnxter v Newmn (1845) 14 
L.J.C.P. 193, 197 (person seized in equity to have the same right to vote as if he had the 
seizen in law). 
136 ShowvFosler(i872)~.~. 5 H.L. 321; LysaghtvEdwards(1876) I Ch. D. qgg; Painev Mulh  
(1801) 6 Ves. 349; 33 E.R. 1088. 
137 Leader, supra note 58, at lo. Once the contract is entered into, the vendor is said to be a 
mere trustee for the new 'owner,' and if he relinquishes possession he loses the right to 
vote. McPherson ElectiunLaw of C a d  (1905) 97. Anelay v L& (1855) 17 C.B. 3 16; 139 
E.R. 1094 (purchaser of land not in actual possession prior to conveyance not entitled to 
vote); Murray v Thonib  ( I  846) 2 C.B. 2 I 7; I 35 E.R. 927 (grantee of rent charge entitled 
to vote only if in actual receipt of rent); R. v Cawthone [1g30] 3 W.W.R. 373; [ig31] i 
D.L.R. 317 (tenants who are not 'purchasers' not entitled to vote); Peny v Morlq, (191 1) 
16 W.L.R. 691; 16 B.C.R. 91 (holder of an unregistered agreement for purchase of land 
not entitled to vote). 
Long after 1696, legislation was enacted which required six months' actual posses- 
sion or receipt of rents toqualify freeholders to vote (I Will. IV, c45, s 23); and still later, 
an act was passed which abolished the right of trustees to vote whether in actual 
possession or not (6 Vict., c 18, s 14). 
138 Ermatinger, supra note 106, at lo; Rogers Laws and Practice of Elections, Election 
Committees and Registration (9th ed 1859) 33. Others have suggested that a purchaser 
could not vote unless the purchase money was paid. Elliot, supra note I 17, at 61-4. 
139 'The question of the eligibility of the mortgagor in possession was much discussed in 
the latter half of the eighteenth century, and seems to have been definitely settled after 
the Bedfordshire and Buckinghamshire cases, 1785, which decided, 'that the interest 
upon a mortgage, the mortgagor still being in possession, is a charge upon the estate 
within the meaning of the Statute (8 Hen. VI, 7)'; and that if it was such as to reduce the 
value of the estate to less than 40s per annum, 'it does not invalidate the vote.' In the 
same year there was a case of by no means so decided an authority but shortly 
afterwards a statute was passed confirming the former decisions.' Turner, The Equity of 
Redemption, Cambridge Studies in English Legal Histoty (193 I)  184. 
140 Burgw v Wka& (1759) 1 Eden. 177; 28 E.R. 652. The same benefits were extended to 
mortgagors who, from the sixteenth century, had been granted equitable relief on 
default - a right in equity which by the latter half of the seventeenth century had been 
described as 'an equitable right inherent in the land ... of such consideration in the eye 
of the law, that the law takes notice of it and makes it assignable and devisable.' See 
Anon, (1557-1601) Gary 1, 2; Bacon v Bacon (1639) Toth. 133; 21 E.R. 146. Simpson 
cites Bodenham v Halle (1456) Seldon Society, vol lo, at 137 as the earliest known case of 
equitable relief afforded to mortgagors. Simpson Anlntroduction to the History of theland 
Law (1961) 224,227. In Coote A Treatise on thelaw ofMortgages (4th ed 1880) 15 relief in 
equity is traced to Langfwd v Barnurd (1594) Toth. 134. 
The quotation is from Pawlett v Att.-Gen. (1657) Hardres 465, 469; 145 E.R. 550; 
Thornborough v Baker (1675) i Ch. Ca. 284. In 1738, Lord Hardwicke claimed that 'An 
equity of redemption has always been considered as an estate in the land ... the person, 
therefore, entitled to the equity of redemption is considered as the owner of the land, 
and a mortgage in fee is considered as personal assets.' Cacborne v Scarfe (1738) I Atk. 
603,605; 26 E.R. 377. 
141 7 & 8 Will. 111, c 25. Turner, supra note 139, at 103, 185 
142 Turner, supra note 139, at 155. By 1867 Cockburn cj in R v Baker could say that 'the 
commissioners are not bound to enquire whether the legal estate is in him. They find 
him in possession of the estate, and he "hath or holdeth the estate and thereby 
satisfieth the terms of the Statute of Henry VI.' R. v Baker (1867) L.R. 2 Q.B. 62 I.  
The protection of social status, class, and political identity may provide an explana- 
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tion for the 'anomalous' anti-forfeiture doctrine affording relief from consensual obli- 
gations. See Michelman, A comment on some uses and abuses of economics in law 
(1979) 46 U .  Chi. L.R. 307, 312. Duncan Kennedy has written an invaluable essay in 
which he has commented on the role of mercy in legal doctrine: Form and substance in 
private law adjudication (1976) 76 Ham. L.R. 1685. 
143 Sugden Vendors and Purchasers ( I  ith ed 1846) 343; Scriven, supra note 51, at 617; 
Twining v Monice 2 Bro. Ch. Rep. 330; Sir Hany Hide v Philifs Prec. Cha. 575 
144 See Hinton v Hinton (1855) 2 Ves. Sen. 631,638; 28 E.R. 406. 
145 Murgrave v Dashwood (1688) 2 Vern. 63; 23 E.R. 650. See Holdsworth, supra note 62, at 
16-18,42-5. 
146 I Spence EquztabL Jurisdiction (1 882) 646; Anon, 2 Freem. I 23; 22 E.R. 1 loo. 
One explanation for the specific enforcement of a class of contracts which was 
significantly broader than the class which involved a transfer of the franchise was the 
influence of the Statute of Frauds (29 Car. 11, c 3) which from 1677 onwards proscribed 
the enforcement of par01 contracts for the sale of land. Copyhold land came within the 
purview of the statute. Scriven, supra note 51, at 262. Courts of Equity soon created 
techniques which enabled them to recognize contracts which the statute deemed 
unenforceable at law, the most famous of which is the doctrine of part performance. 
This equitable doctrine could be applied, however, only in respect of those contracts of 
which a Court of Equity would entertain, or in the opinion of some, grant a suit for 
specific performance. The Statute of Frauds thus created an ovemding incentive to 
expand equitable jurisdiction to award performance of a wide range of contracts 
relating to land, notwithstanding that political rights were not necessarily at issue. R i d  
v March [ig21] 1 W.W.R. gig (doctrine of part performance applies to contracts in 
respect of which a court would mder specific performance). See also Sarbit v Hansun and 
Booth Fishrries Can. Co. [1g50] 4 D.L.R. 34; reversed on other grounds [ig52] 2 D.L.R. 
108; Lavety v Purse11 (1888) 39 Ch. D. 508.518. 
In McManw v Cook (1887) 35 Ch. D. 681,697. it was held that the doctrine of part 
performance applies to contracts in respect of which a court would entertain a suit for 
specific performance. Some authorities take a narrower position - that the doctrine 
applies only to contracts 'concerning land' or 'relating to land,' but this view has not 
been accepted. See B h i n  v Rossiter (1879) I 1 Q.B.D. 123, 129, 131, criticized in 
Williams The Statute of Frauds (1932) 239; Maddison v Aluhsun (1887) I Mac. & G. 572; 
41 E.R. 1387. Fry, supra note 51, at 283, states that the doctrine applies 'to all cases in 
which a Court of Equity would entertain a suit if the alleged contract had been in 
writing.' Spry concurs in this opinion, citing numerous Australian authorities to that 
effect. Spry, supra note 23, at 237, 238. 
147 See Weymouth, 3 June 1714; Middlesex, Peck. 23 cited in Rogers TheLuw ofElections 
(13th ed 1880) 203. 
148 7 & 8 Will 111, c 25, s 7, properly cited as 'An Act for the further regulating Elections 
of Members to serve in Parliament, and for the preventing of irregular proceedings 
of Sheriffs and other officers in the electing and returning of such Members.' The act 
was later amended by 6 Geo. 11, c 23, and by 53 Geo. 111, c 49 (extending the act to de- 
visees). 
149 Ibid 
150 See Rogers, supra note 147, at 204. 
151 Robertson, supra note 62, at 22; 1 Pomt History of the U n r e j m d  House of Commmrc: 
Parliamentary Representation before 1832 (1903) 22, The practice was apparently 
condemned, but for centuries the dilatory process of electoral reform was directed at 
even more disturbing forms of political influence. Dickinson, supra note 40, at I 14. 
152 Marshall v Bourn (1845) 7 Man. & G 188; 14 L.J.C.P. 129 
153 (1846) 2 C.B. 84; 15 L.J.C.P. 133; B k k v  A k d  (1846) 2 C.B. 156; 15 L.J.C.P. 145; Beswick 
v Ashworfh (1846) 2 C.B. 152; 15 L.J.C.P. 145; Rawlins v Bremner (1846) 2 C.B. 166; 15 
L.J.C.P. 145 
154 (1846) 2 C.B. 122; 15 L.J.C.P. 134 
155 See Rtk j  v Crmlqr (1846) 2 C.B. 146; 15 L.J.C.P. 144; Thmntkj v Asfiland (1846) 2 C.B. 
160; 15 L.J.C.P. 145. 
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156 Lewin The Law of T m t s  (7th ed 1879) 95; Anson, supra note 123; Platamone v Staple 
(1815) G. Coop. 250; 35 E.R. 548 (conveyance of rent charge to qualify transferee for 
seat in Parliament injoined); Birch v Blagrave (1 755) Amb. 264; 27 E.R. 176 (conveyance 
to daughter in order to disqualify father from holding office of sheriff of London set 
aside). 
157 Ashworthv Hopper(1875) I C.P.D. 178,179. In Drewev Hanson (1802) 6 Ves. Jun. 675; 31 
E.R. I 253 Lord Eldon referred to a case of Shirley v Davis where a purchaser was com- 
pelled to take property which was supposed to be in Essex but in fact was situated in 
Kent, notwithstanding that 'the purchaser was told he- would be made a Church- 
warden of Greenwich, and though his object was to be a freeholder of Essex.' Claims of 
vendors seeking specific performance of land contracts have been viewed harshly 
where inadequacies of title have been at issue, perhaps on the ground that 
if the purchaser's motive is political identity, a forced sale of a non-enfranchised estate 
even with compensation is entirely inappropriate. Hmley v Grant (1806) 13 Ves. Jun. 
73; 33 E.R. 222. 
.- -- 
158 Ashworth v Hopper, ibid, at 183. However, Coleridge J remarked that the landowner had 
not succeeded in retainine the leeal rieht to forfeit the title of the trust beneficiaries if 
they sold contrary to his iktruczons. 'ibid, at 189. 
159 (1875) 1 Ch. D. 160 (c.A.) 
160 Ibid, at 166 
161 Plucknett English Constitutional History ( I  ith ed 1960) 562. Williams argues that one 
need only have had to buy up a majority of the burgage tenements to attain absolute 
political control of a particular borough. Williams, supra note 70, at 153. Gwyer, supra 
note 63, at 107. 'A seat was as much a marketable commodity in the eighteenth century 
as an advowson in the nineteenth ... the value of a seat was estimated at over f7,ooo.' 
Mamot, supra note 67, at 478. May describes the right of property in enfranchised 
property, capable of sale and transfer as not being different from any other property. 1 
May Constitutional Hutmy of Britain 337 (1889). 
It is not at all startling to discover in the years after initial attempts at electoral reform 
that the incidence of tenancies-at-will rose substantially; for the grant of tenancies for a 
fired term did not allow the landlord to exercise political control over his tenants, while 
the transfer of an indeterminate leasehold interest enfranchised the lessee while 
ensuring electoral influence in the hands of the landowner, who could simultaneously 
dispossess and disenfranchise his tenant if his vote was not cast as directed. Brodrick, 
supra note 30, at 201, 202. 
162 Herberi v Saint Michel(lglo) 18 Rev. de Jur. 2a8 
163 Lnnglois v Baby (1863) l o  Gr. 358; (1864), I I Gr. 2 I ; Emes v Barber (1869) 15 Gr. 679 
164 Namier estimated that not more &an one out of twenty voters was free of the influence 
of the landed gentry in the exercise of his vote. Namier The Structure of Politics at tk 
Accession of George III (2nd ed 1957) 166. 
165 QLeary Elimination of C m p t  Practices m British Elections 1868-~grr (1962) 62. One 
example is given of 37 tenants of the Duke of Newcastle who, in 1831, were quickly 
evicted when they voted against his wishes, and one suspects that their future electoral 
behaviour would not be as autonomous. Turberville, supra note 76, at 250. In the same 
year the Marquis of Exeter, after evicting those tenants who voted contrary to his 
dictates, threatened to evict even those who did obey his commands unless they evicted 
their subtenants. Ibid. In 1860 the landlord of the Cavray Estate in Cardiganshire 
wrote to his tenants as follows: 'I feel myself morally bound to set befqre you two alter- 
natives and you are at liberty t~ choose for yourself, namely, to attend our Church 
services with your family and thus support its principles, or otherwise (if your conscious 
will not allow you to comply with my request) you must quit the farm you hold from 
me.' Cited in Denman Studies in LandEconomy, The Place of Prop* (1978) 55. One result 
of tbe Reform Act in 1832 was to perpetuate the economic and political servitudes 
inherent in a society which tied the franchise to property ownership: 
'The Act of Henry VI which created the 40s. county franchise introduced a new 
motive for letting farms on lease which has not received sufficient attention. It was held 
that a lease for life constituted a freehold, which, if above the value of ~os . ,  camed 
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with it a vote for the county. As English tenants have always been wont to follow the 
politics of their landlords, the multiplication of such freeholds became a ready source 
of political influence ... 
' ... a new and powerful motive for refusing leases was created by the Reform Act of 
1832. Under the so-called 'Chandos clause,' or section 20, of that Act, every tenant of a 
farm, paying a rent o f f  go or upwards, for the first time acquired the county franchise. 
Thenceforward the political influence of landlords was multiplied by the votes of their 
farm tenants, and, in order to maintain that influence, it was thought necessary to keep 
farm-tenants in a state of dependence by letting farms only from year to year.' 
Brodrick, supra note 30, at 201, 205. 
Even before the 1832 enfranchisement of the easily manipulated tenants, the county 
electorate was controlled by landed interests: 
'The two seats in each county were usually in the hands of the great landed families, 
aristocratic or otherwise. The vulgar arts of bribery founded in the boroughs were 
inappropriate among the gentlemen who dominated the affairs of the countryside. 
"Influence," of course, there was, but it was the social and economic influence of landed 
magnates over their relations, their servants, their tenants, their shopkeepers; of 
patrons living over their incumbents; of Lord Lieutenants over the J.P.'s; of aristocrats 
and gentry over their social inferiors.' Williams, supra note 70, at 153. This authority 
has been described as a kind of 'feudal sway' in Oldfield, supra note 77, at 285. 
166 Walcott, supra note 70, at lo; Cannon, supra note 62, at 246, 247 
167 See Wigmore The Australian Ballot System (2nd ed 1889) 10-14; Plucknett, supra note 
161, at 573 
168 Ballot Act, 1872, 35 & 36 Vict., c 33 
169 Hanham Elections and Party Management (1959) 267. See Dickinson, supra note 40, at 
289. 
170 See Morris Parliamentary Franchise Reform in England from 1885 to 1918 (1927) ch 2, 9. 
Abolition of plural voting was a fundamental tenet of the Chartist platform during the 
nineteenth century. Hovell The Chartist Movement (191 8) 16 1 ; Ross Elections and Electors, 
Studies in Democratic Representation (1955) 38. 
171 See 1 Henry v, c I ;  lo Henry VI, c 2; 14 Geo. 111, c 58. 
172 Mill, supra note 11 1, at 2 ig. Although Mill favoured the abolition of plural voting in 
respect of land ownership, he did so only in so far as it would be replaced by plural 
rights founded upon intelligence and education. Ibid, at 217-20. One R. Burnett, 
writing to his principal, the Duke of Newcastle, in I 733, explained that he had met with 
thirty or forty freeholders 'who are most of them Duble votes.' Williams, supra note 70, 
at 149. 
173 Lovell, supra note 66, at 426. 'A county election might be continued from day to day as 
long as voters came to the poll for as many as eleven days.' Courtney The Working 
Constitution of the United Kingdom (1901) 62. Stout, supra note 69, at 206. 'The poll was 
liable to be kept open for forty days.' May, supra note 161, at 350. 
174 Dawson, supra note 102, at 324 
175 Ward, supra note loo, at 220,221 
176 By s.c. 37 Vict., c g, ss 92-100 
177 See House of Commons Debates 13 April 1920, 1158-9; 10-11 Geo. v, c 46, s 57. 
Dawson, supra note 102, at 324. 
178 Lovell, supra note 66, at 427 
179 See May, supra note 161, at 333. 'A vote was a possession too valuable to be parted with 
except for a high consideration.' Marriot, supra note 67, at 477. ROSS describes 
numerous cases of direct bribery in the form of payments to individual electors. Ross 
supra note 170, at 209. 
180 One example is given of a payment of 29 shillings to each of 250 electors, and in 
another case, payment in hogs and tin. Williams, supra note 70, at 155-6. In I 701 the 
32 voters of Norfolk each received fifty guineas. Walcott, supra note 70, at 16. 
18 I Williams, supra note 70, at 153 
182 One might speculate as to the price paid by the friends of the Earl of Shaftsbury for 
wasteland, consisting of nothing but weeds and rubbish, to which the valuable right of 
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suffrage appertained - the land was worth nothing but for the voting privileges 
attached to it. Oldfield, supra note 77, at 54. 
183 Walcott, supra note 70, at 2 I 
184 Cannon describes the constant appreciation in election expenses reflected in the 
inflated price paid by contestants in open boroughs for the saleable votes of the 
constitutents: 'Whereas Thomas Webb, a candidate for Wooton Bassett in 1690, was 
reported to have purchased votes at 32/6d a head, sixty-four years later John Probyn 
and Thomas Estcourt Cresswell were charged thirty guineas apiece in the same 
borough.' Cannon, supra note 62, at 35. 
185 O'Leary, supra note 165, at 62 
186 Williams, supra note 70, at 155 
187 Hanham, supra note 169, at 166 
188 Cox and Grady Regirtration and Elections, Parliamentuq and Municipal (1880) cxvii 
189 Ibid 
190 Ibid. Liberal agents kept records showing the sums paid out in bribery. Hanham, supra 
note 169, at 266. Attempts to discourage bribery were almost futile. Taylor, supra note 
87, at 532. May, supra note 161, at 334. Theoffering of payment for votes was said tobe 
an offence at common law. Taylor, ibid, at 469; May, ibid, at 329. Stephen, however, 
states somewhat equivocally that bribery is said to have been an offence at common law, 
citing no authority in support of that view. 3 Stephen A Histoy of the Criminal Law of 
England (1883) 252. 
In any event legislation was enacted as early as 1695 disallowing elections in cases 
of bribery (7 Will. 111, c4). This was followed by more detailed legislation in 1729 (2 Geo. 
11, c 24), and again in 1809 (49 Geo. III, c I 18). 
191 Hirsh in Social Limits to Growth (1976) develops the concept of 'positional' goods, which 
are described as goods which signify distinctions among individuals on the basis of 
social status rather than simple economic wealth. This phenomenon, which describes 
very nicely the place of votes and contract in law, has been described as 'the importance 
of the symbolic attributes of goods, and the ways in which rank and status are attached 
to them ... When relative position is at stake, then the society will and must create new 
scarcities - that is, new symbolc of success to be striven for - at every turn. It matters little 
what is chosen to signify status differences.' Leiss The Limits to Saticfaction:An essay on the 
problem of nee& and commodities (British edition 1976) xvi. 
Rawls has developed a rather different theory, but one which also acknowledges the 
distinctive nature of certain kinds of goods: 'Those aspects of the social system that 
define and secure the equal liberties of citizenship ... The basic liberties of citizens are, 
vaguely speaking, political liberty (the right to vote and to be eligible for public office).' 
Rawls A Themy of Justice ( I  97 I )  6 I .  Rawls argues that the basis for self-respect (status) is 
not simply one's relative wealth in income, but the publicly affirmed equal distribution 
of these basic rights - including the right to participate in political life. Ibid, at 544,545. 
192 g Anne, c 5. See Gneist The Histmy of the English Constitution (1891) 658; Taylor The 
Origin and G~owth of the English Constitution (1898) 532, 533. In 1838, long after the 
doctrine of specific performance had become fixed, the property qualification was 
reformed to allow candidates to make up their stake in real or personal property. I & 2 
Vict., c 48. It was not until 1858 that the legal property qualification was abolished in its 
entirety by 2 I & 22 Vict., c 26. 
193 Cited in Guttsman, supra note I ,  at 68. Parliamentary attendance, even by the late 
fifteenth century, was no longer an obligatory burden but had become 'an honour to be 
welcomed, a privilege to be sought.' Ross, supra note 170, at 207. See also Wilkinson, 
supra note 57, at 291. 
194 Lovell, supra note 66, at 426 
195 Ogg England in the Reigns of James 11 and William III(lg55) 58 
196 Cannon, supra, note 62, at 36 
197 In Curtis v Peny (1802) 6 Ves. Jun. 739, 747; 31 E.R. 1285, Eldon LC openly admitted 
that a suit to reconvey land given by the plaintiff to his son 'to enable him to sit in 
Parliament ... was very properly dismissed.' But see Platumone v Staple (1815) G. Coop. 
250; 35 E.R. 548 (conveyance of rent charge to qualify transferee as a Member of 
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Parliament set aside); cf ChildeTs v Childmc (1875) 3 Kay &John 310; 69 E.R. I 126 
(conveyance of goo acres of land in order to qualify son as bailiff held enforceable). 
198 Newton v Overseers of Crowlq, (1846) 2 C.B. 207 (grant to son-in-law for a nominal 
consideration held a valid transfer of the vote in the absence of fraud); Newton v 
Harpeaves (1846) 2 C.B. 163; 15 L.J.C.P. 154 (transfer without consideration of land to 
enfranchise two sons held enforceable): May v May (1863) 33 Beav. 81; 55 E.R. 297 
(conveyance of property in order to enfranchise son held enforceable); Groves v Groves 
(1828) 3 Y .  & J. 163; 148 E.R. I 136 (conveyance to one brother in trust for another in 
order to enfranchise the latter held enforceable). But see Brackmbuly v Brackenhly 
(1820) 2 Jac. & W. 391; 37 E.R. 677. 
199 Rob& v Rob& (1818) Dan. 153; 159 E.R. 862 (conveyance toqualify purchaser to hunt 
under the Game Act, 22 & 23 Car. 11, c 25, s 3 held enforceable); Cecil v Butcher (182 I )  2 
Jac. & W. 565; 37 E.R. 744 (claim to equitable relief on conveyance to qualify vendor's 
son to hunt on the Eccleshall estate where deed had been lost, refused). Lord Mansfield 
noted that the qualification was vested in property, and since a trustee was only a 
nominal owner, the beneficiary under a trust of land would enjoy the privilege of the 
hunt. Wetherell v Hall Cald. 230. 
200 (1841) 8 C1. & Fin. 374. 
201 Sugden A Treatise on the Law of Property (1849) 72. 
202 Russell v Reed (1629) Toth. 164; 2 I E.R. 156. But see Freeman v Blagrave Bacon's Cases at 
1 I ,  cited in Potter Histm-icalIntroduction to English Law (1932) 5 13, where an agreement 
to confer a knighthood was refused as 'venal and mercenary.' 
203 Maitland, supra note 64, at 82 
204 The real property qualification appears to have originated at common law, and in 1415 
a freehold ownership in an amount of at  least forty shillings was fixed by statute. See 
Thompson and Merriam Conduct of Jurieslruluding Grand Juries (1882) 20; 4 Blackstone 
Commentaries 302; 3 Bac. Abr. 751-2; 2 Hawk. P.c., 12; 2 Henry v, c 3; Thomas' Case 
(1794) 1 Dyer 99; 73 E.R. 2 18. The value of the freehold as well as the nature of the 
required ownership interest varied considerably over time and also from one kind of 
jury to another. See Samaha Law and Order in Historical Perspective (1974) 48-50; Hay 
(ed) Albion's Fatal Tree: Property and Authority and Criminal Law (1977) 30, 31. See also 
Forsyth, A Histmy ofTrial by July (1878) 143 -5; Moore The July (1973) 68. 
It was not until 1825 that property qualifications were made uniform. The Juries Act, 
1825 (6 Geo. IV, c 50) repealed some 85 statutes and instituted landholding, albeit not 
landholding as restricted as the franchise qualification at the time, as a prerequisite to 
jury service. The 1825 property qualifications remained in force until this decade, and 
notwithstanding that the absolute number of qualified jurors increased through 
devaluation of money and periodic revaluation of assessments, as recently as 1956 it 
was estimated that only one and a half million persons in England could serve asjurors. 
See Cornish The July (1968) 28, 29. Devlin Trio1 by July (1956) 2 1 t 2 2 .  Jackson, in an 
admittedly narrow sampling, found that of 5000 parliamentary electors in a ward in 
Cambridge before the second world war, only 187 persons qualied for jury service. 
Jackson The Machinety ofJustice in England (7th ed 1977) 487; Baldwin and McConville 
July TThh (1 979) 88- 105. 
Jurors, drawn for the most pan  from the same landed classes as the politically 
enfranchised, were hardly sympathetic to calls for electoral reform, and in the trial of 
Daniel Holt in 1793 convicted the accused for publishing calls for expansion of the 
franchise and for democratization of the electoral process (22 St. Tr. I 189). 
205 See Samaha, supra note 204, at 48-50. 
206 Thayer A P~eliminaly Treatise on E&e at the Common Law ( I  898) I 5 I at note 3. Devlin, 
supra note 204, at 17. 
207 5 Geo. rr, c 18 
208 Cannon, supra note 62, at 36 
209 18 Henry vr, c I I .  See Samaha, supra note 204, at 67-94. Taylor, supra note 192, at 
532. 
2 lo  Supra note 39 
2 I I Indeed, the purchaser's promissory entitlement was often protected only by property 
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rule. Until very recently 'expectation' damages could not, for the most part, be 
recovered for breach of a contract to sell land. See infra, at notes 225-66. 
2 I 2 3 Weber Economy and Society (1968) I 108 
2 I 3 Lovell, supra note 66, at 426. '[Mlany men, not freeholders, made large fortunes which 
they usually applied to the purchase of freehold estates.' Ogg, supra note 195, at 57. 
214 See Bagehot, supra note 86, at 164 
215 Turberville, supra note 76, at 427, citing 2 Early Victorian England (ed Young 1934) at 
486 
216 Tobin, On limiting the domain of inequality (1970) 13 J.  of Law and Econ. 263, 269. 
Okun, Equulity and Efficiency: The Big Tradeoff(1975). 
217 Simpson, supra note 140, at 195. Ownership of land, which was equivalent to political 
authority, protected the continued control of political decision-making by the landed 
aristocracy from the claims of mere wealth acquired through finance or trade. 
Pollard, supra note 64, at 156, 164. These habits did not die a quick death. Disraeli, 
before he became prime minister, was loaned money for the purpose of acquiring 
Hughenden, for '[a] landless Conservative leader was a contradiction in terms; 
Disraeli, if he was to fill the position, must possess real estate'. Turberville, supra note 
76, at 420. 
218 See Veal1 The Pqpvlar Movement f w  Law R . f m  1640-1660 (1970) 270 et seq. 
219 Simpson, supra note 140. at 195, 219. Haskins, supra note 39. 
220  Scmtton, supra note 76 
22 I See infra, at note 240 
222 See infra, at notes 225-66. 
223 Ibid 
224 Supra note 135 
225 Chancery Amendment Act, 1 8 5 8 , ~  I & 22 Vict., c 27, s 2: 'In all cases in which the court 
of Chancery hasjurisdiction to entertain an application ... for the specific performance 
of any covenant, contract, or agreement, it shall be lawful for the same court, if it shall 
think fit, to award damages to the party injured, either in addition toor in substitution 
for such ... specific performance, and such damages may be assessed in such manner as 
the court shall direct.' The act was repealed by the Statute Law Revision and Civil 
Procedure Act, 188 I ,  44 & 45 Vict., c 59, and by the Statute Law Revision and Civil 
Procedure Act, 1883, 46 & 47 Vict., c 49 s 3, but the jurisdiction to award damages 
remains pursuant to savings provisions included in those acts through the combined 
effect of s 5 of the 1883 act, the Statute Law Revision Act, 1898,61 & 62 Vict., c 22, and 
the Supreme Court of Judicature Consolidation Act, 1925, 15 & 16 Geo. v, c 49, s 18. 
See Sayers v Collyer (1884) 28 Ch. D 10%; Lee& Industrial Co-operatiue Society Ltd. v Shuk 
[1g24] A.C. 851 (H.L.) Stevenson D.C.J. in error in E.J.H. Holdings Ltd. v Bougk et w. 
(1977) 3 Alta. L.R. (2d) 244. Jolowicz has pointed out that thejurisdiction created by the 
1858 legislation may have been accidentally repealed in 1974 on the enactment of the 
Statute Law Repeals Act, 1974, 22 & 23 Eliz. 2, c 22. Jolowicz, Damages in Equity - a 
study of Lord Cairns' act [1g75] Camb. L.J. 224, 228. 
Similar legislation exists in Canada. See Queen's Bench Act, R.S.S. 1965, c 73, s 45, 
para g; Judicature Act, R.s.O. 1970, c 228, s 2 I ;  The Judicature Act, R.S.N.B. 1973, c J-2 
as explained in Bsidges Brothm Ltd. v Fwest Protection Ltd. (1977) 72 D.L.R. (3d) 335. The 
Chancery Amendment Act, 1858, is in force in British Columbia by virtue of the Law 
and Equity Act, R.S.B.C. 1979, c 224, s 2; see Rombough et al. v Crestbrook Timber Ltd. 
(1966) 55 W.W.R. 577 (B.c.c.A.). 
226 See I Bonbright The Valuation of Property (1937) 328, 329. While innumerable cases 
dealing with recovery of damages in sales of goods transactions may be cited as 
authority for the kinds of loss for which compensation will be granted and for the 
boundaries of recovery in terms of causation and remoteness, most texts on real 
property cite Diamond v Campbell-Jones [1g61] Ch. 22 as authority for the most 
fundamental of principles of contract recovery. See Ogus The Law of Damages (1 973); Di 
Castri The Law of Vendor and Purchaser (2nd ed I 976); McGregor McGregw on Damages 
(14th ed 1980). 
227 See Fry, supra note 51, at 600; Toddv Gee (1810) 17 Ves. 273,278; Blorev Sutton (1817), 
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3 Mer. 237. 247-8; Jenkins v Parkinson (1833) 2 My. & K. 5, 11-12; Nelson v Bridges 
( I  839) 2 Beav. 239. These and a number of additional cases on point are collected and 
very thoroughly analysed in Harpum, supra note 22, at 67-73. 
228 In Pomeroy's Specific Performance of Contractc (3rd ed 1926) go3 we find the somewhat 
paradoxical statement that while 'the amount of compensation may be ascertained 
upon somewhat the same basis as that upon which damages would be assessed for the 
same loss ... the motives and principles upon which compensation is allowed are wholly 
different.' But see Mayne, supra note 36, at 204, who argues that 'the compensation was 
really damages.' As one recent commentator put it, 'The exact relationship between the 
two remedies is not easy to deduce from the reported cases.' Harpum, supra note 22, at 
67. 
229 Jurisdiction to award damages in Equity was exercised only rarely, and while of 
historical interest, it had very little, if anything at all, to do with the enforcement of 
contractual obligations. See City of London v Nash ( I  747) 3 Atk. 5 12; 26 E.R. 1095; Phelps 
v Prothero (1855) 7 De G.M. & G. 722,734; 44 E.R. 280,285. Fry, supra note 51, at 600; 
Story Equity Julirpidence (14th ed 1918) 473-4. Simpson points out that an award of 
damages would have violated the maxim that equity only acted when the legal remedy 
was inadequate, but claims that 'there seems to have been no reluctance to make an 
order for payment of money.' Simpson, supra note 9, at 596. Holdsworth writes, 'It was 
not until the eighteenth century that it was settled equity would grant only specific 
performance if damages were not an adequate remedy.' I Holdsworth A Histoty of 
English Law (7th ed 1956) 457. 
There existed as well inherent equitablejurisdiction to order an accounting of profits 
irrespective of the loss incurred by the plaintiff. See P a r k  v McKenna (1874) L.R. 10 
Ch. 96, I 24. 
230 Todd v Gee (1810) 17 Ves. 273, 278; 34 E.R. 106, 107; Kendell v Bechett (1830) 2 Russ. & 
M. 88; 39 E.R. 327 (refusal of claim for return of deposit on contract to sell shares) 
231 Clerk and Humphry Sales of Land (1885) 358. It is said, in 2 White and Tudor Leading 
Cases in Equity (9th ed 1928) 453, that defects in tenure which 'extend to the nature of 
the property itself cannot be compensated in damages. See also Fry SpecijicPerfmnce 
supra note 22, at 527,528; Hick v Phillips (1721) Prec. Ch. 575; 24 E.R. 258; Fordyceetal. 
v Ford (1794) 4 Bro. C.C. 494; 29 E.R. 1007; Drewe v Cwp (1804) g Ves. Jun. 368; 32 E.R. 
644; In Re Ridgeway and Smith's Contract [ I ~ O I ]  2 Ch. 98,108. But see Price v Macaulq 
(1852) 2 De G.M. & G. 339; 42 E.R. 903. 
232 (1776) 2 B1.W. 1078; 96 E.R. 635 
233 See Washington, Damages in contract at common law 11 (1932) 48 Law 4. Rev. go, 94, 
95. Law Reform Commission of British Columbia Report On theRule in Bain v. Fothergill 
(L.R.c. 28, 1976). Poumett v Fuller (1856) 17 C.B. 660 (damages not recoverable where 
vendor contracts under mistaken belief that his interest in the property was sufficient); 
Rowe v School Board for London (I 877) 36 Ch. D. 6 I g (damages not recoverable in case of 
breach of contract to transfer easement); Sihes v Wild (i861), I B .  & s. 593; (1863), 4 B. & 
s. 42 I. 
In 1826 in Hopkins v Grarebrook (1826), 6 B.  & C. 31, it was held that full contractual 
damages would be recoverable in a case where the vendor knew of the defect at the time 
of contracting. This exception to the rule was overruled some fifty years later in Bain v 
Fothcrgill (1874) L.R. 7 H.L. 158, at 207: 'Upon a review of all the decisions on the 
subject, I think that the case of HopRins v Grazebrook ought not any longer to be 
regarded as an authority ... the rule as to the limits within which damage may be 
recovered upon the breach of a contract for the sale of a real estate must be taken to be 
without exception. If a pmon enters into a contract for & sale of a real estate knowing that he 
has no title to it, nor any means of acquiring it, the purchaser cannot recover damages beyond the 
expenses he has incurred by an action for the breach of the contract' (emphasis added). 
Although Horwitz has argued that the expectation interest in contracts was not 
recognized in any context prior to the nineteenth century, this thesis is not supported 
by the evidence. Simpson, The Honvitz thesis and the history of contracts (1979) 46 U. 
Chi. L.R. 533; Horwitz supra note 20, at 937. 
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234 In an early claim for mesne profits, brought in 1770 in connection with an action for 
ejectment by a plaintiff seeking compensation for the loss sustained on his disposses- 
sion from his land, Gould J said '[Tlhe plaintiff in this case is not confined to the very 
mesne profits only, but he may recover for his trouble, &c. I have known four times the 
value of the mesne profits given by a jury in this son of action of trespass; if it were not 
to be so sometimes, compleatjustice could not be done to the party injured.' Goodtitle v 
Tombs (1770) 3 Wils K.B. I 18; 95 E.R. 965. In a later case, Buller J said, of a claim for 
mesne profits, 'The damages here are as uncertain as in an action of assault. 'Goodtitle v 
North et. al. (1781) 2 Dougl. 584; gg E.R. 368. 369. 
235 (1604) Noy. 142; 74 E.R. 1104. See also Brig's Case (1624) Palm 364; 81 E.R. 1125 ('Un 
action sur le case pur losse de benefit de son bargaine'). 
236 Ibid. The reference to 'country' most likely refers to the county in which the franchise 
was most closely associated with the ownership of freehold land. Ogg, supra note 195, 
at 122. 
237 Supra note 232 
238 Bain and Paterson v Fothergill and H a n k  ( I  874) L.R. 7 H.L. I 58 
239 Seepournett v Fuller (1856) 17 C.B. 660; Keen v Mear [lgzo] 2 Ch. 574. The status of the 
restriction on contractual recovery in Canada has been thrown into considerable doubt 
by the recent decision of the Supreme Court of Canada in A.V.G. Management Science 
Lfd. v Barnell Developmmts Ltd. et al. [1g7g] 2 S.C.R. 43, which, although decided with 
reference to the Torren's system, or rather the quasi-Torren's system, in British 
Columbia, is of general applicability. In that case Laskin cj, speaking for the court, 
noted recent British Columbia legislation which abrogates the rule and commented 
disparagingly on its applicability generally in Canada. 
The Province of British Columbia in s 33 of the Property Law Act, R.S.B.C. 1979, c 
340, has abrogated the rule and allows recovery for a purchaser's loss of bargain. It 
should be noted, however, that the legislation says nothing of recovery of consequential 
damages. The report of the British Columbia Law Reform Commission upon which 
the section was based clearly contemplates recovery of incidental and consequential 
damages as well as lost profits. Law Reform Commission of British Columbia, supra 
note 233, at 19, 20. 
240 Bain v Fothergill, supra note 238, at 174, 2 I I ;  Locke v Fun8 (1866) L.R. I C.P. 441,453; 
Barnes v Cadogan Developments Ltd. [1g30] 1 Ch. 479,488; J.W. Cafe's Ltd. v Brownslow 
T m t  [1g50] I All E.R. 894,896; Day v Singleton [18gg] 2 Ch. 320.329; Phillips v L a d i n  
[1g4g] 1 All E.R. 770. This analysis is, however, suspect, as it would be easy enough to 
require. proof of actual intention. See Law Reform Commission of British Columbia, 
supra note 233, at 13; Ogus, supra note 226, at 303. 
241 S k  v Wild, supra note 233 
242 Bain v FothergiU, supra note 238, at 173; Maitland v Maahms (1915) 8 W.W.R. 274; Di 
Castri, supra note 226, at 748 
243 Bain v Fothergdl, ibid, at 202 
244 McCormick Handbook on the Law of Damages (1935) 563, 684 argues that Flureau v 
Thornhill, supra note 232, was 'one of the first instances of assumption by the judge of 
control over the damages in contract cases.'See also Horwiu, supra note 20, at 925-6. 
245 Mayne A Treatise on the Law of Damages (1856) 106. Mill has made a similar point in a 
broader context: 'The ordinary progress of society, which increases in wealth, is at all 
times to augment the incomes of landlords - to give them a greater amount and a 
greater proportion of the wealth of the community, independently of any trouble or 
outlay incurred by themselves. They grow richer as it were in their sleep, without 
working, risking or economising.' Mill Princi$b of Political Economy book 5, c 2, para 5. 
See also George Progress and Poverty (fiftieth anniv. ed 1929). 358-67. 
246 Fuller and Perdue, The reliance interest in contract damages (1936) 46 Yale LJ. I ,  61, 
62 
247 It is true, as discussed earlier, that the vendor could purchase the first buyer's rights 
from him, thus sharing the wealth represented by the higher price paid by the second 
offeror. This, however, does not answer the point that the incentive to breach and thus 
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to transfer land to its (objectively) more valued use would be quantitatively reduced by 
the redistribution of wealth. In addition, the 'negotiated breach' argument, if it can be 
put that way, must taken into account that, at least in respect of land, the prospective 
purchaser's expectation of success would have been a virtual certainty. Moreover, 
negotiations in this two-party paradigm are apt to be extremely protracted and 
expensive. See Trebilcock, An economic approach to the doctrine of unconscionability, 
in Swan and Reiter, Studies in Contrnct Law (1980), at 396. 
248 See Harnett v YeiMing (1805) 2 Sch. & Lef. 549. The example given by Sir John Romilly 
MR in Earl of Durham v Legard (1865) 34 Beav. 61 I of a man selling his property as a 
freeholder when in fact he held only by copyhold is a classic illustration of the 
intersection of the rules relating to specific performance and franchise. 
249 In Bain v Fothergill, supra note 238, at 172, the House of Lords could not trace the rule 
to any case before 1776. 
250 See Nomood v Read ( 1~58 )  Plowd. 180. See Honvitz, supra note 231, at 919-23. 
251 Crmhaw v Williams 231 S.W. 45; 191 Ky. 559 ( ~ g z l ) ,  at 48 
252 See Slotk v Lockhart ( 1863) 1 J.R. (s.c.) 1 (New Zealand); O'Neil v Drinhh (1 908) 8 W.W.R. 
937 (Canada); West v Read (1913) 13 S.R. (N.s.w.) 575 (Australia). In the United States 
the majority of state courts adopted traditional contract damage rules. See McCormick, 
supra note 244, at 680-3; Corbin Corbin on Contracts (1st ed 1950) 1098; 3 Sedgewick on 
Damuges (9th ed 1913) 1012, 1016. 
253 Ogg, supra note 195, at 70 
254 'Landowners ... favoured primogeniture since it helped to concentrate ownership.' 
Veall, supra note 218, at 60. Simpson has written that the propertied classes 'realized 
that primogeniture was the very basis of their whole way of life.' Simpson, supra note 
140. at 253. 
255 Tenures Abolition Act, 1660, 12  Car. 11, c 24 
256 Whalan, Immediate success of registration of title to land in Australia and early failures 
in England (1966-7) 2 N.Z.U.L.R. 416,419. Dicey has argued that disappointment of 
land reformers during the nineteenth century was caused in part by the reactionism of 
the legal profession: 'legal experts, and certainly English conveyancers, are in no hurry 
to revolutionize a system which enlists their sympathies and promotes their interests.' 
Dicey, supra note 33, at 223. See also Simpson, supra note 140. at 253. 
257 See Merryman, The inter vivos transfer of land (1978) 26 (supplement) J. of Znt. W 
Comp. Law gl ,  at 97-100. 
258 'There is certain to be some price at which the plaintiff would surrender his right to 
specific performance.' Reiter and Sharpe, supra note 12 at 151. 
259 Kronman, supra note 12, at 358-60. A similar view has been expressed in respect of 
other legal phenomena. See Calabresi T h  Costs of Accidents (1970); Veljanovski, The 
economic approach to law: A critical introduction (1980) 7 Brit. J. of Law andsociety 158, 
171; Weinrib, Utilitarianism, economics, and legal theory (1980) 30 U.T.L.J. 307, 
312-15. 
At the very least, the price which things'have' will obviously depend upon the way in 
which we ask the question. Kelman, Consumption theory, production theory, and 
ideology in the Coase theorem (1979) 52 S. Cal. L.R. 669; Kennedy, Cost-benefit 
analysis of entitlement problems: A critique (1981) 33 Stan. L.R. 387,401-7. Kennedy 
has noted the 'non market behaviour' of some classes of persons when faced with the 
opportunity to sell certain 'goods' with obvious moral, religious, or political attributes: 
'Take the issue of the manufacture of napalm by Dow Chemical during the war in 
Vietnam. The private manufacturing sector could never possibly have bought out the 
antiwar opposition to that allocation of resources - indeed it is doubtful that it could 
have bought out one single serious antiwar activist.' Ibid, at 420. 
260 See Weinrib, supra note 259, at 315. 
261 Denman Origins of Ownership (1958) 144, 145 
262 Freemn v Blagrave, Bacon's Cases at 1 I cited in Potter, supra note 202 
263 Fortescue-Brickdale Methooh of Land TraNfer (1914) 207, described land transfer 
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reform as the foundation of social egalitarianism. See also Russet, Inequality and 
instability: The relation of land tenure to politics, in Dahl Readings in Modem Political 
Analysis (1968) 151-62. 
264 i Mill Principles of Political Economy (5th London ed 1893) 296. One of the duties to 
which Mill refers is, of course, the franchise, and it was this concept of public duty or 
trust which was propounded as justification for the open ballot. Only through public 
exercise of the trust could society assess whether a citizen was fulfilling his public 
obligation. 
265 Calabresi and Bobbit TragiG Choices (1978) 32. See also Singer, Freedoms and utilities in 
the distribution of health care, in Dworkin, Bermant, and Brown (eds), supra note 7, 
with respect to the market distribution of health services. 
The Law Reform Commission of Australia in Human Tissue Transplants (Report No. 
7,1977) recommended that the sale of human tissue be forbidden by law, resting their 
judgment in part on the grounds that 'traffic in "human spare parts" is objectionable in 
itself, and that payment will encourage blackmail, coercion, or duress.' Ibid, at 86. 
266 While the courts may have withdrawn from attempts to monetize the value of political 
identity not merely in response to intractable complexities of assessment, but also 
because of the affront to social values which such pricing would have entailed, we 
should note that the withdrawal was not absolute. In the famous case of Ashby v White et 
al, discussed at note 128, the plaintiff, in an action decided ultimately in the House of 
Lords, recovered ten pounds as damages (in tort) when his vote was maliciously refused 
by a returning officer. 
267 Ogg, supra note 195, at 56, 57. 'NO revolution in the distribution of political power 
would come about without a redistribution of real property.' Turberville, supra note 
76, at 407. 
268 Maine Ancient Law (loth ed 1912) 
269 Ibid, at 185 
270 The absence of explicit constitutional limitations in England and Canada restricting the 
right of the state to take property was not as remarkable as one might suspect. The 
protection of property through legal limitations on governmental power was instead 
carried out through the exercise of political authority by powerful property owners 
elected by less powerful property owners. The narrow franchise was openlyjustified on 
the ground that only through government by property owners could the institution of 
private property be preserved. The function of government as the guardian of private 
property was established not by constitutional guarantees but by the restriction of 
political authority in landowners. See Fellman, Property in colonial political theory 
(1942), 16 Temp. L.Q. 388, at 399, 400. See also Hadley U&-Currentc in American 
Politicc (1915) 48: 'The first cause for this persistence of property right is to be found in 
the land policy of the United States .. The immigrant who settled in the western states 
was offered two things: the vote, and the chance of becoming a landowner ...' The 
opportunity to own farms in freehold made ambitious settlers conservative. Men with a 
hundred and sixty acres of land were not likely to pass laws which would interfere with 
the rights of property, and particularly of landed property. The prospect of becoming 
landowners had the same sort of steadying effect upon men who framed the 
constitutions of new states in 1820 or 1830 that the fact of already being landowners 
had upon the men who framed the Federal Constitution forty years earlier.' 
271 Kessler, Contracts of adhesion - Some thoughts about freedom of contract (1943) 43 
Col. L.R. 629,640 
272 In societies which operate without a market, in which the dominant motive or purpose 
for an exchange transaction is not merely the realization of profit but 'the main goal is 
to satisfy social needs even if the profit motive is also incidentally present,'damages will 
not be the preferred remedy. Treitel, Remedies for breach of contract (courses of 
action open to a party aggrieved), in 7 Zntmtional Encyclopedia of Comparative Law c 16, 
179 (1976). Gsovski in 1 Soviet Civil Law (1948) 438, 439 has described the Soviet 
concept of specific performance as follows: '[Sloviet jurists unanimously insist that 
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soviet law is governed by the principle of specific performance [which] corresponds to 
the purposes which the obligation serves under the soviet law ... Since the socialist 
national economy demands that the flow of goods run along the channels established 
by the plant, the general rule is that the debtor is not relieved from specific 
performance by paying damages in money ... Specific performance of such obligations 
is at the same time the fulfilment of the national economic plan.' 
273 Farnsworth, supra note 5, at 1216 
274 See Gneist, supra note 60, at 391 
275 One notable example which Holmes immortalized in The Common Law is the imposition 
of criminal sanctions in cases of breaches of contracts for the carriage of passengers, 
which was advocated in Macauley's draft of the Indian Penal Code. The explanation of 
the recommendation was that the palanquin-bearers of India were too destitute even 
'to pay damages, and yet had to be trusted to carry unprotected women and children 
through wild and desolate tracts, where their desertion would have placed those under 
their charge in great danger.' Holmes, Supra note 5, at 40,41. Stephen, Supra note 
190, at 300-2. See also Ahmed Anquilla Bin Hadje Mohumed Sallah Anquilla v Estate and 
Trust Agencies (192 7), Ltd. [1g38] AX. 624,635 (the breaking of an enforceable contract 
is an unlawful act). 
In addition, while specific performance of employment contracts would not be 
ordered at law, employers did not need private relief to assist them in enforcing their 
employees' obligations. Until the Master and Servant Act, 1867,30 & 31 Vict., c 141, 
and the Employers and Workmen Act, 1875, 38 & 38 Vict., c 13, breach of an 
employment contract by an employee was a criminal offence under the Master and 
Servant Act, 1824,4 Geo. IV c 34. In essence, what we have is specific performance at 
the hands of only one of the parties to the contract. 
276 One possible explanation for criminal laws which generally did not touch upon 
interference with contractual rights but demonstrated a remarkable concern with and 
sensitivity to propeny, was the identity of the architects of the criminal law. Moral and 
social insult was far more likely to be focused on interference with wealth in the form of 
property than with wealth in the form of bargains. Dickinson, supra note 40, at 162. 
Hay, supra note 204, at 17-63. 
One's perception of the nature of land and the nature of land transfer must take 
account of penal legislation first enacted in Canada during the nineteenth century 
designed to reinforce the 'sanctity of contract': 'Everyone who, knowing of an 
unregistered prior sale or of an existing unregistered grant, mortgage, hypothec, 
privilege or encumbrance of or upon real property, fraudulently sells the property or 
any part thereof is guilty of an indictable offence and is liable to imprisonment for two 
years.' The Criminal Code, R.S.C. 1970, c C-34, s 345. This section of the Criminal Code 
originated in Quebec, and its application was limited to that province until 1892. 
Section 8 of An Act to amend and explain the Ordinance concerning the registration of 
Hypothecs in Lower Canada, 16 Vict., c 208, was enacted on 14 June I 853. The section 
first appeared in its modern form as s 114 of An Act respecting the Registration of 
Titles to or Charges Upon Real Estate, - the Law of Hypothecs, - the Dower and 
Property of Married Women, - and the Conveyance of Socage Lands, c.s.L.c., 1860, c 
37. The preamble to the act stated its purpose as the prevention of losses from secret 
conveyances of real estate and the elimination of uncertainty and insecurity of title in 
Lower Canada. The legislation was incorporated into The Larceny Act, R.S.C. 1867, c 
164, ss gr, 93.94, and subsequently into the first Criminal Code, i8gz,55 & 56 Vict., c 
299 ss 372.373. 
Althourrh the section (even though it was cou~led to a 'reverse onus' ~rovision in 
respect 07 proof of ownership) aipears not t i  have been widely enjbrced, rare 
convictions and prosecutions have been recorded. See R. v McDeuitt (1906) 17 C.C.C. 
331; R. v Foreman (1955). 11 1 C.C.C. 297; R. v Lawerue (1g50), g C.R. 5. 
Perhaps the legislation and the absence of any convictions outside Quebec can be 
explained by the civilian doctrines of sale and propeny which are markedly different 
from those of common law. In R. v Lawrence, supra, Barlay J suggests (at I 2) that 'the 
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document was not a mere promise to buy within a specified date, the l o  day period 
refers not to the sale but to the signing of the deed which will evidence the sale. The 
signing of the deed was not to create the contract but was to evidence thecontract of sale 
already completed between the parties. The sale ittelf conveyed the property to the 
purchaser but for the purposes of registration a .... deed had to be executed.' Marler 
states 'By the contract itself, the ownership, which is a right, is transferred to the 
purchaser ... the purchaser is owner of the thing through the contract.' Marler The Law 
of Real Property (1932) paras 213,436-43; Castel The Civil Law System ofthe Province of 
Qutbec (1962) 129-33. Not until 1966 was the Quebec Code of Civil Procedure 
amended to preclude imprisonment for violation of a civil obligation. c.c.P., Art. I .  The 
existence of penal sanctions (in the truest sense of the word) to enforce contractual 
obligations has been criticized by the federal Law Reform Commission, which 
recognized that the offence, if retained in a revised Criminal Code, ought not to be 
assimilated to the general law of theft. Law Reform Commission of Canada, Criminal 
Law, Thefl and F r a d  (Working Paper ig, 1977) 59. 
277 Supra note 246 
278 Treitel, supra note 272, at 179. See Grossfeld, Money sanctions for breach of contract 
in a Communist economy (1963) 72 Yale L. J. 1326, 1340-1. Farnsworth argues, 
however, that 'even in communist countries ... breach of contract is not a crime.' 
Farnsworth, supra note 5, at I 145, I 146. 
279 In recent times the argument has been made that basic human and political rights 
should be insulated from the market because of 'fundamental considerations of liberty 
and human dignity.' Schulue The Public Use of the Private Interest (1977) 28. See also 
Rawls A Theory of Justice, supra note 1 g 1. 
280 During the eighteenth century the task of assessing damages was left entirely to the 
jury. '[Iln Courts of Law all the evidence in mercantile cases was thrown together; they 
were left generally to a jury, and they produced no general principle.' Lickbarrow v 
Macon (1 787) 2 T.R. 63,73; loo E.R. 35,40. 'The amount to be given was in the discretion 
of the petty jury; it was in the discretion of the attaintjury whether or  not this amount 
was too great.' Washington, supra note 233. By the middle of the eighteenth century 
the courts were indirectly but effectively controlling the assessment of damages by the 
jury through manipulation of the rules of evidence, and the exercise of the power of 
review in so far as the jury acted in disobedience of the trial judge's charge. Ibid, at go, 
91. 
A similar practice was followed in the United States. See Horwitz, supra note 20, at 
925, 926. One of the more important but often overlooked aspects of H a d h  v 
Barendale (1854) g EX. 34 I ;  156 E.R. 145, was the enhanced predictability of damages 
through the increasedjudicial authority overjury damage assessment. Danzig, Hadley v 
Barendab: A study in the industrialization of the law (1975) 4 J .  of Leg. Stvdies 249, 
272-4. 
281 A point commonly made in cases of specific performance is that one piece of property 
cannot be identical to another, for at the very least each occupies different places in 
space. The consequences of spatial uniqueness in an era when canal transport 
constituted the sole form of transportation were substantial. See Sedtadley Railroad 
Transpwtation (1885) 3; Moulton Watenuays versus Railways (1926) 1 10, 1 19. Road 
transport was in an abysmal state, and the railways did not flower until the 
mid-nineteenth century. Jackman The Develqpment of Transpotlation in Modon Enghnd 
(2nd ed 1962); DYOS and Aldcroft British Transport, An Economic Suruey from the 
Seventeenth Centuty to the Twentieth (1969); Albert The Turnpike Road System in England 
1663-1840 (1972). But see Chartres, Road carrying in England in the seventeenth 
century: Myth and reality (1977). 30 Econ. Hut. Rev. (2nd series) 73. 
The significance of proximity to a canal was incontravertible. See Sedtadley Railroad 
Transpotlation (1885) 159; Danzig, supra note 280, at agg,z60. Turnbull, Pickfords and 
the canal carrying trade, 1780- 1850 (1 973) 6 Transport History 5; Pegrum Transporta- 
tion and Publu Policy (1973) 40. As one railway official put it, 'the canals only carry from 
one point to another, from A to B o r  C, as a rule, whereas railways can carry from A to the 
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rest of the alphabet.' Moulton Waterways versus Railways (1926) log. The importance of 
locale and thus the concept of 'uniqueness' was not restricted to inter-urban markets. 
One must, in reading the cases, keep in mind that even London did not have an urban 
mass transportation system until the second half of the nineteenth century. Some '44 
square miles held some 425,000 people (44 percent of the total population of London 
at an average density of 149 to the acre). By 1851 this ... area had extended to include ... 
g square miles; it then housed 945,000 people.' Hall, The origins: urban growth in 
Britain I 801-1939, in I Hall (ed) The Containment of Urban Land (1973) 76. 
As notable a political and economic observer as Adam Smith has described the 
transformation of the relevance of differences of geographic situation resulting from 
efficient and accessible transportation facilities which resulted in 'upon that account the 
greatest of all improvements.' 1 Smith An Inquiry into the Nature and Causes of the Wealth 
of Nations (Glascow ed, Cambell, Skinner, and Todd, eds, 1976) 163. 
282 Vestiges of the connection between land ownership and political power do, however, 
remain. For example, after Confederation property qualifications were often imposed 
on candidates. See Spencer v Farthing (1915) 8 W.W.R. I 186 (Man. c.A.); Falconer v 
Langley (1899) 6 B.C.R. 444; R .  v Galloway (1886) 3 Man. R. 297. Similar qualifications 
were sometimes imposed on voters. In re Kelso Municipal Voters List (1go7), I 2 B.C.R. 362 
(registration under land registration statute necessary to vote); Peny v Morley (191 I )  16 
W.L.R. 691 (holder of an unregistered agreement for purchase of land not entitled to 
vote); In re Clark (1906) 3 W.L.R. 31 I (applicant for homestead with first right to obtain 
interest not entitled to vote). Some remnants of the connection exist even today. See 
The Municipal Ebctions Act s.0. 1972, c 95, s 13. 
283 At note 2 I supra 
284 At note 239 supra 
285 For example, the contractual entitlement to corporate shares, and, more particularly, 
the right to sufficient shares to constitute the prospective owner the effective manager 
of the corporate wealth represented by the assets of the corporation and influence of 
the office, are specifically enforced virtually as a matter of course. Dobell v Cowichan 
Copper Co. Ltd. (N.P.L.) et al. (1967) 61 W.W.R. 594 (B.c.s.c.) (injunction restraining 
disposition of shares by defendant to anyone other than plaintiff); Gilbert v B a r n  
(1958) 13 D.L.R. (2d) 262. 
Although the speculative nature of any attempt to assess accurately the pecuniary 
value of 'control' has been proferred as the underpinning of equitable relief, another 
equally plausible rationale might be an implicit recognition that the political and social 
influence exercised by the modern corporation cannot be measured in dollars and 
cents. See Note, Specific performance of contracts for a controlling interest in a 
corporation (1995) 49 Ham. L. R .  122; Neef, Equity - Specific performance - Recent 
trends in the specific performance of contracts to sell securities (1953) 51 Mich. L. R .  
408,414-16. Thus it is not at all surprising that the specific performance of a right to 
obtain corporate securities is now enshrined in legislation. For example, s 87(3) of the 
Ontario Business Corporations Act, R.S.O. 1970, c 53, reads as follows: 'The right to obtain 
or reclaim possession of a security may be specifically enforced by specific performance 
or its transfer enjoined.' 
286 University Council of the Vidyodaya University of Ceylon v Silva [1965] I W.L.R. 77 
287 Supra note g. Waddams, supra note 2, at 427. 428; Emerald Resources Ltd. v Sterling 
Oil Property Managnnent, supra note g, at 647. The fear that an order for specific 
performance of a contract of employment would be unworkable was typical of 
eighteenth-centuryjudges. A common concern was expressed by Fry LJ in De Francesco 
v Barnum (18go), 45 Ch. D. 430, at 438: 'For my own part, I should be very unwilling to 
extend decisions the effect of which is to compel persons who are not desirous of 
maintaining continuous personal relations with one another to continue those personal 
relations. I have a strong impression and a strong feeling that it is not in the interest of 
mankind that the rule of specific performance should be extended to such cases. I think 
the Courts are bound to be jealous, lest they should turn contracts of service into 
contracts of slavery; and therefore, speaking for myself, I should lean against the 
extension of the doctrine of specific performance and injunction in such a manner.' 
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288 A related point which provides insight into and reinforces this rationale for the 
evolution of property rules was the common law's outright denial, except in limited 
cases which need not concern us here, of damage compensation in cases of contracts of 
employment for anything but demonstrable economic loss. See Addis v Gramophone 
Limited [igog] A.C. 488; Groom v Crocker [1g3g] 1 K.B. 194; Sedgwick Elements of the Law 
of Damages (2nd ed 1909) 103. Hobbs v L.S.W. Railway (1875) L.R. 10 Q.B. I I 1, 122 
(inconvenience, annoyance, disappointment not compensible in damages); Hamlin v 
G.N. Railway (1856), I H. a N. 408; 156 E.R. 1261 (damages not recoverable for injury to 
feelings). Thus the loss of social stature or  the failure to acquire political identity or 
authority on the purchase of land were not compensable under traditional common 
law rules. No impenetrable barrier existed to the development of an exception to this 
rule which would recognize the kind of loss incurred on the failure of a land contract, 
but the ephemeral nature of social prestige and the risks and uncertainty inherent in 
the assessment of the value of the political attributes of land combined to nurture the 
development of property rules rather than common liability rules to protect contrac- 
tual entitlements. 
289 Supra note 288 
290 Re an Arbitration between Golomb and P&er W Co. (1931) 144 L.T. 583, at 588; Withers v 
General Theatre Corporation [ig33] 2 K.B. 536; (1933) 149 L.T. 487 (damages recovered 
for lost opportunity of enhancing and maintaining reputation); Tolnay v Critnion Film 
Productionr [1g36] 2 All E.R. 1625 (damages recovered by playwright for lost publicity). 
But see Collier v Sundny Referee Publishing Co. [igqo] 2 K.B. 647. 
29 I See Moss v Chesham Urban Dittritl Counn'l (I 945) 172 L.T. 30 1. 
292 Supra note 288 
293 Bertram v Bechtel Pmjic  Corporation Ltd. (unrep. ~6178,  Whang), cited and discussed in 
Szakats, Wrongful and unjustified dismissal: Damages and compensation, A Case for 
Reform [1g7g] N.Z.LJ. 13. 
294 [lg76] 3 All E.R. 161 
295 Ibid, at 166 
296 Tippet v Zntffnationul Typographical Union (1976). 71 D.L.R. (3d) 146, 149-150. Other 
cases evincing a liberal attitude towards non-employment subsidiary losses including 
relocation expenses and 'intangible but valuable loss of future benefits' have surfaced, 
leading one commentator to remark, insightfully, that the decisions 'run contrary to 
the principle of the employer's rights to terminate with notice'. Vos v Security Trust 
Company Limited (1969) 68 W.W.R. 310; Johnston v Northwood Pulp Ltd. (1968) 70 D.L.R. 
(2d) 15. Szakats, supra note 293, describes numerous cases decided by the New 
Zealand Industrial Court granting compensation for 'distress of mind,' 'hurt feelings,' 
'loss of dignity,' 'impairment of reputation,' and the like. 
Generally, however, Canadian courts have taken the Addis v Gramophone, Limited 
decision as gospel. See McMinn v Town of Oakuillc (1979) 85 D.L.R. (3d) 13 I .  In Abouna v 
Foothih Provincial General Hosptal Board (No. z )  (1978) 83 D.L.R. (3d) 333, the Alberta 
Court of Appeal held as follows: '[Glenerally speaking, damages are limited in the 
case of a fixed term contract to earnings which would have been made during the 
balance of the fixed term, less anything which may be the result of mitigation, or  
anticipated mitigation; or, in the case of indeterminate hiring, salary for a period 
amounting to reasonable notice. Damages for loss of reputation in a suit for wrongful 
dismissal cannot be claimed.' 
The Supreme Court of Canada, in Peso Silver Mines Ltd. (N.P.L.) v Cropper [1g66] 
S.C.R. 673; 58 D.L.R. (zd) I ,  has affirmed the Addis doctrine (per Cartwrightj, at 683-4): 
'The learned trial judge awarded the respondent $10,000 which represented the 
balance of his salary for the year ending December 16, 1964. He indicated, however, 
that he would have fixed the damages at $6,500 were it not for the circumstances of the 
respondent's dismissal, namely that the unsubstantiated allegations of impropriety 
made against him and the fact of his dismissal so shortly after Charter had taken control 
of the appellant could not fail to damage his reputation among mining men. I agree 
with Bull J.A. that the claim being founded on breach of contract the damages cannot be 
increased by reason of the circumstances of dismissal whether in respect of the 
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respondent's wounded feelings or the prejudicial effect upon his reputation and 
chances of finding another employment'. 
A case in favour of awarding compensation for intangible losses is Thurbw v Alberta 
Government Telephones 18 March 1963 (unreported), cited in Harrison, Termination of 
employment (1972) 10 Alta. L.R. 250. 
297 Yewens v Noakes (1880), 6 Q.B.D. 530 
298 See Canto1 Ltd. v Brodi Chemicals Ltd. et al. (1979) 5 B.L.R. 177; Elsley v J.G. Collins Ins. 
Agem'es Ltd. (1978) 83 D.L.R. (3d) I (s.c.c.) (imbalance of bargaining power may, in the 
negotiation of a contract of employment, lead to oppression). 
299 See Fry, supra note 5 I ,  at 2 19,386; Snell's Principles of Equity (27th ed 1973) 582; Flight v 
Bollund (1828) 4 Russ. 298; 38 E.R. 817; Cooke v Gay (1956) 4 D.L.R. (2d) 146 (N.s.s.c.); 
Pickering v Biship of Ely (1843)~ 2 Y. & c. Ch. 249; Johnson v Shrewsbuty and Birmingham 
Ry. (1853), 3 De. G.M. & G. 914. 
300 5 Eliz., c 4. The act is set out in full in Smith A Treatise on the Law of Master and Servant 
(3rd ed 1870) 505-14 The legislation was modified over the years by a number of 
statutes including 2 0  Geo. 11, c 19; 27 Geo. 11, c 6; 6 Geo. 111, c 25; 4 Geo. rv, c 29; 4 Geo. 
IV, c 34; and 10 Geo. IV, c 52; the first schedule to the Master and Servant Act, 1867, 
30 & 31 Vict., c 141, lists seventeen acts regulating employment contracts. 
301 5 Eliz., c 4, s g 
lo2 Ibid. Other sections of the act dealt with freedom of travel, certificates and testimonials 
., 
by masters confirming that the servant was not in breach of his service, the avoiding of 
contracts in contravention of the act, special rules relating to service by women, 
apprentices, and various procedural and jurisdictional issues. 
303 Ibid s 47 
304 2 0  GO. 11, C 19, S 1 
305 See R. v Hoseaton (181 I )  14 East. 605; 104 E.R. 734; Kirby v Simpson (1854) 1oExch. 358; 
156 E.R. 482. 
306 ro  Geo. 11, c 19, s 2 
307 6 Geo. 111, c 25, s I 
308 Ibid. By 32 Geo. 111, c 57, s 13 an apprentice who left his employment was liable to be 
whipped as well. 
309 After 1824 two classes of case were contemplated. One was breach of a contract 
without ever having entered upon performance; the other was breach of a continuing 
employment relationship. The difference between the two was that the former would 
not give rise to criminal liability unless it was signed by both parties. 4 Geo. IV, c 34. See 
Smith, supra note 300, at 457; R. v Lmd (1850) 12 4 . 8 .  758; 116 E.R. 1055. 
310 In 1867 the Master and Servant Act 1867, 30 & 31 Vict., c 141. consolidated some 
seventeen earlier acts and continued the enforcement of employment contracts 
through criminal sanctions. In 1875 the Conspiracy and Protection of Property Act, 
1875.38 & 39 Vict., c 13, s 5, created the offence of wilfully and maliciously breaking a 
contract of service, knowing or having reasonable grounds to believe that the 
consequences would endanger human life, cause serious bodily harm, or  expose 
valuable personal or  real property to destruction or serious injury. The Employers and 
Workmen Act, 1875.38 & 39 Vict., c go, s 3(3), expressly authorized the court to order 
performance of contracts of service, but the breach was not a criminal offence, and the 
court was one of civil jurisdiction. Ibid, ss 4,g. 
3" See R h v  Wood (185g), I L.T. (N.s.) 30; 29 L.J.M.C. I .  See also Youlev Mappin (1861) 6 H .  
& N. 753; 158 E.R. 311. 
312 Brown and Beattie C a d i a n  Labour Arbitration (1979) 64; Brown, Remedies in 
arbitration: Fidelity to labour relations, in Hickling (ed) C u m  Problem in Labour 
Arbitration 1978 (1979)~ at 169, 180-3. Recent decisions, however, cast some degree of 
uncertainty on that unequivocal opinion. See Progressive Contracting Ltd. [1g78] I 
W.L.A.C. 564 (Mazko); D o u g h  Colkge Technical and Vocational Institute (1977) 16 L.A.C. 
(2d) 139 (Munroe). 
Authority to order reinstatement is now vested in labour arbitrators in all common 
law provinces. The Labour Relations Act, R.S.O. 1970, c 232, s 37(8); the Canada 
Heinonline - -  32 U. Toronto L.J. 106 1982 
Labour Code, R.S.C. 1970, c L-I, s 157(d), as amended S.C. 1972, c 18, s I ;  The Alberta 
Labour Act, S.A. 1973, c 33, as amended, s 143(2); Labour Code, S.B.C. 1973 (2nd Sess.), 
c 122, s g8(d), as amended S.B.C. 1975, c 33, s 27; Manitoba Labour Relations Act, S.M. 
1972, c 75, s 69(6) (continuing consolidation, c LIO); Industrial Relations Act, R.S.N.B. 
1973, c 1-4, s 76(4): Labour Relations Act, R.S.N. 1970, c 191, s 26~(7)  as amended, S.N. 
1 9 7 3 , ~  107,s 2; Tradeunion Act,s.~.s. 1 9 7 2 , ~  1g,s4i(d); P.E.I. Labour Ac~,R.s.P.E.I. 
1974. c L-I, s 36(7); Trade Union Act, s.s. 1972, c 137, s 25(3). 
See Adams G7ieuance Arbitration of Discharge Cares: A Study of the Concepts of Inductrial 
Discipline and Their Results (1978); Feller, A general theory of collective bargaining 
(1972) 61 Cal. L.R. 663, at 750. 
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